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ABSTRACT  
  
The M3 theory contributes to new knowledge through original research and advanced 
scholarship by introducing a descriptive framework for strategic decision-making in 
uncertain and changing environments. Aided by the introduction of a Social Realism 
epistemology into management literature it is differentiated its ability to present 
complex strategic positions as essentialist (via modes), relative (via models), and 
dynamic (via momentum) to plot the dynamic trajectory of innovation emergence, 
change, adaptation and transformation over time. At a fundamental level, the M3 
theory identifies a consistent set of rules that decision-makers intentionally or 
unintentionally engage with or ignore to take strategic positions based on four 
integrated yet polarized pairs of modes: systematic (+S) vs. responsive (+R) 
strategies, and conforming (+C), vs. differentiating (+D) strategies.  
 
Systematic strategies (+S) is the mode dedicated to increasingly sophisticated 
rational cognitive processes; these processes plan, purposefully compartmentalize, 
and regulate emotions. Responsive strategies (+R) conversely, is the mode dedicated 
to increasingly sensitized intuitive processes; these processes are reflective, 
associative, action-orientated and emotionally expressive. The second pair of modes 
intersects with the two aforementioned modes with conforming strategies (+C) 
moving towards convergence by adapting or conveying socially perceived superior 
norms; these processes include the exploitation of existing power. In contrast, 
differentiating strategies (+D) represents the mode dedicated to diverging from 
traditional norms with empowerment for exploration. These processes include 
novelty-seeking, sabotage, risk-taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, 
and higher levels of innovation. Finally, the dynamic (momentum) component 
informs how strategic modes and models under uncertainty improve and adjust in 
sophistication under the pressure and demands of the four drives (+L). 
 
The M3 theory is informed by three distinct but interrelated and simultaneous 
empirical streams of data: (i) field data from five ethnographic case studies, with 
research participant feedback loops; (ii) the mapping of 200+ peer reviewed 
decision-making models; and (iii) prototyping the principles in the construction of 
the emergent M3 theory.  
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FOUNDATION 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1.  Introduction 
 
If science is defined as "the pursuit and application of knowledge and understanding 
of the natural and social world following a systematic methodology based on 
evidence" (Science Council, 2009), then what would be an antithesis? Could science 
also be the pursuit and understanding of the impact and response to the unknowable? 
  
Initially the objective of this thesis was to get as close as possible to that elusive 
phenomenon of emergence of strategic innovation on wicked and complex problems 
which can only be solved in collaboration with various stakeholders intentionally 
moving together. The intent was to naturalistically study the initial conditions that 
give rise to collaborations that succeed in building momentum on an initiative for 
which no precedent exist. 
 
Since the potential success of any project is unknowable or unknown at inception, 
what ultimately resulted was a hedged strategy of studying five international 
ethnographies in five different industries on the off chance one of them gains traction 
on the emergence of innovation. This five-pronged approach ultimately also yielded 
benefits and synergies beyond its intentional design to give rise to the foundation of 
an integrative descriptive theory M3 theory which offers a new epistemology for 
management literature. It offers a category spanning scaffold to practitioners and 
theorists alike to also identify lurking categorical blind spots of the unknowable and 
unknown that could hinder progress over time. 
 
First evidence of the scholarly pursuit of wrestling with this unknowable and 
unknown 'dark matter' of social sciences also aptly commenced with the introduction 
of the concept of 'epistemology' by British philosopher James Frederick Ferrier 
(1854:46). To him at the time it was not just a matter of describing the approaches 
knowledge seekers can choose from to understand our world, but he also specifically 
explored Agnoiology or 'the absence of knowledge'.  
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In Agnoiology or Theory of Ignorance, Ferrier on the one hand claimed that there 
can be an ignorance of which there can be no knowledge. On the other hand, he also 
claimed that ignorance is a defect, and argued that there is no defect in not knowing 
what cannot be known by any intelligence. Critics have trouble reconciling the two 
stances and perceive them to be contradictory. Specifically, Haldane (1899) explains 
that given these two positions it therefore stands there can be an ignorance only of 
that of which there can be a knowledge. Therefore, the knowable alone is the 
ignorable.  
 
This thesis does not perceive Ferrier’s two stances to be in contradiction. Instead, it 
illuminates an important distinction as it applies to the body of knowledge presently 
at the forefront of the inter-disciplinary academic field, Agnotology, or the study of 
Ignorance (Gross & McGoey, 2015). Compared to historic Agnoiology, the modern 
Agnotology is more narrowly concerned with the study of culturally induced 
ignorance or doubt, particularly the publication of inaccurate or misleading scientific 
data (Proctor, 1995). In the context of management studies, this distinction is 
important. As this thesis' diversified stream of empirical data will demonstrate, even 
some of the most successful, educated and respected strategic decision-makers in the 
world, when confronted with the unknown may not always have enough resources to 
differentiate between unknowables and doubt or false certainty (regardless of 
intentional social engineering or not). 
  
Through this study of strategic decision-making under uncertainty and the unknown, 
40 strategists and over 367 additional participants and actors engaged naturalistically 
in wicket problem-solving that required complex collaboration and pooling of 
resources. In five distinct ethnographies each spanning multiple years these strategic 
decision-makers made themselves open and vulnerable to being wrong so that 
emergence, change, adaptation and transformation through innovation could also be 
analysed. What emerged was the creation of new knowledge through original 
research and advanced scholarship in the construction of the M3 Theory coding 
strategic decision-making under uncertainty on the three dimensions of dominant 
modes, perceptual models and evolving momentum. 
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1.2. Background 
 
Similar to how Chester Barnard (1938) imported the term “decision-making” from 
the lexicon of public administration into management literature to include narrower 
descriptions such as “resource allocation” and “policy making,” so too this thesis 
seeks to embed “decision-making under uncertainty” into management taxonomy 
subsuming within it theories and models of ‘emerging innovation’ and ‘strategy’. 
 
‘Decision-making under uncertainty’ is distinctive from ‘decision-making’ on account 
of actor(s) choosing actions based on often imperfect observations, with unknown 
outcomes (Knight, 1921).  In 1921 Frank Knight distinguished furthermore that this 
uncertainty is unknowable, i.e. the probability of an outcome is not possible to 
determine. Uncertainty is thus the antithesis of probability, and is yet different to 
risk because risk constitutes a situation when the probability of an outcome is 
possible to calculate (or is knowable). This is thus a study of strategy and innovation 
in the wake of the unknowable. 
 
Innovation is often also viewed as the application of better solutions that meet new 
requirements, unarticulated needs, or existing market needs. This is accomplished 
through more-effective products, processes, services, technologies, or business 
models that are readily available to markets, governments and society (Maryville, 
1992). In the context of this thesis, higher levels of innovation will also be presented 
in relation to decision-making under uncertainty where deliberate and conscious 
effort is put towards opting for higher levels of uncertainty because valid arguments 
exist that systems can benefit from being optimally positioned for unexpected 
developments. 
 
‘Strategy’ is commonly framed as a process synonymous to planning (Drucker, 1974; 
Moore, 1959; Von Clausewitz, 1976; Von Newmann and O. Morgenstern, 1944; 
Glueck, 1980; Porter, 1980; 1985; Schelling, 1980). However, in the context of this 
thesis the broader context and specifically strategy’s relation to a variety of decision-
making methods will be important. Therefore, strategist and decision theorist Henry 
Mintzberg definition will be used which describes strategy as "a pattern in a stream of 
decisions" (1978). This also aligns with a more updated definition by Max 
McKeown (2011) describing strategy as "shaping the future" and is the human 
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attempt to get to "desirable ends with available means" under conditions of 
uncertainty.  
 
The emergence and evolution of strategy as a part of management studies will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter 12. One of the limitation in the evolution of 
management studies over the past century is how strategy and innovation have often 
been compartmentalized as distinct silos of information. Communicating the 
importance and value of re-integration of these concepts is an important component 
of this thesis.  
 
To achieve this higher-level holistic view, Chapter 2 breaks down the literature into 
four important categories of theories. First is the most dominant classic rational 
decision-making under uncertainty theories. These are the strongest and most 
developed scientific inquiry into the field. It also strongly aligns with natural sciences 
and positivistic lenses for inquiry. Second is the behavioural economics decision-
making under uncertainty theories. These have the second strongest basis in 
scientific inquiry and is closely aligned with social sciences. Social constructivism 
would be an example of an epistemology that closely aligns with the models that 
emerge from this category. Third is the improvisational decision-making under 
uncertainty theories. Naturalistic observation may be an example of a research lens 
especially well calibrated for inquiry here. And finally, is the consilience decision-
making under uncertainty theories. Though extensive background was conducted on 
complexity theory and how it would be a well aligned method of inquiry, this thesis 
ultimately took a more philosophical inroad on this category and sought out a more 
organically social sciences approach that ultimately also subsumes complexity theory 
within it. Data driven codes then also revealed a pattern of polarizing modes, models 
and momentum by which inter-organizational collaboration develop over time and in 
Chapter 11 an interdisciplinary set of seminal theories and models are sought out to 
articulate findings using the best available terminology, models and theories available 
on decision-making under uncertainty to date. In Chapter 12 the lens is then inverted 
as 100 of the most seminal strategy theories and models are coded according to the 
modes, models and momentum findings from the ethnographic data. 
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1.3. Analytical Framework 
 
In spite of the predominant disposition that assumes the superiority of rational 
models of strategic decision-making under uncertainty based on Nobel laureate 
awardees, business school curriculums, boards of director’s deliberations, corporate 
consulting, think tanks, and organizational management strategy communication, 
this thesis’ contribution seeks to transcends that of pure rational decision-making. As 
the G.K. Chesteron’s maxim claim in the seminal Orthodoxy: “Life is a trap for 
logicians. Its wildness lies in wait” (Chesteron, 1908: 40). And since chaos so often 
triumphs over control, even centuries worth of mathematical discoveries can only do 
so much.  
 
During the creation and interpretation process of constructing the new descriptive 
theory framework for strategic decision-making in uncertain and changing 
environments, both deductive and inductive methods of reasoning were in dialogue 
with each other. This iterative building allowed for the model to be unique in its 
ability to present complex strategic stances as both essentialist and relative, and can 
plot the dynamic trajectory of emergence, change, adaptation and transformation 
over time. Ultimately M3 offers decision-makers and collaborators a methodology 
that can be used for comparing, developing and evolving strategic stances in 
uncertain environments. M3’s practical contribution furthermore also extends to 
academia as prototyped with this thesis to offer social science, development and 
evolutionary researchers, (another type of strategic decision-makers) a new tool for 
confronting blind spots.  
 
After careful analysis of pure decision theory and its related disciplines across 
multiple fields in relation to the data that emerged, the following ‘anchor models’ 
were selected as the strongest baselines to explain the three most basic tenants of the 
new resulting integrative model at its broadest base.   
i. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tverky’s work on System I and System II 
decision making. M3 will be centrally building onto this theory by 
referring to the modes respectively as a Responsive (+R) versus 
Systematic (+S) strategies. 
ii. James G. March’s work on Exploration and Exploitation. M3 will be 
referring to these modes respectively as a Conforming (+C) versus 
Differentiating (+D) strategies. 
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iii. Nelson & Winter’s work on Evolutionary Economics moving static 
modes and models to integrate dynamic elements in strategy and 
change (+L).  
 
After the introduction of the empirical data in Part II of the thesis, Part III will 
highlight the emergent patterns of five ethnographies relative to one another. It is 
also at this point that three vivid representations of what constitute a mode, model 
and momentum will be made, as well as how the three M’s relate to one another in 
the context of strategic decision-making under uncertainty. Because the theory was 
informed by the data (as oppose to being imposed from existing literature), a detailed 
discussion highlighting the most seminal and ground-breaking contributions from 
independent and interdisciplinary fields related to decision-making under 
uncertainty is revealed in Chapter 11 once the patterns from the data is clearly 
established. However, even in the review of each of these three areas none have 
sufficient development to date to serve as a single theory that specifically address the 
emergence of different types of innovation during strategic decision-making. 
Integration of various existing theories and models are important in constructing the 
M3 theory and model.  
 
 
1.4. Research Methodology 
 
This thesis furthermore constructed and assessed the validity of the M3 theory 
informed by three distinct but interrelated and simultaneous empirical streams of 
data: 
1. field data from five ethnographic case studies, with research participant feedback 
loops; 
2. the mapping of over 200 published management frameworks and models to the 
M3 theory introduced in this thesis to review the evolution of strategic decision-
making theory; and 
3. prototyping the principles of the M3 theory during the construction of this 
doctoral thesis. 
 
Adopting and extending the epistemology of Social Realism from Sociology (Maton, 
2010), the M3 makes new theoretical contributions as it introduces management 
literature to a new epistemology for framing knowledge that is simultaneously 
  8  
essentialist, relativist and dynamic. In reference to the cubed component, three 
layers of information can simultaneously be represented in the plotting of a strategic 
position within M3. The layers are: 
I. essentialist modes – the mapping of a static categorical position within the 
wider uncertain environment; 
II. relative models – the mapping of a particular position in relation to another 
strategic stance; or 
III. dynamic momentum – the mapping of the movement of a strategic stance 
over a period of time. 
 
 
1.5.  Layout of the Thesis 
  
The thesis is structured into four main parts. In the first part the approach and 
conceptual framework for the study are established: Following this first chapter, 
chapter 2 reviews the broader literature of decision-making under uncertainty 
theories and frames it specifically around classic rationality, behavioural economics, 
improvisation and consilience. This results in a high level theoretical scaffolding in 
anticipation of the empirical data and new integrative descriptive theoretical lens of 
strategic decision-making under uncertainty that follows; chapter 3 builds on the 
methodological implications of valuing various aspects of this framework for the 
ethnographic research design. It explains how the research was conducted and the 
resulting process of conceptual development.  
 
Part II is the stream of empirical data. It details context and narrative on the five 
emerging collaborations chronicling the story of one of five emerging collaborations 
across multiple industries and follows their emergence, changes, developments, 
adaptations and transformations over the course of several years. First, in chapter 4, 
the field worker shares the eight snapshots along the journey of a group of Blue Chip 
Multi-National Corporations’ (MNC) General Counsel (C1) collaborating on a new 
way of contracting powered by a dozen of some of the most powerful companies in 
the world seeking a better way to negotiate complex contracts without breaking any 
anti-trust laws. Then, in chapter 5 the fieldworker is appointed to an elite 
international university’s revenue diversification steering committee (C2) as 
strategies for diversifying from the traditional and standard revenue model is 
explored. In chapter 6 the same field-worker embeds as a full-participant on a major 
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British metropolitan’s economic development initiative (C3) bringing diverse 
industries, stakeholders and resources together to explore social enterprise 
development support platforms as a solution to local multi-generational 
unemployment. In chapter 7 the field-worker then chronicles the development of a 
software start-up (C4) from the very moments of inception when an executive was 
laid off. Ultimately the data section concludes with chapter 8 where the same field 
worker joins the advisory board of a non-profit healthcare centre (C5) focused on 
developing solutions for integrated medicine by signing a partnership contract with 
one of the most esteemed research hospitals in the US, but struggling to find the right 
business model for scaling. 
 
The third part reviews the empirical data in the form of five collaborations’ journey to 
challenge and develop the construct of the emergent innovation per the strategic 
decision-making under uncertainty. In chapter 9 the findings focus on the primary 
data from the case studies but zoom in specifically on the most vivid circumstantial 
parallels that happen to have emerged in these specific field for analysis along three 
dimensions. Each theme has significantly broader implications but the chosen 
examples illustrates the principle most concretely. Theme A is essentialist (modes), 
and was able to delve into the broad cross-section of dominant communication 
mediums over the extended period of idea development and transformation. Theme 
B is relational (models), and as formal workshops were independently facilitated in 
each of the five ethnographies, it juxtaposed the idea development workshops in 
relation to participants and strategic-decision-makers’ projected strategic preferences. 
Theme C is the dynamic (momentum) seeking to derive insight from how different 
idea journeys evolved under philosophical and strategic stances projected by strategic 
decision-makers in the leadership. With chapter 10 the discussion of the findings in 
the three themes is brought full circle back to decision-making under uncertainty 
models and its direct implications.  
 
Finally, in part four juxtapositions between the themes and existing literature is 
brought to a head. Chapter 11 explores the best seminal theories to ascertain 
vocabulary, model and theory that best fit the phenomena witnessed. This includes 
decision-making under uncertainty scholarly contributions specifically from 
management studies but also reaches from beyond the field in a quest to confirm, or 
reconfirm the phenomena using different lenses and objectives. Chapter 12 
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specifically takes the field of management strategy’s evolution over the past one 
hundred years and codes the most seminal strategies according to the framework. 
Chapter 13 then ultimately concludes with suggested directions for further research 
and a vision for the next century of management studies utilizing the M3 Strategic 
Decision-Making under Uncertainty theory and model to illuminate the unknowable 
and unknown path forward. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1.  Introduction   
  
Decision theory is an interdisciplinary topic, studied by not only management 
scholars but also economists, statisticians, psychologists, political and social 
scientists, and philosophers (Hansson, 2005). At its fundamentals, the discipline 
breaks down in a number of dimensions. First there is programmed and non-
programmed decisions. This thesis only focuses on non-programmed decisions by 
high level strategic decision-makers and not programmed decisions by which 
strategic decision-makers inform subordinates on the policies and protocols that 
need to be conformed to. On a related dimension of certainty, risk and uncertainty, 
this thesis again takes an extreme point of view focusing specifically on uncertainty 
environments.  In progressively staged levels of ambiguity, certain environments 
refer to environments and situations with implied perfect information where all 
relevant information to the problem is known. Risk refers to environment and 
situations with implied partial information. Some of all the relevant information to 
the problem is stochastic. Uncertainty, (this thesis’ focus) is then the implied 
environment or situation with incomplete information. Some of all the relevant 
information to the problem is missing. (Taha, 1987: 428). This is commonly the 
realm in which high-level decision makers operate and specifically problem-solver 
addressing complex societal problems function. 
 
First evidence of the scholarly pursuit of decision-making under uncertainty dates 
back to before the 6th century B.C. In reviewing one such chronological table (see 
Appendix A) which integrates both western and eastern philosophies, as well as 
purposefully showcases various academic disciplines, it becomes evident that the 
theories of decision making under uncertainty has been evolving in complexity 
century after century. Many factors can be contributing to that, but what will be 
specifically explored with this thesis is a better understanding on the emergence of 
more complex strategies and innovation. As it turns out, significant similarities exist 
between dealing with the abstract concept of uncertainty and applied real-world. 
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When a variety of perspectives from different national cultures, different historical 
evolutions, different disciplinary values tackles the unknown and unknowable, the 
resulting overlay in models and frameworks illuminates interesting and similar 
dominant trends as well as offers insight into blind spots that could be explored 
better in the future with alternative theoretical lenses. 
Table 2.1 – A selection of Nobel Laureates with contributions to Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
 
Over the course of this thesis over 200 seminal frameworks and models will be 
discussed and coded at various level of detail in relation to the theory and model 
being introduced. Possibly some of the more notable amongst them will include those 
that have also been awarded with society’s esteemed Nobel Prize. For example, since 
1969 almost all the Economics Nobel Laureates have been making contributions to 
decision-making theory, and a sizable number of awardees have included 
management scholars or adjacent fields focusing specifically on decision-making 
under uncertainty as presented in Table 2.1.  
     
 
Three distinct groups of Nobel laureate theorists that will specifically be analysed in 
depth for the context of the strategic decision-making under uncertainty theory and 
model of this thesis includes:  
1. Decision-Making Modes. Two behavioural economists, Herbert A. Simon 
(1978 awardee) a management scholar that challenged the idea that 
economic rationality is followed in managerial decision-making, and 
Daniel Kahneman (2002 awardee) a psychology scholar explained some of 
the mental shortcuts used in managerial decision-making under 
uncertainty. Also from beyond the traditional scope of economics Roger 
Wolcott Sperry (1981 awardee) in the field of Medicine also made 
Year Theorist Contribution Field Theory 
2009 Elanor Ostrom Mgmt. of Common Pool Resources  Economics Consilience 
2002 Daniel Kahneman Behavioural Economics Economics Behavioural 
2001 George A. Akerlof Asymmetric Information Economics Classic Rational 
2001 A. Michael Spence Asymmetric Information Economics Classic Rational 
2001 Joseph E. Stiglitz  Asymmetric Information Economics Classic Rational 
1994 John C. Harsanyi Game Theory Economics Classic Rational 
1994 John F. Nash Jr.  Game Theory Economics Classic Rational 
1994 Reinhard Selten Game Theory Economics Classic Rational 
1993 Douglass Cecil North Institutional Change Economics Classic Rational 
1991 Ronald Harry Coase Nature of the Firm Economics Classic Rational 
1986 James M. Buchanan Jr. Public Choice Theory Economics Classic Rational 
1981 Roger Wolcott Sperry Specialization of cerebral hemispheres Medicine Behavioural 
1978 Herbert A. Simon Rational Decision-Making in Business  Economics Behavioural 
1972 Kenneth Joseph Arrow Social Choice Theory Economics Classic Rational 
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contributions with his work on how the specialization of cerebral 
hemispheres drive different types of decision-making under uncertainty. 
2. Decision-Making Models. Elanor Ostrom (2009 awardee) an 
anthropologist that define eight conditions under which collaborative 
decision-making can have an even better outcome than defaulting to 
behavioural power based models in common pool resource management. 
Most Economic discipline recipients also contribute to rational models, but 
specifically valuable to rational models collaborating under uncertainty as 
defined in this thesis, these include the three 1994 awardees for Game 
Theory, and the three 2001 awardees for Asymmetric Information. 
3. Change in Decision-Making Momentum. Kenneth Joseph Arrow (1972 
awardee), Ronald Harry Coase (1991 awardee), and Douglass Cecil North 
(1993 awardee) all also contributed under making contributions to 
understanding evolutionary methods in social science. 
 
Though this list is not intended to be exhaustive, it signals that after 47 years an 
integrative model connecting models and theories which had historically been 
presented as adversary and distributive should also be considered in an integrative 
way to possibly reconcile differences and divides -  in the spirit of the Nobel Peace 
Prize category. 
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2.2.  Decision-Making under Uncertainty Theories   
Over the course of this thesis’ development four classifications of theoretical lenses 
were permitted to provide a foundation on the existing landscape of decision-making 
under uncertainty. Though researchers (and their methodology) took sharp divides 
on ontological and epistemological components of what constitute truth all were 
accepted at the fundamental level of having made a contribution to furthering human 
knowledge in the field of decision making. The four lenses are as follow: 
 
I. Classic Rational Decision-Making under Uncertainty Theories (+Q1) – are 
concerned with making logically sound decisions by conforming to multi-step 
processes following a rational, orderly and linear path from problem 
identification through solution. These include utility functions and axioms. It 
also most closely aligns with risk decisions relative to uncertainty decisions. 
Pioneering rational decision-making under uncertainty theorists commenced 
with Blaise Pascal (1670) with his Famous Wager, and Daniel Bernoulli (1738) 
with the St. Petersburg Paradox.  
 
II. Behavioural Decision-Making under Uncertainty Theories (+Q2) – recognize 
human decision-making’s limitations with regards to available information, 
time, processing ability, and place a premium on the schemas and mental 
short cuts to prevent information overload. This includes the use of social cues 
and sensitivity to loyalty, trust and the pursuit of outcomes that satisfactorily 
are sufficient to meet a minimum qualification threshold. Pioneering 
behavioural decision-making theorists include Nobel laureate Herbert A. 
Simon (1957) who introduced the models’ central tenants of bounded-
rationality and satisficing, and Charles Edward Lindblom (1959) who 
introduced gradualism. 
 
III. Improvisational Decision-Making under Uncertainty Theories (+Q3) – is 
“bringing to the surface, testing, and restructuring one’s intuitive 
understanding of phenomena on the spot, at a time when action can still make 
a difference” (Weick, 1996: 147). In spite of findings (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), that humans are generally risk averse, purposeful decision-making 
strategies do exist where a strategic stance is taken in pursuit of higher levels 
of uncertainty. Higher levels of innovation are often at the core of these 
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strategic stances as strategic decision makers respond in real-time to changes 
and information that might not be fully anticipated. It would be synonymous 
with what is commonly referred to in music or theatre as improvisation. 
Pioneering management scholars introducing the terminology into 
management literature include Moorman and Miner (1998) and Cunha, Cunha 
and Kamoche (1999). Improvisation is also generally accepted to include 
bricolage (Lévi-Strauss, 1967; Baker et al., 2003; Garud & Karnøe, 2003), 
adaptation (Campbell, 1969; Stein, 1989) and serendipity (Merton, 2002) in 
dealing with change and ambiguity. 
 
IV. Consilience Decision-Making under Uncertainty Theories (+Q4) –are 
decision-making under uncertainty that unifies knowledge. It is the intentional 
and simultaneous process of creating and destroying something else of value 
by the same group of decision-makers. Similar to Improvisation models, a 
strategic stance of “high reward with least volatility” is left on the table, but 
specifically in Consilience Decision-Making Models this is because the chance 
of a longer-term or more important objectives are more attractive. Often the 
probability of success may be smaller, however, if successful, this strategy 
would have the capacity for an exponential impact relative to the more 
common linear and incremental innovation. And though 20/20 hindsight 
accounts of history, Hollywood and the media has mad legends out of persons 
demonstrating these outlier decisions, they remain rare and uncommon in 
bigger organizations with strong political infrastructure. There has however 
been a considerable uptake in recent years of strategy theorists contributing 
models to the development of strategic stances which are the purposefully 
pursuing solutions in uncertain and changing environments. In Management 
Studies, much of the work of Clay Christensen's (1997) Disruptive innovation2 
and Otto Scharmer's (1999) Theory U makes contributions to this quadrant. 
High-level post-conventionalism ethical decision-making (Kohlberg, 1957) 
would be another example. However, the word and philosophy originates as 
discussed in Chapter 1 outside of management studies while advocating for an 
                                                 
2 Note that there are two different types of disruptive innovation. The type where the decision-maker is 
simultaneously the creator and destroyer of some aspect of value if it a part of the Consilience model. 
The type where the decision-maker is creating value for themselves but destroying value for another 
(competitive) party the disruptive innovation would be classified as a part of the improvisation model.  
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integration of knowledge as is commonly done by innovative strategic 
decision-makers but discussed using different vocabulary. 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1.  Classic Rationality Theories (+Q1)  
 
Historically a dominant mode for framing decision-making in scholarly work had 
been classic rational decision-making. It’s systematic and structured framework as 
also made it especially prevalent in management education, consulting as well as 
framing institutional communication. In such models, decision-makers are viewed as 
rational actors who are capable of quantifying probabilities and risks in a world of 
uncertainty. Decision-making under uncertainty then by extension ends up as 
objective or subjective approximated probabilities of states or utilities as a 
consequence of viable ranges.  
 
The continuously expansive territory of classic rational decision-making under 
uncertainty theory is and has been for the past four centuries around some form of 
proxy probability measure on events, and maximizing the expectation of utility 
relative to one’s uncertainty and one’s preferences. Like its traditional rational 
decision-making counterpart models, problems are still clearly defined, extensive 
possible action alternatives are generated and their consequences are perceived as 
clear. Figure 2.1.1. provides a refresher on the Classic Rational models coded in 
relation to other strategies for decision-making under uncertainty. 
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Theory and Application 
 
Popular application examples of rational decision-making under uncertainty includes 
De Finetti ‘s Dutch book (1974), Cox and van Fraasen’s axiomatics (Cox, 1958; van 
Fraassen 1980), Joyce’s accuracy (2009), as well as Dempster-Shafer’s convex 
capabilities and non-additive probability belief functions (1976). Probablism 
encompasses Bayesian networks with its graphical models that captures probabilistic 
relationships between variables. Seminal contributions in expected utility include 
long-run optimization as well as another branch of axiomatics of Ramsey (1990). 
Popular application examples of expected utility encompass Markov decision 
processes as a method for modelling sequential problems; model uncertainty; state 
(1957). Most recently seminal contributions of probablism that involves cooperative 
decision making involving multiple interacting agents like systems for attribute-
based person search, speech applications, collision avoidance, and unmanned aircraft 
persistent surveillance (Kochenderfer, 2015).  
 
However, this thesis will not focus on the rational logic behind these theories as 
executing them merely constitutes a programed response of decision-making under 
uncertainty. In the context of this thesis it is the pursuit and understanding thought 
process behind the emergence of strategic and innovative problem solving under 
uncertainty that is the focus. Each of these mathematicians, economists and 
statisticians’ systematic and purposeful journey and approaches in generating a 
theorem or equation would thus constitute strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty in the context of the model and theory.  
 
As this rational quadrant lends itself well to objective thought process, it may also be 
one of the easier quadrants to view as standardized, quantified and measured. In 
principle, this thesis acknowledges serious limitations of standardized tests limiting 
options for true innovations when multiple choice bubble tests block out a broader 
spectrum of options and reduce noise by only providing a small amount of 
information designed to feed a specific input. However, for the purpose of empirically 
looking at how capacity for producing non-learned rational models have possibly 
changed over the past century, IQ tests are one of the better resources available. 
  
James R. Flynn was one of many researchers to study and observe IQ tests scores for 
different populations over the past century. In 1994, he famously published the fact 
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that IQ scores increased from one generation to the next for all of the countries for 
which data existed (Flynn, 1994). This was dubbed the Flynn-effect. But what made 
Flynn’s work specifically of interest to the construction and advancement of this 
thesis’s discussion on Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty model, and 
especially its context to emergence, adaptation, change and transformation is that 
Flynn was also one of the first to also engage with the data using a more of a social 
constructivist lens. 
  
There are various types and theories of intelligence, but in the context of strategic 
construction of original rational thought this thesis will anchor on specifically Fluid 
intelligence (Gf) as measure by tests like the Ravens, the Norwegian matrices, the 
Belgian Shapes test, the Jenkins test, and the Horn test. The reason for this 
specialized focus is because these tests are specifically constructed to emphasize 
problem solving and minimize a reliance on specific skills or familiarity with words 
and symbols. These tests on average have shown an increase of about 15 points or one 
standard deviation per generation (Flynn, 1994, 1987). Deary (2001) notes that it is 
these types of tests (i.e., "culturally reduced") on which we would not expect to see 
score increases if the cause of the increases was due to formal educational factors. 
  
Arguments for world-wide nutrition, genetic evolution and society changes associated 
with test teaching for "time limits" (Brand, 1981) could also not account for the 
significant differences between generations.  "The hypothesis that best fits the results 
is that IQ tests do not measure intelligence but rather correlate with a weak causal 
link to intelligence." (Flynn, 1987). Based on the presence of the effect on nonverbal 
tests such as the Raven's Matrices, Flynn believes that the increase is actually an 
increase in abstract problem solving rather than intelligence. Flynn (1994, 1999) 
favours environmental explanations for the increase in test scores. 
  
Contributing to this hypothesis that more work is necessary in understanding the 
historic and cultural context is the work of Alexander Luria (1976). He discovered 
when he tested rural Russian peasants in the 1930s, pre-scientific people can't take 
the hypothetical seriously. That is, if you pose to them questions like, "There is snow 
at the North Pole; where there is snow, bears are white; what colour are bears at the 
North Pole?" they would say, "Well, I've only seen brown bears. And only if a person 
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came from the North Pole with testimony would I believe that the bears there are 
white." 
 
Luria describes this worldview as "being addicted to the concrete world", not the 
world of hypotheticals which is especially important under uncertainty. And that of 
course has a big impact on a whole range of tests. If you look at Raven's, where the 
gains have been especially significant, the test consists of all hypothetical questions 
about symbols that are well removed from concrete reality. Another example of how 
abstract thought has changed involves classification. Luria also asked his subjects 
questions like, "What do dogs and rabbits have in common?" In 1900, a person would 
say, "You use dogs to hunt rabbits." Today you say, "They're both mammals." And 
that gets the question right. 
  
What we thus gained from the longitudinal study of society’s rational cognitive 
problem-solving is evidence of increased conforming to systematic thinking similar to 
those of intelligence test designers. In the past, people's minds were focused on 
utilitarian and responsive modes. They weren't interested in hypotheticals or in 
classifying things together as scholarly individuals do. But today the generations have 
"donned scientific spectacles." What we have is evidence of increased scientific habits 
of mind. An ability to attack a wider range of conceptual problems. The average 
person can do creative work today that they couldn't do in 1900.  
 
In the context of this thesis' focus on collaboration and emergence of innovation this 
concept that has been labelled 'generational increase in IQ' thus suggests increased 
and possibly continued capacity for systematic innovation into the future especially 
with the aid of technology, computerization and Artificial Intelligence.  
 
2.2.2.  Behavioural Theories (+Q2)  
 
A secondary, yet still dominant mode of decision-making (under uncertainty) 
analysis in scholarly work had been behavioural (economics) decision-making. Also 
known as bounded rationality this type of rationality recognizes the cognitive 
limitations restricting our information-processing capabilities that result from 
information deficiencies and over-load which compromises the decision-maker’s 
ability to engage in a classically rational process. Nobel laureate Herbert Simon (1957) 
explains that this bounded rationality is in fact the most common decision-making 
  20  
mode and frequently incorrect, but without it decision-making paralysis would be the 
most likely result. Behavioural Decision-Making models also draws on the work of 
Antonio Damasio (1999) with brain damaged individuals which demonstrates that in 
the absence of emotion it is impossible to make any decisions at all. 
 
 
 
 
The study of behavioural schemas or heuristics is traditionally more likely taught in 
the context of politics, psychology and marketing, but in recent decades it has also 
increasingly been included in more traditionally rational subject areas of finance and 
economics. Unlike Classic Rational models it does not presume rationality, fully 
informed actors, or complete certainty. There is thus no distinction between models 
classified as Behavioural Decision-making and Behavioural decision-making under 
uncertainty. Behavioural Decision-making models view decision-makers as acting 
only in terms of what they perceive about a given situation. Figure 2.1.2. provides a 
refresher on the Behavioural models coded in relation to other strategies for 
decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
 
Theory and Application 
 
Historically behavioural economic theories scholarly research has focused on the 
continually expansive dark side of behavioural decision-making that leads to 
mistakes and biases that often interfere with the quality of decision-making. Many of 
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these mistakes can be traced back to the use of heuristics. Heuristics are simplifying 
strategies or ‘rules of thumb’ used to deal with uncertainty and limited information 
common in problem situations. However, they can also lead to systematic errors that 
affect the quality and perhaps ethical implications of decisions. This includes “cold” 
cognitive bias such as mental noise (Hilbert, 2012) as well as “hot” motivational 
biases such as when beliefs are distorted by wishful thinking (Maccoun, 1998).  
 
Over the past five decades some seminal heuristics and biases have included: 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic and escalated commitment. The anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic (Northcraft & Neale, 1987) would be an example of cognitive 
bias that involves assessing and event by taking an initial value from historical 
precedent or an outside source and then incrementally adjusting to this value to make 
a current assessment. For example, decision-makers could be leaving money on the 
table in situations where cost-plus pricing strategies are used when there is a unique 
point of differentiation no relationship between a product/service’s value in the 
market and what it costs to produce it. If information about the cost is not 
intentionally withheld, at least initially, a pricing decision-maker is more inclined to 
skew their price recommendation closer to the production cost or anchor amount.  
 
An example of a flawed motivational heuristic could be reflected in the popular adage 
“if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.’ If instead of backing off on a decision that 
was previously made under less certain conditions and results in a decision-maker 
getting entrapped and dismissing information to change a course of action, this could 
constitute escalating commitment. This includes continuing and renewing efforts on 
a previously chosen course of action even though it is not working (Staw, 1981). An 
example of this would be when a new decision-maker hired from outside the 
organization turns a losing cause into a winning one because the new strategist is not 
emotionally vested and more capable of disentangling ego and reputation than an 
entrapped decision-maker unable to separate personal affect from evidence of failure. 
 
2.3.3.  Improvisational Theories (+Q3) 
 
Improvisation Theories is not commonly associated with strategic decision-making 
under uncertainty literature and a part of this thesis aspires to theoretically and 
empirically confirm or refute the relation to the more generally accepted classic 
(rational) and rational decision making theories. Improvisation has been introduced 
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empirically into the management studies lexicon by Moorman & Miner (1998) and 
Cunha, Cunha & Kamoche (1999), but this study is the first to frame it in the context 
 
 
 
of strategic decision-making under uncertainty models, and specifically as it 
categorically relates to classic rational and behavioural models. Derived from 
performing arts improvisation, the pronoun ‘improvisational’ is most commonly 
associated with a prolific expert in an artistic genre such jazz, rap, comedy, or public 
speaking capable of thinking on their feet fusing pre-planned objectives and routine 
with responsive information that was unknowable many moments before their 
execution of something novel. Often this type of decision-making brings delight to 
both the audience and the artist because the experience is custom created for that 
specific moment and is not likely to be replicated in the same way ever again. 
Similarly, in management studies Miner et al., (2001: 314) succinctly describes 
improvisation as "the deliberate and substantive fusion of the design and execution of 
a novel production.” Figure 2.1.3. provides a refresher on the Improvisation models 
coded in relation to other strategies for decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
Improvisation vs. Classic Rationality  
 
Crossan & Sorrenti (1997), Ciborra (1999) and Alterhaug (2004) references 
improvisation as a form of inferior action that occurs when planning breaks down, 
indicating that improvisation is action without preparation or plan.  This is possible, 
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however in the context of strategic decision-making under uncertainty this limited 
frame is not capturing the full potential of improvisation sought out empirically in the 
context of his thesis. It is however a valuable starting point for relationally unpacking 
opposites and extremes.  
 
Schon (1989, 1991) expresses a valuable starting point for discussing both an opposite 
and extreme with his claim that the main characteristic of ‘modern management 
thinking’ on strategy to be technical rationality (TR). Up until this point in history, 
decision-making theories have indeed moved beyond the assertion that technical 
rationality is the only utility function in socio-cognitive strategy, but for the time, 
Schon’s assertion that technical rationality was (and still is) a dominant and 
extremity point in the arena of classic rational strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty will not be contested by this thesis. Technical rationality is a rule-bound 
form of action that strictly follows an administrative model or procedure. This 
involves corporality, in which all processes are planned and rational. To work 
optimally, it assumes a high level of stability or insulation from external factors.  
 
On a continuum, the polar opposite to technical rationality decisions would thus be 
spontaneity which Bergson (1944) describe as an unbreakable tie between a living 
body and a present-in-the becoming (as presented in Figure 2.6). Improvisation 
models as an aggregate can thus be described on this continuum as more rule-bound 
relative to spontaneity with some administrative models and procedures in place, but 
breaking the rules where it sees fit. Improvisation does however align closer with 
spontaneity (as opposed to technical rationality) in that responsive modes (as oppose 
to rational systematic modes) dominate the strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty. To work optimally, improvisation thus assumes a lower level of stability 
and in a competitive landscape assumes superior abilities to strategically harness 
(unexpected) external factors.  
 
 
Improvisation vs. Bounded Rationality 
 
After the counterpoint review of technical rationality and spontaneity it becomes 
unequivocal that the phenomena of improvisation are more aligned with 
responsiveness as opposed to systematic strategy modes. One may even go as far as to 
challenge Crites, (1971) and Purser & Petranker (2005)’s opinion that improvisation 
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is "thinking" in the present on the present. The time-bound component may be 
relatively true, however, in comparison to technical rationality, is it possible that 
what improvisation really entails is more of a “feeling and acting” than a "thinking 
and acting"? And if so how would the extreme responsive and controlled feeling be 
different from the extreme responsive and differentiating? 
 
A couple of clues can help theoretically distinguishing between behavioural and 
improvisation models. First and most important are findings include that of 
Kahneman and Tversky, (1979), that humans are generally risk averse. The generality 
of this risk aversion is important because even thought their findings suggest most 
situations would statistically be prone to favour decisions where uncertainty and 
ambiguity can be minimized, outliers and example of differentiators will exist. These 
outliers should not be neglected because their actions stand to have big impact. 
 
A second key concerns once again drawing upon insight derived from referencing 
spontaneity as an extreme example. In a more recent publication Dehlin (2013: 237) 
describes improvisation as “cemented in the everyday mash of spontaneity, creativity, 
emotionality, irreversibility and sociality.” To him it is spontaneous and 
hermeneutical sense making via external action. Of the descriptive words he used, 
most applies to responsiveness. However, two words stand out as not readily aligning 
with conforming or differentiating. ‘Sociality’ aligns better with conforming as 
opposed to differentiating, and ‘creativity’ aligns stronger with differentiating 
compared to conforming. It can thereby be derived that spontaneous responses that 
conforms to social expectations would more likely be behavioural decision models, 
whereas creative spontaneity may have stronger internal, physiological emotional 
desires to seek out novelty or be contrarian.  
 
 
Theory and Application 
 
This thesis recognizes that historically technical rationality has been perceived to be 
at the centre of the strategy universe, but is working on increasing the body of 
empirical evidence that expansions on this framework is needed. Some of the best 
work produced up until now on improvisation include specifically recognizing the 
strategic value that can be derive from uncertainty. This includes:  
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• Vera and Rodriguez-Lopez (2007) both offer low structuration and 
improvisation as good compliments to planning. 
• Baker et. al (2003) describes it as the convergence of design and execution 
phases. 
• Moorman and Miner (1998) suggest that there are cases when the composition 
and execution of an action converge in time so that, in the limit, they occur 
simultaneously.  
• Hmielesky & Corbett (2006) reports the complimentary nature in a new 
product development case study.  
• MacCormack, Verganti & Iansiti (2001) explains where there is both an 
increasing need of combined flexibility and efficiency, planning plays a central 
role.  
• Stockstrom & Herstatt (2008) noted that preliminary planning's positive 
influence on project achievement but also that it may become a constraint in 
reacting to changes - which is supposed to be improvisations' forte.  
 
Also, in addressing prospect theory’s empirical evidence from controlled experiments 
that decision-makers are generally risk-averse (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and 
that ambiguity and uncertainty are not pleasant long-states to exist in without 
resolution, this thesis calls for the exploration of outliers. In understanding the 
deviance samples of strategic decision-making entrepreneurs, engineers, artists, 
scientists that do not conform (sometimes at great peril) but seek to explore new 
boundaries great contributions could be made to strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty. One of the easiest starting points would involve integrating theories and 
models from innovation into the strategic decision-making under uncertainty 
knowledge base.  
 
2.2.4.  Consilience Theories (+Q4) 
 
Consilience models are the fourth and final category of strategic decision-making 
under uncertainty this thesis seeks to investigate in conjunction with the established 
models. Unlike Improvisation models there is no single word uniting the models and 
theory in management literature at this time. The first scholar to propose the concept 
in relation to dealing with the epistemological framing for dealing with knowledge 
was British philosopher William Whewell in 1840 who defined ‘consilience of 
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inductions’ as a process that takes place when induction, obtained from once class of 
facts coincides with an induction obtained from another different class. Thus, 
consilience is a test of the truth of the theory in which it occurs (Whewell, 1840: 74). 
 
 
 
In the context of Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty, Consilience Models 
are thus not perfect confluence of knowledge alignment models but rather 
collaborative problem-solving vehicles where different vantage points are considered 
an asset. Traditional power models perceive differentiation as a liability, noise, waste 
that needs to be ‘corrected’ with traditional hierarchal power, social conformity, 
waste management that induces stakeholders to conform. Consilience seeks to build 
and manage the platforms where such differences can be an asset during strategic 
decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
Some of the changes in society that highlights the importance of this quadrant is that 
decision-makers are facing a new kind of challenge that did not exist half a century 
ago. Specifically, in management barriers of entry is continuously lowered, a glut of 
information streams is demanding attention, as well as the various waves of 
disruptive change has the capacity to redefine the context of organizations and 
markets. One wave has to do with the rise of the Internet based “new” economy and 
its driving force, the process of digitization (Castells, 1998; Kelly 1998). A second has 
to do with the rise of new relational patterns and their underlying driving forces: the 
processes of globalization (of markets, institutions, products), mass customization (of 
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products, people, and their careers), and increasingly networked structures and web 
shaped relationship patterns (Castells, 1996). Responding to newer types of 
challenges thus introduces the need for more complex solution systems and a longer 
time-horizon vision (+S). 
 
Using specifically strategy theory and models, innovative Consilience decision-
models will be compared and contrasted with each of the other three models to clarify 
Consilience models as a distinct category of strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty that this thesis seeks to empirically capture. Figure 2.1.4. provides a 
refresher on the Consilience models coded in relation to other strategies for decision-
making under uncertainty. 
 
 
Consilience vs. Classic Rationality Theories and Models 
 
Looking at Consilience decision-making as categorically different from classic 
rationality decision-making theories it may be most useful to start with similarities. 
Graphic representations highlight their adjacent approximations and the fact that 
both share a systematic drive towards progress, development and evolution. However, 
where classic rationality conforms to replicating best practices and thought processes 
that can be internally controlled, Consilience decision-making models ventures into 
high-risk and uncertain territories, crossing boundaries and maximizing potential for 
creativity.  
 
Drawing from negotiation strategy theories may be especially helpful in illuminating 
the difference in approach and possible outcomes to strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty. On the one hand is Distributive Negotiation which focuses on positions 
staked out or declared by the parties involved, each of whom is trying to claim certain 
proportions of the available pie. On the other hand, is Integrative negotiation or 
principled negotiations. This approach focuses on the merits of the issues, and the 
parties involved trying to enlarge the available pie rather than stake claims to certain 
portions of it (Fisher and Ury, 1983). 
 
It is also ultimately the work of innovation researchers that provides the best insight 
into illuminating the details of this category in discussion of ‘lower-risk strategic 
innovation’ and ‘higher-risk strategic innovation’ as decision-makers decide where 
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and how to invest their time and energy for what they perceive to be the best return. 
In a two-part discussion of Pisano’s (2015) Innovation Landscape map (Figure 2.2) 
the first part will focus specifically on which he refers to as “innovation that requires 
new technical competencies.”  
 
 
 
 
Pisano labels innovation that conforms to an existing business model but 
systematically seeks to improve the technology to solve problems as radical 
innovation. A significantly more glamorous term than ‘classic rationality’ or 
‘technical rationality’ which we also commonly used, but still driving at the same 
points. Here the challenge is purely technological. The emergence of genetic 
engineering and biotechnology in the 1970s and 1980s as an approach to drug 
discovery, is an example. Established pharmaceutical companies with decades of 
experience in chemically synthesized drugs faced a major hurdle in building 
competences in molecular biology. But drugs derived from biotechnology were a good 
fit with the companies’ business models, which called for heavy investment in R&D, 
funded by a few high-margin products. 
  
What makes the classic rational innovation (or radical innovation) different from the 
Consilience innovation (or architectural innovation) is that the latter simultaneously 
takes on technological and business model challenges simultaneously. An example is 
digital photography. For companies such as Kodak and Polaroid, entering the digital 
world meant mastering completely new competences in solid-state electronics, 
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camera design, software, and display technology. It also meant finding a way to earn 
profits from cameras rather than from “disposables” (film, paper, processing 
chemicals, and services). As one might imagine, architectural innovations are the 
most challenging for incumbents to pursue. 
 
 
Consilience vs. Behavioural Theories and Models 
 
Both Consilience and Behavioural decision-making strategic stances are concerned 
with the human collective as opposed to more inward facing individualist forms of 
innovation. And as this collective is concerned with innovation and strategic decision-
making under uncertainty it ultimately boils down to power. The British philosopher, 
Bertrand Russell, defined power simply as the ability to produce intended effects 
(1986). But how the two different strategic stances go about harnessing and 
channelling power is significantly different.  
Old Power Values New Power Values 
Managerialism, institutionalism, 
representative governance 
Informal, opt-in decision making; 
self-organization, networked 
governance 
Exclusivity, competition, authority, 
resource consolidation 
Open source collaboration, crowd 
wisdom, sharing 
Discretion, confidentiality, separation 
between private and public spheres 
Radical transparency 
Professionalism, specialization Do-it-ourselves, “maker culture” 
Long-term affiliation and loyalty, less 
overall participation 
Short-term, conditional affiliation; 
more overall participation 
               Table 2.2 – Old Power and New Power values (Heimans and Timms, 2014) 
 
Hermans & Timms (2014) identifies two types of power. They equate old power to a 
currency. It is held by few. Once gained, it is jealously guarded, and the powerful have 
a substantial store of it to spend. It is closed, inaccessible, and leader-driven. It 
downloads, and it captures. New power, on the other hand, operates differently. It is 
more like a current. It is made by many. It is open, participatory, and peer-driven. It 
uploads, and it distributes. Like water or electricity, it’s most forceful when it surges. 
The goal with new power is not to hoard it but to channel it.  
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As pictured in Figure 2.3 relaying this old and new power can be expressed in both 
business models and values. To maintain simplicity in contrasting Behavioural and 
Consilience decision-making models, only the purest form of old power (pertaining to 
both values and business models) and new power (pertaining to both values and 
business models) will be unpacked.  
 
Herman & Timms (2014) labels the quintessential combination of old business 
models and values as Castles. US President Obama, the ruler of the free world’s 
pragmatic politics can be categorized as a Castle because the presidency traditionally 
has a strategy of exclusivity and has executive powers to legislate certain types of 
policies from the top down. It is also renowned for secrecy and aggressive protection 
of information. Fascist dictators would be an even more extreme version of old power. 
This high level of control wielded by the top strategic decision-makers thus results in 
pressure to conform and especially in the US a kneejerk responsiveness to like or 
dislike a policy not based on careful systematic study of its content, but a bias party 
affiliation predisposition causes for it to traditionally operate under a responsive 
modes of strategic socio-cognition. 
 
Likewise, the quintessential combination of new business models and values is 
labelled Crowds. Using the example of President Obama before he came to formal 
power his record breaking campaign was also Consilience by leveraging the power of 
Old Power Values 
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the crowd when it came to campaign donations and grassroots efforts. This is where 
established peer-driven players, like Wikipedia, Etsy, and Bitcoin, and newer sharing-
economy start-ups, like Lyft and Sidecar would be categorized. This quadrant also 
includes distributed activist groups and radically open education models. Based on 
these innovators’ break from traditional power that diverges and the capacity to 
quadratically scale.  
 
 
Consilience vs. Improvisation Theories and Models 
 
Both Consilience and Improvisation Models are thus on the differentiation and 
exploration side of innovative strategic decision-making under uncertainty. Both 
thriving strategically under higher levels of uncertainty. The model’s ‘textbook 
answer’ for how each occupy opposite ends of the same continuum thus boils down to 
Improvisation being the more responsive category and Consilience the more 
systematic and hyper rational category of strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty. 
 
Apart from often relating improvisation to planning, improvisation is also often 
related to time (Moorman & Miner, 1995; Vera & Crossan, 2004; Weick, 1993; 
Crossan, Cuhna, Vera & Cunha, 2005). The next question would then be, if 
illuminating the differences between Improvisation and Consilience’s disposition 
towards time can be observed? Here it is especially important to distinguish between 
different ways time can be viewed (e.g. objectively, subjectively, event horizons.) In 
this specific instance, we are contrasting the definition of time referred by its most 
common application as defined by Lee & Liebenau as:  
“Homogenous and divisible in structure, linear and uniform in its flow, objective and 
absolute, that is, existing independent of objects and events, measurable (or 
quantifiable), and as singular, with one and only one ‘correct time’” (Lee & Liebenau, 
1999: 1037)  
 
For disambiguation, clock-time is distinct from machine-time defined by computing 
capacities (Adams, 1995), social-time define by unbounded field of dure´e and kairos 
(Jaques, 1982), epochal-times defined by events (Bluedorn, 2002).  
 
With respect to clock-time the research, Crossan, Cunha, Vera & Cunha’s (2005) 
resulted in a 2 x 2 matrix pictured in Figure 2.4 A. Having already established that 
relatively to conforming strategies, differentiating strategies operates under 
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conditions of higher uncertainty, and that the highest possible clock-time pressure 
would result in spontaneous physiological improvisation, and spontaneous social 
responses in bounded rationality, we can deduct the rest as depicted in Figure 2.4. 
 
 
 
The term Full-scale improvisation in the context of this figure would be a scenario 
characterized by physiological spontaneity (as opposed to social spontaneity) and 
high creativity. It strongly aligns with what we have referred to as the baseline for 
improvisation. In this extremity, it would be the most challenging strategic stance 
because it makes planning impossible when time is scarce and the environment is 
undecipherable.  These circumstances characterize crisis situations and rapidly 
changing environments. Firms that persist in planning under these conditions find 
themselves frustrated by the simultaneous pressure to act and the inability to 
understand what is going on around them (e.g., Roux-Dufort & Vidaillet, 2003). Once 
strategic decision-makers select the improvisation strategic stance, (Weick, 1998a: 59) 
characterize the next steps as “wading into situations with fallible knowledge, secure 
in the belief that they can recombine that knowledge by shifting their fallibilities 
around. Faith in their ability to ‘make do’ infuses confidence into their balance of 
knowledge and doubt.”  
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As a point for quality control reference, the term Ornamental Improvisation is the 
context of this figure would then be a scenario characterized by social spontaneity (as 
opposed to physiological spontaneity) and low creativity. It strongly aligns with what 
we have referred to as the baseline for behavioural models. It is one of the more 
common strategic stances often embodied by followers. The word Ornamental used 
in this context to describe improvised behaviour that results from minor adjustments 
to a routine (Moorman & Miner, 1998b; Preston, 1991; Weick, 1998b). The 
environmental cues are clear, and firms need only structure their response quickly. 
High spontaneity and a strong influence of prior routines and experience. Moorman 
and Miner (1995) provide examples of this scenario when they describe how product 
development teams improvise new marketing campaigns in response to clients’ or 
competitors’ feedback on previous efforts.  
 
Neither of the ornamental or full-scale improvisation discussions are fundamentally 
adding new knowledge or awareness to the concepts that this thesis is labelling 
improvisation or behavioural strategic models and theories. Nor would discussing 
explicitly how ‘planning’ aligns with Technical Rationality or classic rational decision-
making under uncertainty. That point has been made and discussed thoroughly to 
this point. However, seeing the concepts reappear and making sense in its 
descriptions and relational comparative qualities (even when different keywords are 
used) do serve as independent affirmation when theorist from different fields 
converge and agree while pursuing different goals and using vocabularies. Where the 
Crossan, Cunha, Vera and Cunha (2005) does however make fundamental 
contributions is in the context of ‘discover improvisation’ or what this model is 
referring to as a consilience strategic decision-making stance. 
 
Per Crossan, Cunha, Vera and Cunha (2005) another common improvisational 
scenario is that of “discovery improvisation,” in which uncertainty, not time, is the 
problem. However, even if there is time for it, systematic planning comparative to 
that of technical rationality is unlikely to occur. The reason is because there is too 
little or too much information. So, instead of planning and then acting, decision 
makers do a different type of ‘improvisation’. Here the decision makers rely on a low 
level of spontaneity or responsiveness, so the processes are predominantly systematic. 
However, what makes this systematic approach different from its planning rich 
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counterpart is that in the context of strategy it still constitutes a high level of 
creativity, and a rich combination of past knowledge. 
 
In the context of Consilience, strategic stances decision-makers act first and then 
make retrospective sense of their experience in order to act again. This type of 
decision-making often occurs in product development experiments, especially with 
software and pharmaceutical drugs. Experiments usually involve an iterative cycle of 
steps to design, build, run, and analyse (Thomke, 1998). But as environmental 
turbulence increases, these steps start to overlap and occur simultaneously (e.g., 
Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Iansiti, 1995; Leonard, 1995). One of the most famous 
commercial examples of this may be the development of the Postit® note (Peters & 
Waterman, 1982). Using a “failed” glue to make temporary placeholders on sheet 
music demonstrates great creativity. In this example, there was a low level of 
spontaneity, low time pressure, and a high degree of uncertainty regarding the 
application and commercialization of the product—processes that required decision-
makers to take actions and learn from the outcomes.  
 
 
Theory and Application 
 
Ultimately the theories connecting back to consilience models and theories are the 
most disjointed. This is partially due to its complex collective nature as it pertains to 
decision-makers and stakeholders when traditional power structures cannot be 
assumed. The strategic decision-maker’s point of view and time-horizon is thus 
paramount. Take for example the concept of disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997) 
defined as a process by which a product or service takes root initially in simple 
applications at the bottom of a market and then relentlessly moves up market, 
eventually displacing established competitors. Taken from the Consilience strategic 
decision-maker(s) point of view, the time-horizon would be long and most likely 
involves the strategic decision-maker taking the risk of intentionally cannibalizing its 
own market with a new technology because as time goes by it has capacity to produce 
technology cheaper and more accessible market solutions while pursuing a new wider 
market. Though a revenue streams may be associated with this, a decision to take this 
strategic risk may also be in service of protect the higher end market from competitor 
entry. In the case of technology quadratic scaling is likely to be involved for example 
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if the strategic decision-makers at the helm of Britannica Encyclopaedias also 
launched Wikipedia.  
 
However, it is important to recognize that for the purpose of this strategic decision-
making under uncertainty thesis there are two distinct classifications of disruptive 
innovation. The most commonly framed type (also illustrated above) is if strategic 
decision-makers are transferring existing solutions from one market to a new 
unrelated market. This is more likely to be considered to be improvising decision-
making which may also include imitators, patent trolls or purchasers of an orphan 
technology. Commercially this happens when start-ups like Netlix tries to compete 
with Blockbuster by sending DVDs though the mail, and Uber tries to compete with 
traditional taxi services by introducing a two-sided market app. This second type of 
disruptive innovation is more likely to occur when strategic decision-makers 
calculatedly risk cannibalizing their own market with a new technology and model. 
Here the more mature Netflix’s decision to pursue streaming video after successfully 
launching in the mailed DVD model, and later again the same type of decision was 
made to pursue original content production in conjunction with the streaming video.  
 
New technological paradigms seldom spring full-blown from the minds of their 
inventors, and when they do, as in the case of Arthur Clarke’s vision of 
communications satellites, the visionary is unlikely to be the person who makes the 
technological dream come true especially as complexity and uncertainty increases. 
This does however happen as in the case with Intel and the low-end microprocessor 
as well as Netflix moving from mail order to streaming services over the past two 
decades. 
 
 
2.3.  Conclusion 
 
Ultimately each of the four discussed categories of decision-making under 
uncertainty theories and models is shooting roots not only in management literature, 
but also appear to be growing in adjacent fields concerned with decision-making 
under uncertainty. In some instances, the vocabulary is shared but in some in others 
it appears to have sprouted from unrelated origins. Fundamentally it however 
appears to converge on very similar principles with shared themes. Each of the four 
quadrants have produced and fruitfully verified extensive variations of models and 
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proven their unique contributions to the field of knowledge (all be it in more isolated 
categories and under keywords not central to decision-making). 
 
What is however novel being two things: i) first there is an overlay of these models in 
relation to the aforementioned core drives; and ii), the integration of models to the 
right of the y-axis more commonly associated with innovation (as oppose to 
decision-making) while the models towards the left of the y-axis more commonly 
associated with decision-making (as opposed to innovation) is within this taxonomy 
classified in relation to each other on a single continuum. 
 
These two novel contributions combined are especially valuable in the context of this 
thesis as it extends a greater overarching theory with nested models in informing the 
broader point of view on decision-making under uncertainty and ultimately paves the 
way for a next iteration on the construction of the resulting strategic decision-making 
under uncertainty model. 
 
Finally, in linking the decision-making drives and decision-making and innovation 
combination models to the concept of emergence, change, adaptation and 
transformation, yet further integration of management concepts will be needed. For 
the purpose of this model the academic literature base of change management and 
strategy will be the core important contributors to evolve the strategic decision-
making under uncertainty theory and model to yet another level of sophistication. 
In the next chapter a research methodology will be discussed that is capable of 
integrating as much of these different theoretical lenses as possible in a meaningful 
and synergistic way. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, METHODS, AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction   
 
As has been gradually emerging from chapter 2’s theoretical lenses (and even more 
vividly in retrospect) gathering data on systematic aspects of strategic socio-cognition 
was not going to be good enough. In gathering empirical data on strategic decision-
making under uncertainty, space needs to intentionally be created for the unexpected 
and dealing with unforeseen elements in real-time. It was thus imperative to design a 
methodology that is capable of picking up unexpected peripheral data that was not ‘in 
the plan.’ 
 
In the terminology of the dominant theories, the descriptive framework needed to be 
able to integrate both rationality and behavioural, both qualitative and quantitative. 
This expectation also started to limit the types of viable research methodologies. And 
considering that the initial research question focusing specifically on how the ideas 
emerges, develops, changes, adapts and transforms over times the methodology 
needed to be robust in the type of data that it included for consideration. Chapter 3 
unpacks the research methodology, methods and analysis used in the construction, 
verification and refinement of the M3. 
  
 
 3.2.  Methodological Principles and Research Design       
  
A central premise in selecting the best methodological principles to facilitate model 
construction revolved around the fact that to truly allow social realism an opportunity 
to emerge from the ground up in management research, it needed to not be too 
narrow an approach. Specifically, the research methodology needed to allow a 
researcher to work on integrating multiple theories. To that criterion Blalock (1991) 
offers a clear and definitive path: qualitative research. His argument being, that the 
deductive nature of quantitative processes forces the researcher to work within a 
single theory rather than to challenge or extend it.  
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3.2.1.  The Extension on the Choice of Qualitative Research       
  
Bryman’s (1993) discussion of qualitative research also illuminates the weakness of 
qualitative research that needs to be proactively addressed in the context of this 
specific thesis. He defines qualitative research as an approach concerned with the 
social world, and looks to explain and analyse the culture and behaviour of [persons], 
from the point of view of thesis being studied. Yet in the construct of social realism 
there remains a need for also considering the objective functions of absolute truth as 
distinctive from relative truth. To this challenge Maton (2010) Young (2011) asserts 
that epistemologically social realism does not preclude qualitative research from also 
including objective quantitative measures. Minchiello et al (1990) furthermore 
distinguished between the Conceptual and Methodological choice of qualitative and 
quantitative research.  Methodologically this thesis ultimately choses to rely on a bold 
and expansive, yet robust methodological approach that is also no less of a systemic 
than quantitative research (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Eldabi et.al., 2002). 
 
Eldabi et al’s (2002) and many others’ assertion that the contextual understanding of 
qualitative research providing a systematic, empirical strategy for answering 
questions about people in their own bounded social context, yet the direct and in-
depth pursuit of knowledge of a research setting or set culture still provides some 
limitations in the context of inter-organizational collaborations where the lines of the 
Bourdieu ’s (1997) subject ‘field’ is more blurred. In many respects during idea 
development in the context of inter-organizational deliberations new rules of the 
game gets drawn up in the process of collaborating. The researcher and strategic 
decision-maker (participant) in such a context thus have a similar learning curve 
stepping into a new working culture. 
 
The advantage of viewing behaviour is context of a social setting does however seem 
to provide a greater depth of understanding, allowing greater flexibility. This is also 
important as decision-making locals move around and increasingly information 
technology become a social setting in which ideas conceived and developed. Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) furthermore claim that qualitative methods can give the intricate 
details of phenomena that are not easy to express with quantitative methods. In this 
specific thesis, however both qualitative and quantitative representation are needed 
to make progress on complex concepts. 
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This specific thesis strives to further the growing recognition that a ‘holistic real-
world answer to real world problems’ is the way, but unlike Newman (1991) and 
Tesch’s (1990) claims, this thesis does not preclude quantitative context from also 
proving necessary context.  
 
What is however a concern being that Qualitative methods produce a wealth of 
detailed data on a small number of [phenomena] (Patton, 1991). Generally speaking, 
Glaser & Strauss' (1967) solution is to focus the qualitative research on that which is 
usually the most "adequate" and "efficient" way to obtain the type of information 
required, while contending with the difficulties of an empirical situation. 
   
The fact that qualitative research takes a less planned approach (Eldabi et al, 2002) is 
ultimately one of the most important and attractive qualities in the context of 
naturally researching decision-making under uncertainty. The fact that it has more of 
a preference towards judgmental and expert knowledge rather than hard data is less 
attractive. In this thesis, extensive effort will be put forth to patch the holes of 
qualitative research with quantitative supporting materials across the multitude of 
case studies. Also, formal logic of deductive reasoning combined with induction will 
be used to explore categorical, relative as well as dynamic trajectory patterns to 
inform model, and theory development of strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty, as well as practical application in management and research. 
  
                      
3.2.2.   Research Paradigm       
                       
A second implication of using qualitative rather than quantitative research as a 
keystone in the development of the strategic decision-making under uncertainty 
model concerns directing effort towards descriptive versus prescriptive model 
building (Brazerman, 2006). 
 
Prescriptive models (or normative models) provide mathematical models that help 
decision-makers act more rationally by developing and proving methods for making 
optimal decisions which takes an omnipotent decision-making scientist and creator 
with controlled and designed experimental conditions, this specific thesis would not 
be able to make a strong direct contribution to prescriptive models during this 
specific thesis. It would however seek advance and explore knowledge to inform 
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future such models as the theory construct is indeed built upon positivist principles of 
decision-making. But in its primarily qualitative design this would entail more of a 
supportive contribution. 
 
Conversely, building a descriptive model (or positive model building) for decision-
making under uncertainty also considers the bounded ways in which decisions are 
actually made (Bazerman, 2006: 6-7). It entails decision theory concerned with 
describing observed behaviours under the assumption that the decision-making 
agents are behaving under some consistent rules. Highly regarded descriptive 
decision-making models have been especially successful in making sense of the gaps 
in rational models. To name just a few, game theory decision-making pioneers’ Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) used descriptive model building axioms with 
behavioural violations of the expected utility hypothesis to produce the Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, Laibson (1997) used an explicitly functional form of 
time-inconsistent utility functions to produce his Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting. 
Amos Tversky's (1972) used consistent behavioural rules to derive a procedural 
framework for his Elimination by Aspects Model.  
  
  
3.2.3.   Epistemology and Ontology 
  
Within the research paradigm of qualitative descriptive models, a valuable next level 
of clarification can be derived from also addressing epistemology and ontology (Guba, 
1990). Both concerned with the philosophy of knowledge, epistemology answers 
“How does one know?”, while ontology is about describing things and their 
relationships to answer the question: "What is used to know?"  
 
Epistemology 
 
Epistemology thus describes the approaches we can chose to understand our world. 
As established in Chapter 2 an important contribution this thesis is attempting to 
make to management literature is the introduction of social realism as a viable 
epistemology that combines essentialist and relativist philosophies of knowledge.  
 
Social realism builds on the ‘field’ theories of Pierre Bourdieu (1994, 1996) and ‘code’ 
theory of Basil Bernstein (1977, 1990), and emerged from discussions among a range 
of sociologists in the field of education in the late 1990s and early 2000. (Maton & 
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Moore, 2010). It highlights knowledge as the basis of education as a social field of 
practice arguing that the choice between essentialism and relativism is false: we can 
say that knowledge is historically and socially situational and shaped by struggles 
among social groups without saying this also means knowledge is equal and its status 
is merely a reflection of social power. Social realism acknowledges that knowledge 
changes and is shaped by relations of power but maintains that this is not the whole 
story. Not all knowledge claims are equal - some are more epistemologically powerful 
and offer better explanations than others (Moore, 2009). Exploring the collective 
procedures whereby judgments of the comparative value of knowledge claims are 
made by academics or teachers has thus been a central and ongoing focus of social 
realist research. 
  
This thesis makes the case that the social realist principles of collective construction 
on knowledge claims can also be applied outside the field of education. Especially 
relevant to management studies it especially offers value in constructing a vocabulary, 
framework and research tools for gaining insight on emergent innovation. Social 
realism claims that different forms of knowledge have effects for intellectual practices: 
knowledge may be social but it is also real. Against knowledge-blindness afflicting 
existing accounts of social change more generally, social realism brings the forms 
taken by knowledge into view and an excellent vehicle for demonstrating that would 
be emergent innovation.  
 
A central (and first) example of a social realist framework is Legitimation Code 
Theory (LCT) (Maton, 2013). LCT is less a set of claims about the nature or purpose 
of knowledge and more a conceptual toolkit for research. The framework allows 
research to get beneath the surface features of empirical situations to explore their 
organizing principles or 'codes'. A useful analogy is to think of the genetic code that 
lies behind all our differences and similarities such as height, weight and so on. LCT 
aims to get at the genetic code of practices, in order to reveal the fundamental 'rules 
of the game' or basis of achievement ('legitimation') of different contexts, the way 
they develop over time, what they enable or constrain, and how they relate to the 
dispositions actors bring to those contexts. Strategic Decision-Making under 
Uncertainty Model codes are thus the second theory to emerge out of the social realist 
epistemology and the first in the discipline of Management Studies. 
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Ontology 
 
Building onto the epistemology that a dichotomous relationship need not exist 
between knowledge being simultaneously absolute and relative, the philosophical 
position of the ontology then presses forward on what is the nature of reality. Buber 
(1958), an existentialist, espouses the belief that people cannot understand others the 
way they understand objects, but rather, human understanding requires a 
relationship of openness, participation and empathy. Its point of differentiation from 
the Cartesian method of analysis is marked by the fact that the world is not seen 
objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another. Instead it is 
a "descriptive psychology" of intentions presented in an objective or interpretive, 
non-judgmental framework. 
 
Yet in the context of this thesis the ontology is even more complex than 
compartmentalizing a world of people vs. a world of objects. Specifically, in the world 
of ideas driven by a philosophy of strategic stances with a predominant 
predisposition towards decision-making under uncertainty. To this, one solution is to 
turn to the work of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) founder of modern 
phenomenology. 
 
Husserl (1970) defined phenomenology as a nature of inquiry primarily concerned 
with the systematic reflection on and study of the structures of consciousness and 
the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. Focusing attention on the 
deeply embedded frameworks of tacitly known, taken-for-granted assumptions 
through which humans make sense of their lives (Yanow, 2006:15). 
 
Further aiding in the qualitative research alignment discussed in section 4.2.1, and 
the descriptive decision model alignment in 4.2.2, Phenomenology is a branch of 
philosophy different from others in that it tends to be a one of the few branches of 
qualitative research that when focusing on topics usually regarded as subjective 
(conscious experiences such as judgments, perceptions and emotions) it is 
approached more objectively. It is thus well suited for this study's non-judgmental 
analysis of what happens in the critical first phases of innovation. Per alignment with 
the second section, in this alignment of objective pursuit of knowledge that includes 
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subjective subject areas phenomenology still seeks to be more descriptive (rather 
than prescriptive). 
 
Predicated on the work of Husserl (1970), a transcendental phenomenologist, this 
thesis will thus build on the phenomenological foundation involved theorizing about 
how knowledge comes into being. Using the phenomenology terminology these 
experienced strategic decision-makers would then be regarded as persons, not 
individuals. This is because persons can be understood through the unique ways they 
reflect the society they live in. It is further believed that analysing human behaviour 
naturalistically when there are not enough resources for perfect information, 
collectives’ decision-making under uncertainty can provide a greater 
understanding. And because phenomenology is considered to be oriented on 
discovery, research methods are less restricting. Assumptions are grouped through a 
process called phenomenological epoche, and data sources are referred to as capta. 
  
  
3.3.   The Research Process 
  
Having established methodological principles that support and augment each other 
leaves resolving to a research process that tracks idea emergence, change, 
development, adaptation and transformation. To accomplish that a research process 
is needed that is truly socially responsive and behavioural, holistically natural and 
can be observed in relation to changing information relative to its real-time context.  
 
  
3.3.1. Methodology     
  
In answering "How should the research study go about finding out knowledge?" one 
of the first methodological iterations to emerge was Mintzberg’s doctoral thesis which 
also happened to be a seminal ‘structural observation’ leading to a new model on the 
ten roles of a manager (1974). Using naturalistic research methods, he embedded for 
one week with five different executive decision makers to document their 368 verbal 
interactions (observations) and 890 correspondence artefacts (archived material) 
which they came in contact with over the time of observation. Though this 
methodology provided a strong starting point an exact duplication was not going to 
serve the best interest of this specific model construction because it did not meet all 
the necessary criteria.  
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As unpacked earlier in Chapter 3, in meeting the objective of constructing a 
descriptive model on strategic decision-making under uncertainty, research data or 
capta needed to allow for uncertainty and ambiguity so that it could be observed if 
and when strategic decision makers purposefully opt for uncertainty because they 
perceive they would be able to benefit from it. However, because this purposeful 
choice would sometimes be rational and sometime be happening below the threshold 
of awareness, the methodological option needed to be inclusive of both rational and 
behavioural research data markers. 
 
Since the focus is specifically on high quality outcomes a purist view focusing 
exclusively on interviews with expert strategists engaged practically with decision-
makers under uncertainty would offer assurances of quality data. However, in light of 
interviews’ limitation as it applies distorting behaviours or rationalized 
reconstructivism in hindsight it may be a weaker option in gathering data on 
bounded rationality. Also, since some behaviour happen below the threshold of 
awareness, by definition, some of the deep bounded rationality this research would be 
very interested in analysing will have pre-verbal qualities which means the individual 
experiencing it may not be capable of observing and articulating insights about it 
themselves. Doing interviews with peers may improve this, but the social 
phenomenon of group think would still be limiting the level of insight that could be 
derived and still limit the quality of System II data. 
 
A thoughtful and thorough review of archived materials leading up to a revolutionary 
idea’s implementation could possibly have the same assurances of a high project 
being analysed, but is still unlikely to resolve the data discussed earlier associated 
with System II decision-making on account that documented materials is biased 
towards rationality and System I decision-making processes as well. Archived 
documents that could be retrieved for sharing would furthermore cluster towards the 
formal as opposed to informal which would result in emergent properties in the 
earlier ‘draft’ versions of ideas not being as accessible as the more mature and 
finalized iteration of an idea. Thus, even if high quality audio and audio-visual 
behavioural data are available, it would skew towards formal interaction processes 
and leave gaps on informal and pre-planned dynamics around an idea. 
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To address the behavioural blind spot that may be a concern in interview based 
research methods, and the out-of-the-spotlight blind spot that may be a concern in 
curated archived materials first-person observations does provide a solution. 
However, because first-person observations are more behavioural and informal and 
may have a rationality and formality blind spot, this model construction stand to 
benefit most from an integrated research method with data from first-person 
observations as well as interviews, archived materials: ethnography. 
 
Emergence of Ethnography 
 
With roots in Anthropology, Malinowski (1915) practiced and coined the formal 
concept of ethnographic research methods as the colonized 'other culture' in a natural 
laboratory "doing science". Around the same time the Chicago School of Sociology 
(1920) also helped ethnography gain scientific method status momentum as it 
focused on the 'other culture' in terms of class thus looking at urban poverty, 
deviance, and subcultures. In today's management studies framework, the process of 
contracting, and especially joint ventures, mergers and forming alliances is also a 
cultural practice, it thus makes sense to study emergent inter-organizational 
collaborations from an ethnographic point of view. 
  
Initially the emphasis was on naturalism, the fly on the wall. Being unnoticed was 
equated with being truthful and reliable. 'Being there' it was argued, lead to 
authenticity of direct knowledge, and 'telling it like it is' produced an unvarnished 
journalistic truth. Based on descriptions like these it becomes evident how the genre 
was competing for validity by using the positivism rule book to establish itself, and 
makes it apparent how far this research method has come over the past century. 
  
It was around the 1970 that ethnography as a social science practice increasingly 
started getting questioned by academics. And even though Max Weber (1864-1920) 
was dead for almost half a century by this time, the legacy of his work has had a 
profound influence on ethnographic methodology and theoretical thinking. Through 
the lens of the positivist values it is not hard to scorch holes in the fabric of 
ethnographies as a relative, biased person's perception of truth, quality of informants, 
manipulation by those with agendas, and the chronicles of an immersion experience. 
Geertz’s (1973: 261) rebuttal to such critique was that the study of culture is “not an 
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experimental science in search of laws” but “an interpretive one in search of meaning.” 
This led to a paradigm shift in what is truly the valid question to be asking, and 
Geertz helped frame that it is not about replication, but positioning and subjectivity 
that makes up the strength of this research method. It relies on our engaged selves as 
the instrument of knowing. Or in the words of Ortner (1995) “Ethnography…has 
always meant the attempt to understand another life world using the self – or as 
much of it as possible – as the instrument of knowing.” 
 
Today ethnographic research holds its own, in its own space by making clear the 
unique contribution that it makes to knowledge by tackling some of the limitations of 
exclusively quantitative research methods not concerned with depth and context. 
Also, though initially conceived outside the field of Management, ethnographic 
research has most recently received special attention specifically in the business 
world as corporations with increasing access to big data recognize its limits and start 
turning towards context rich ethnographic research to understand and market value 
propositions better by exploring consumer subcultures’ needs, fears, and desires. 
(Anderson, 2009). 
 
 
Confessional Ethnography 
Using a single full-participant fieldworker committing to confessional ethnography 
(Van Maanen, 1988) or vulnerable writing (Behar 1996) a balance of the subjective 
and objective world is explored to fully immerse in both the rational and affective 
components associated with dealing with uncertainty. This unifying constant 
furthermore serves as a data point for comparisons across the different case studies’ 
collaborations and increased the relative value of each case study relative to the full-
participant (Barbour, 2014). This is also consistent with the principles of social 
realism where essentialism and relativism can and do combine in the construct of 
knowledge and truth. At no point are any responsive subjective impulses as 
participant-observer supposed to be misconstrued as critical ethnography. In Part II 
it serves as a consistent lens for data to be reviewed later in the context of the internal 
and external uncertain environment from which it sprung. It is the intent of this 
ethnographic study that the subjective and objective items be balanced in aggregate 
but the specific placement of high concentrations of rational vs. affective responses 
also represent data. 
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Ethnography Snapshots 
 
In the context of this specific thesis the ethnographic narrative is presented similar to 
the ‘portrait’ style pioneered by Willis (1981) and Foley (1990). Each collaboration’s 
development unfolds with the rich description of the most important eight ‘snapshots’ 
of each collaboration. Each snapshot revealing in detail the conditions under which 
the central idea underwent a pivotal or iterative transformation, (or in some 
instances boldly reinforced an existing stance) when the space was created to 
theoretically allow for change over the course of multiple years. 
 
Each snapshot utilizes different communication mediums and had different members 
of a leadership collective present. All these will be pointed out in relation to the 
context of the bigger picture. Special focus will be put on including the answering 
generally accepted ethnographic questions like the following: 
1. Layout of the space or room  
2. Specific objects or physical elements in the space  
3. Discussion on the people involved 
4. Clues to signify participants and actors’ statuses and roles  
5. Decision-makers and their influencers general actions or the communicated 
intent of their actions. 
6. Explicit structures, rules, or norms govern the situation  
7. Attire  
8. Affect  
9. Communication mediums and methods  
10. Specific verbal and non-verbal communication of participants and actors 
  
 
3.3.2.    Data Sources   
  
As explored earlier, ethnographic methodologies rely on three type data sources: i) 
observations, ii) interviews (or conversations) and iii) archived material. 
 
Observations 
Observational methods refer to data gathering techniques that focus on experience as 
they unfold' (Grove and Fisk, 1992:218). It includes physical actions, verbal and 
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expressive behaviours and spatial relations, using multiple senses to maximize 
findings (O'Leary, 2004; Zikmund et. al, 2013).  
 
Observations provides 'real world' insight (Grove and Fisk, 1992:218) and produce 
more complete accounts of decision makers' experiences (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008; Keans, 2010). Specifically, in pursuit of knowledge on the early phases of 
innovation ethnographer field workers should observe, first hand, innovations in 
their own 'natural' setting (Myers, 2013:137, Marshall & Rossmann, 1995) and not 
just rely on 20/20 hindsight and rationalized accounts.  
  
Surveillance can range from covert and unobtrusive (O'Leary, 2004: 87) to full 
participant. In the context of this specific ethnography it was appropriate and 
necessary to the data collection phase to immerse the field worker fully. Observations 
were also unstructured (or set by strategic decision-maker or facilitator’s agenda) and 
allowed for the 'recording of the unplanned and/or unexpected' (O'Leary, 2004: 173) 
  
Fayol (1916), considered by many as the Father of Management, introduced the first 
theory on management by documenting his observations over the course of 30 years 
embedded in a single corporation in France. Others followed suit as Carlson (1951) 
developed the diary method to study the work characteristics of nine Swedish 
managing directors. It entailed each individual detailing and logging personal 
activities. Subsequent users have legitimized the approach, notably Stewart (1967) 
where 160 top and middle managers of British Companies described their work for 
four weeks. She then analysed the differences between their work. 
  
Sayles (1964) studied the work content of middle and lower-management level 
decision makers in a single large US corporation. He used what was referred to as an 
'anthropological' approach. Sayles move freely in the company collecting whatever 
information struck him as important. Guest (1956)'s strategic decision makers were 
foremen. 56 US foremen were observed during one of their eight-hour-shifts. Each of 
their activities were recorded for analysis. 
  
Hodgson, Levinson and Zaleznik (1965) analysed the strategic decision makers at a 
top US hospital. By zeroing in on the relationship between three top executives they 
could investigate in particular the ways in which work and socio-emotional roles were 
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divided between the three managers. Even Whyte (1955)'s embedment with a street 
gang ultimately allowed Homans (1950) to analyse how the strategic decision makers 
of a street gang share some interesting similarities of job content with corporate 
managers. 
 
Collis and Hussey (2003) however contents that observations in itself is not enough. 
They criticise that the observations are just assumptions from afar whereby visibility 
and hearing is constrained to result in inaccurate analysis of situations. To this 
concern this thesis included extensive interviews and archived material to 
corroborate ideas and provide context. 
  
 
Interviews (Conversations) 
 
Specifically, hen observations are combined with interviews the chances of 
misinterpretations of actions, decisions and bigger picture objectives are dramatically 
reduced (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Froggatt, 2001; Dumay & Qu, 2011; Silverman, 2005). 
Interviews have rich potential to enhance the observations during an ethnography on 
account that it specifically offers insight into the rationalization which is a critical 
component of this model. Charmaz (2006: 142) may have intended to be cautionary 
when he also defines interviews as potentially bleak with respect to absolute true as 
he explains the limitations of interviews as "retrospective accounts subject to 
reconstruction in view of present exigencies and purposes". However, in the context 
of decision-making under uncertainty such reconstruction with purposes was in fact 
important information and was captured conversationally by the full-participant field 
worker amongst the chaos and uncertainty of the project state time throughout the 
development of each of the ethnographic case studies.  
 
With participants’ consent interviews were either recorded for audio-visual, just 
audio, or handwritten notes depending on what suited the situation and what 
interfered the least with the interviewee's focus on the project. (Glaser and Strauss, 
2009). A red research diary was carried in readiness to record developments in situ, 
recoding location, time and interpretation of scenarios to provide an overview of the 
concept development at that moment (Silverman, 2005). This red research diary also 
became a reference text during analysis of interviews, to aid verbal data collected 
from interviews (Kearns, 2010). Reflective field notes were also documented  
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retrospectively with hours or days processing time to reflect critically on patterns and 
anomalies. 
 
With concern to the ‘interviewer-effect’ (Denscombe, 2010: 178) this thesis accepts 
and also discloses the fieldworker’s relevant affective and philosophical 
predispositions by including the ethnographic data as a confessional ethnography. 
The reason it is deemed data as oppose to noise or contaminant in this specific thesis, 
is because affect and philosophy is speculated to have an impact on decision-making 
under uncertainty. Where possible this information was also captured and recorded 
on other participants in the leadership collective. This affective disposition also 
serviced as a constant for comparative purposes between the different collaborations 
against which data can be measured. 
 
What was however important was that the full-participant field worker stay open and 
interested in hearing and integrating when other participants said something that ran 
contrary to expectations and to sincerely respond to ensure clarity in understanding 
an alternative point of view. Recorded and transcribed interviews was helpful in 
serving that function. Interviewees were given the chance to speak freely about 
behaviours, beliefs, events and perceptions in relation to the research topic as well as 
non-related topics. Overall the research data is created and grounded in these lived 
experiences of decision-making, which are now exposed and explained. 
  
After a prolonged lag time of the full-participant field worker being removed from the 
collaboration a final set of semi-structured interviews were completed with key 
participants to reflect on the idea development period retrospectively. This final 
interview was directed by the emerging concepts from the narrative. Involving 
strategic selection of informants and interviews protocols were more structured 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006). For this end, 40 pivotal decision makers 
were selected across the five collaborations aiming to saturate data and authentically 
sustain the resulted new model for strategic decision-making under uncertainty 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
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Archived Material  
   
Secondary data sources also have a 'rich potential' to enhance an intensive 
investigation (Crowton, 1998: 427). Despite concerns that secondary data may be 
historical and unspecific, these limitations are overcome by triangulating inferences 
with various forms of primary research in ethnographies.  
 
In the context of decision-maker research Neustadt (1960) may be an exemplary 
example of having used no observation but rather a combination of archived 
materials and interviews to study presidential strategic decision-makers Roosevelt, 
Truman, and Eisenhower. Through the lens of secondary sources - documents and 
interviews with their collaborators and subordinates - he generated his data to make 
a meaning contribution to knowledge. 
 
In the context of this thesis archived Material also allows for the use of verbatim 
quotes be it from documents or recorded audio-visual, and in the modern context of 
research analysis research have increasingly more access to informal backstage 
interactions via email, voicemail and text message archives.  
  
  
3.3.3.  Sample      
  
Ethnography challenges the value of a representative sample. There are detractors 
who still advocates that qualitative research could ask for a representation sample of 
the population under research. However, Gerring (2006: 709) makes the point that 
though case studies are not representative samples of a broader population, they 
nonetheless are reflections of larger phenomena. Yin (1994, 2009) also offers a 
solution by differentiating between statistical and analytical generalization. The latter 
would thus apply to case studies where convergent evidence is sought analogous to 
using multiple experiments to duplicate the results from previous work.  
  
Instead of following the principles of statistical random sampling, this specific case 
study approach benefits from identifying positive deviance sample (Tuhus-Dubrow 
2009; Sternin and Choo, 2000) of exceptional experienced strategic decision-makers 
and first movers if we want to analyse innovation that has never happened before. 
Indeed, it is researching their process and intentions as the project evolve with 
entering and exiting partners. Purposeful sampling selects participants which meet 
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particular conditions to provide research specific data and this is thus a characteristic 
of qualitative studies (Patton, 2002). Purposeful sampling was also safe as the gate 
keepers where known and reliable and so their judgement was trusted. (Eriksson and 
Kovalainen, 2004) 
  
In the context of analysing emergent innovation, a criterion of seven qualities were 
identified and shared with an intermediary one year before the model was conceived. 
The objective of the email was to identify a singular exemplary inter-organizational 
case study that hit as many as possible of the following criteria: 
 
1. Timeline: We are hoping the project would commence within the next few months 
and that quantifiable results would be reviewable from the negotiation 12 months 
later 
2. Three (or more) stakeholders together at the table: the logic behind this is 
very much in line with what you said about not having one powerful entity dominates 
the discussion but to maximize the chances of seeing a truly collaborative and 
innovative problem solving process unfold.  
3. Familiarity: if at least one of the stakeholders don't have extensive experience 
working with the others that would give us insight into early stage processes. 
4. At least one stakeholder from the technology sector: As you pointed out that 
is not necessarily where the innovation is strongest with your example of 
pharmaceutical and oil companies. But they may still be the alpha movers in 
networked communication structures due to their core competency in IT? 
5. International: As we discussed, rich info may be gained from different cultures 
having different core objectives and approaches to be able to look at their conformity 
evolution shapes over time. 
6. Higher profile: if possible something with a fishbowl visibility that may get public 
scrutiny (voters or stockholders) would be helpful to see how the difference in public 
and private conversations. You mentioned public sector deals and that may be ideal if 
one of the stakeholders is a government entity 
7. Location: Purely for logistical and cost saving purposes we hope the in-person deal 
could be based in London if we were to spend approximately two months embedded… 
 
Medium: 
Sender: 
Receiver: 
Date: 
Email 
Fieldworker 
Association President 
28 June, 2013 
 
In the months that followed the fieldworker started engaging with one collaboration 
after another keeping options open because emerging collaborations are shrouded in 
uncertainty as to their sustainability. A few months later the ethics paperwork was 
started and submitted for the collaboration deemed most viable (Collaboration 1), but 
one year later ethics paperwork was in place to analyse any Collaboration amongst 4 
options. Six months later a fifth collaboration was also added. Ultimately each of the 
expert strategist collaborations maintained a prolonged period of development and 
underwent multiple iterations over the course of multiple years. Also, worth noting is 
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the fact that none of the collaborations’ data had been discarded and all five 
collaborations were instrumental in the construction of the strategic decision-making 
under uncertainty model of this thesis.  
 
One year after the seven point criteria was established the Ethics paperwork was in 
place summarizing the emergent innovation qualities at that specific point in time as: 
  
[…] Collaboration 1: [Blue Chip Corporate General Council Idea] 
In this project, I will be observing lawyers of IT suppliers, and customers as they try to 
develop a framework for collaborative contracting for complex projects. […] 
  
Collaboration 2: [Research Intensive University Idea]  
This project brings together senior level management from [various universities and] 
departments with the objective of diversifying beyond the core undergraduate 
education focus and strengthening the university offering specifically as it pertains to 
post-graduate education (e.g. MOOCs, the launch of a Professional and Executive 
Development Centre, and alternative Post graduate taught programs).   
  
Collaboration 3: [Economic Development Idea] 
This is a project partly funded by a [City] Council and [a] University. It brings 
together approximately 50 individuals and organizations from the private, public and 
third sectors in order to create a prototype design of an enterprise city as part of [City] 
Council’s strategic plan. 
  
Collaboration 4: [Software Start-up Idea] 
A start-up company is in the process of building collaborative relationships and 
material of value for offer to university Health and Safety departments, and to 
ultimately commercially launch a suite of videos and an ePlatform to be used by Small 
to Medium enterprises in the building and manufacturing sector.… 
 
Collaboration 5: [Corporate Wellness and Healthcare’s Idea] 
Start-up company that signed a license to partner with [one of the top research 
hospitals in the world] to commercialize a training program looking at healthcare 
solutions with a new integrated medicine dimension. Developed by world renowned 
doctors and psychologists, it has been illustrated to be successful with 60+ case 
studies and 150,000 participants over the past 6 years.  
 
Medium: 
Sender: 
Receiver: 
 
Date: 
Ethics Approval Request Form 
Fieldworker 
Newcastle University Faculty of 
Humanities and Social Sciences 
10 June, 2014 
(21 January 2015 C5 addendum) 
   
All five collaborations share and differentiate on a number of characteristics that 
make the sum of the parts even more valuable than what they are as individual case 
studies. In terms of the unifying characteristics, they offer a mode for comparative 
analysis: 
• Accomplished strategic decision-makers: all strategic decision-makers 
are seasoned and accomplished at the top of their industries in England or the 
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US even though embarking on a collaboration and innovation that is shrouded 
in ambiguity and uncertainty. It also carries some sort of penalty for failure. 
• Collaborating Competitors: All collaborations were collaborating with 
their industry competitors in an attempt to achieve something that none of 
them would be capable of accomplishing alone. 
• Contemporaries: all of the initiatives launched between 2012 and 2013 by 
most standards of what would be defined as the genesis.  
• Nationality: all the collaborations have British or US roots but include 
multiple nationalities amongst the collaborators. 
• Public-Private partnerships: each of the partnerships depend on 
understanding and integrating the benefits and drawbacks of public as well as 
private offer to the other. 
• Full-Participant in each of the collaborations the field worker was a full 
participant immersed to serve as an authentic, natural partner serving the 
collaborative team in solving the problem set by leadership collaborative. 
  
Differentiating characteristics would include some of the factors that may help us 
understand divergent approaches used in strategic initiative shrouded in ambiguity 
and uncertainty: 
• Industries: From professionally trained lawyers, academics, seasoned civil 
servants to turnaround king executives, to healthcare professionals, a diverse 
collection of professional industry background was represented. 
• Organization: From publicly traded corporations, to elite education 
institutions, to sizable governing municipalities to the contrast of a software 
and non-profit start-up, each collaboration embodies a different set of 
organization values. 
• Approaches to risk: from highly risk adverse dispositions collaborating by 
hiding behind an intermediary for anonymity, non-disclosure agreements, and 
no-compete contracts to competitors disclosing strategies for success and 
disclosing vulnerabilities like the company may not survive if it does not 
receive a cash infusion within the next 90 days. 
• Approaches to financial investment: The initiatives represent various 
levels of cash and resource investment. The investment also came from a 
variety of sources internal to the organization, external to the organization, as 
well as individuals’ personal pockets. 
  55  
• Approaches to rationality: rationality was bounded in a number of 
different ways depending on the project included but not limited to: time, 
resource allocation, human resource selection, partner exclusion, not seeking 
true reasons for why some stakeholder partners abandon the cause. 
• Approaches to social norms: on the one hand, some decision-makers were 
conscientiously researching what peers are doing so that they are not left 
behind whereas others had no interest in researching or assessing what others 
are doing and wanted to march to the beat of their own drum. 
  
The success of securing Collaboration 1's participation was the result of obtaining the 
support of the aforementioned CEO of a high profile international non-profit acting 
as intermediary. Collaboration 2 was a result of the principal researcher's educator 
interest in Massive Open Online Courses and university administration strategy. 
Collaboration 3 started out as an attempt to earn money based on a proven track 
record as a successful economic development practitioner and grant writer. The 
project proved unsuccessful with respect to providing financial assistance. 
Collaboration 4 was the result of a laid off executive's request to assist in the initial 
stages of setting up a company. Collaboration 5 was the result of a request to join a 
non-profit advisory board. The field worker received no financial compensation for 
the services to any of the collaborations. 
  
Beyond Collaboration 1, the intention behind initial participating in collaboration 2 
through 5 was not designed for inclusion in a doctoral thesis but rather personal 
interest in certain types of collaborative initiatives with capacity to facilitate 
fundamental industry shifts.  To that end, conversations and observations were 
documented in field notes almost daily over the course of a year plus, and archive 
material were preserved. It was mostly after long-term involvement in this 
combination of projects that the value of seeing the collaborations relative to each 
other became apparent. Patterns of collaborative emergent properties became clearer 
(and changed) over time. Permission for including the full formal and informal 
narrative of all five initiatives was thus a journey made official only after the 
Newcastle University Ethics Review committee approved the continually evolving 
research design and all participants signed off.  
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3.3.4.  Summary 
  
The strategic decision-making under uncertainty model is informed by five full-
participant ethnographies that shares many aspirational and high standard qualities, 
but also demonstrates clear philosophical differences in how they go about 
accomplishing objectives across industries. And just like a rich diversity of 
professional strategists’ fields were brought together with the collaborations, so too a 
concerted effort was made to capture not only formal but also informal data, 
rationalized and behavioural accounts, and the ambiguity of decision-making under 
uncertainty did not only naturalistically occur during the development of the industry 
solution, but also the research processes can benefit from remaining open to being 
surprised during the data and pattern discovery process.  
                      
3.4.  Construction of Well-Informed Impressions 
Well-informed impressions are the basis of this thesis with cross-checking, multiple 
data sources, and participant checks. The first component of the well-informed 
impressions includes the cross-checking data sources on as much of the continuum of 
public and private data sources could be viably secured. That includes considerable 
effort was put into securing both formal and informal data on each collaboration. On 
the formal end of the spectrum would be reports, minutes, agendas, press releases, 
presentation decks, edited videos and websites. On the more informal side it included 
conversations over drinks, napkin and whiteboard scribbles. It also includes rolling 
camera footage between takes and impulsive reactions to unexpected texts amidst 
tending to unrelated matters. Another dimension on the same spectrum of public and 
private socio-cognitive expression is the formal dissociative pedagogies that 
fundamentally underlie universally used workshops regardless if researchers, 
facilitators, participants, or strategic decision-makers recognized the relatedness to 
the stakeholder or participant group, or the collaborative approach leveraged up to 
the workshop date. Similarly, another other extreme type of the impersonal 
researcher non-effect spectrum would be the highly curated one-to-one emails 
(sometimes referencing past offline conversations) or videographer interactions that 
was facilitated outside my presence but that I was able to gain access to ultimately. 
Unbeknownst at the time this rich diversity of media used in communication 
captured ultimately lead to important discoveries on the dominant modes that 
ultimately facilitate different types strategic decision-making under uncertainty. 
Similarly, unbeknownst at the time, coincidental use of externally conceived and 
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designed workshops by all collaborations allowed for pure cognitive external 
reference point to compare intra-group socio-cognition in terms of comparative 
models. 
 
The second component of the well-informed impressions included participant 
participation in the construction of the strategic socio-cognitive factors. On 
Collaboration 1 and 2 the strategic decision-makers were not informed when the 
fundamental four dimensions emerged out of the data towards the end of the period 
over which data was collected. On Collaborations 3 and 4 key strategic decision-
makers were informed immediately as the four fundamental components of the 
strategy modes emerged approximately half way through the period of observation. 
On Collaboration 5 key strategic decision-makers were informed of the fundamental 
codes and throughout the initiative’s development the codes were used as generally 
accepted terminology to discuss various ways to advance the project.  
 
The third component of the well-informed impressions included giving multiple 
strategic decision-makers from each of the five collaborations an opportunity the 
opportunity to weigh in on the written summary of the project. In the process of 
closing the feedback loop key strategic decision-makers were invited to correct 
content details, recommend alternative important focus points as well as weigh in on 
the dominant strategic models if they felt comfortable weighing in. A sample of the 
theory summary on strategic models in laymen terms is included in Appendix C. 
 
In response, each of the five collaborations had two or more key strategic decision-
makers independently corroborate accuracy of the content as well as the snapshots 
picked as the strongest representation of the development of the initiative. As 
expected the more politically sensitized Collaboration (3) had a single individual that 
requested changing and augmenting data on exact words quoted. None of the 
changes materially changed the data from the point of view of the thesis. The request 
was honoured. The act of requesting words to be changed that had been captured in 
audio also demonstrates the political sensitivity in managing the perceptions and 
(intended) accuracy of the decision-maker. 
 
All participants that attempted to code their own or their project’s strategic stance 
coded in 100% alignment with what the thesis researcher had already written 
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(unbeknownst to the participants at the time). Answers represented each of the four 
strategy quadrants furthermore supporting the validity and reliability claim. 
 
Finally, the theory was workshopped throughout its development to over one 
hundred independent, impartial stakeholders to see if they would code scenarios or 
strategy models in a similar way. Of the 10% who articulated an opinion shared a 
similar position with positions and insight that ultimately helped further refine the 
theory. 
 
Fundamentally there is not an expectation that all participants on every project would 
be able to code their or other behaviour, but on account of having used a deviance 
sample of exceptional and experienced strategists this specific thesis was able to 
benefit from the self- and other-insight of looking at the strategies on a more abstract 
and conceptual level. 
 
3.5. The Analysis of Data 
  
A central tenant of the ethnographic data analysis relied on identifying a 
phenomenon, describing it, and seeing how our concepts interconnect' (Dey, 1993:31). 
The ethnographic write-up aimed to produce "thick description" (Geertz, 1973) with 
sufficient details in the narrative descriptions of relevant events, gatherings, rituals, 
public and private, flow of conversation as well as ‘interviews’ and archived material 
to produce ‘snapshots’ of the most critical points in the five collaborations’ 
developments. Additionally, it included details on space usage, analyses on tone, and 
quantification of data. 
  
In response to Francis (1992) and Myers’ (2013) concerns that ethnography is 
vulnerable to personal interpretation and observer bias, a rigorous 24 step analysis 
plan was implemented. By triangulating not only data sources, but also cross-
referencing with participants, theorists, researchers and practitioners unrelated to 
the project, chances of data distortions and interpretations were minimized: 
  
Step 1: Fieldworker amasses data (+R, +D) 
In the context of the full-participant and confessional ethnography the 
fieldworker first and foremost captured and reported with full transparency 
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the primary and secondary data in terms of both affect and rationality; formal 
and informal contact; structured and unstructured engagement, as well as the 
fieldworker paying attention to the public and private world of which they 
specifically were not explicitly involved in. Deliverables included, but were not 
limited to, hand written notes, field notes, transcriptions, audio-visual and 
audio recordings, photographs, scanned documents, texts, emails, letters, 
board proceedings, approved minutes, budgets reports, research reports, 
doodles on napkins. 
 
Step 2: Fieldworker frames data for analysis (+R, +C) 
The fieldworker in the context of full immersion then also took responsibility 
for linking the data together to ensure that it would be meaningful from an 
outsider point of view. This entailed the integrated universal research calendar, 
reflective stances of accounts after some time has passed and more context 
was available. This entails the higher level reflective field notes, and narrative 
passages, reflective transcriptions with visual context of the more important 
snapshots in a project’s development. 
 
Step 3: Researcher reads and codes data (+S, +C) 
With complete disregard to the fieldworker’s feelings, the researcher then 
embarked on an increasingly systematic framework and started looking for 
similarities, differences, points of tension, snapshots of progress. These were 
documented in an excel spreadsheet allowing for gaps and colour maps, chaos, 
dead ends, and identification of missing pieces. Text segments were flagged 
and labelled for potential use in the narrative.  
 
Step 4: Researcher cross-examination (+S, +D) 
The researcher then proceeded to deconstruct the codes built up, listed 
potential blind spots that the fieldworker may not have noticed in the moment 
and private worlds that may not have been explored or may not have had 
access to. Inquiries addressed at the fieldworker’s headnotes on experiences 
not documented formally were also brought to the surface because data or 
information that may seemed unimportant at the time could ultimately be of 
value. Hard questions were also asked that may have been embarrassing to 
confront by the field worker. 
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In this specific theory’s development, the fieldworker was also challenged in 
the final collaboration (C5) (after the model had been constructed out of data 
from the first four collaborations) to explain the model to participants and use 
it as a structure and vocabulary to discuss potential business models from 
which the emergent development and transformative phases would be 
benchmarked.  
 
But this cross-examination did not only happen in dialogue with the field 
worker, it also happens in dialogue with seminal theorists during the literature 
review - with published theories when the theory was represented for the 
application and elaboration of the new conceptual framework in a discourse 
analysis of the empirical descriptions. In the words of Bernstein (1996: 140-141) 
to excavate the field worker’s field the theory was ‘ignored’ at first to 
concentrate instead on exploring the empirical object in order to develop a 
language of description appropriate to this specific object. At the end of step 4 
however the model had re-engaged with historical theories. 
 
Step 5: Fieldworker constructs the narrative report (+R, +D) 
In the first cyclical transformative step of resolving and balancing conflicting 
tension, the responsive fieldworker (+R) integrated the research analyst’s (+S) 
systematic framework to construct the ethnographic narrative. Using the 
researcher’s snapshots highlights, flags, questions, and adding headnotes, the 
fieldworker reengaged with the data to assemble a narrative that contains the 
necessary details, but also reconstructs the gaps in the narrative so that a third 
person reader who was not present should be able to make sense of the linear 
progression of the central idea’s emergence, development, change, adaptation 
and transformation.  
 
Step 6: Fieldworker constructs reviewable narrative draft (+R, +C) 
In the second transformative step the fieldworker increased self-awareness 
recognizing that their actions, affect, decisions and predispositions will be 
judged by not only third-party but also in consecutive steps by participants. 
That which had no bearing on the theory is removed. This was also the draft at 
which grammar, punctuation and spelling were considered. 
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Step 7: Researcher sets evaluation criteria on quality (+S, +C) 
The researcher also investigated and identified critical components and 
standards for the narrative to be adhered to produce an ethnography at the 
highest possible quality levels. Appendix X.1 discusses the criteria on quality in 
detail first observing general quality criteria for ethnographies but also 
includes a custom six-point framework specifically for confessional 
ethnographies in the context of social realism. The six dimensions include: 
reliability (Hammersly, 1992:67; Kirk & Miller, 1986:19), validity (Hammersly, 
1992:67; Kirk & Miller, 1986:19), juxtaposition (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007; 
Marcus & Fischer; 1986), moderation (Van Maanen, 1998:93), interlacing 
(Whythe, 1996), minimalism (Behar, 1996:13) and dialogic qualities.  
 
Step 8-11: Participants review data & codes (+S, +R, +C, +D) 
Albas and Albas (1988) developed a method of inspection that adds an 
additional level of research due diligence that research collaborating with high 
functioning participants can leverage to improve the integrity of their research. 
It involves engaging in a healthy two-way conversation with the research 
participants themselves after initial theory or model drafts are in place: 
 
They explain their major categories to certain participants they have studied 
and then inquire whether and to what extent these categories fit each 
participant's experience. (Albas and Albas, 1988 quoted in Charmaz, 2006:111).  
 
A semi structured list of questions during a final interview gives key 
participants space to go through their own personal process of transforming 
the snapshots and narrative that they had been a part of with items they deem 
important in their unique personal truth (+R, +D), socio-political projection 
(+R, +C), factual corroboration or reframe with supporting evidence (+S, +C) 
and unique substantiated immortal contribution to the idea and/or research 
(+S, +D). 
 
Steps 12-15: Researcher integrates participant feedback (+S, +R, +C, +D) 
Per the criteria set out in the ethics section, the researcher finally makes the 
decision as to which changes augments the narrative in Part II, refutes the 
analysis in Part III and make the necessary adjustments to respect and balance 
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both the essentialist and relative elements of truth and knowledge 
construction to the best of their ability. 
 
Steps 16-19: Non-participant strategic decision-makers review model & 
theory (+S, +R, +C, +D)  
Similarly, strategic decision-makers unfamiliar with the specificities of the five 
collaborative case studies, as well as academic experts in heterogeneous 
professional contexts were then asked to test drive the new emergent theory as 
applied to their personal philosophy of facilitating emergent innovation inside 
their sphere of influence. (Charmaz, 2006.). The goal would be to assess if the 
model passes their own personal litmus test. 
  
Steps 20-23: Researcher integrates non-participant feedback (+S, +R, +C, +D) 
Even though these stakeholders’ input would be in the form of interviews, 
presentations or abbreviated written synopsis, they would not be included as 
empirical evidence in Part II of this thesis. Impact of their insight may be 
applied in Part I by the inclusion of theory and background literature from 
recommended published peer reviewed scholarly articles. In part II it may be 
unattributed and applied to the categorization or treatment of data. However, 
it is in Part III that their contribution is expected to truly shine as this thesis is 
based on a problem-field approach, the practical implications of the emergent 
theory is paramount. 
 
Steps 24: Transformed Theory in practice (+S, +R, +C, +D) 
The final documented step of analysis in the Phase I iteration of the theory 
leave control of the collaboration where conception took place and allows the 
work to be responded (+D) and evaluated (+S) by other strategic decision-
makers be it in practice or in academic research. 
  
The analysis undertaken in the research was designed to enable a creative and 
perpetual dialogue between theory and data. I was also designed to facilitate a healthy 
dialogue between the different types of data, and stakeholders’ reflections upon that 
data and theory. One could describe the theory’s evolution over the analysis of 24 
steps to be analogous to transformation a child experience during maturation as 
depicted in figure 3.2. 
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Summary of analysis of data as theory transforms under the pressure or different 
levels of complexity and drives: 
Steps 1 – 7: Early childhood - a theory’s protected phase shaped 
predominantly by highly vested paternal dynamics and drives; 
Steps 8 – 15: Formative years - a theory’s formative years shaped by semi-
insular one-way scholastic literature reviews and participant drives; 
Steps 16 – 23: Adolescence - a theory’s more experimental and daring phase 
with critical academic reflections and practitioner debate drives; and 
ultimately,  
Step 24 and beyond: Adulthood - a theory us charged with standing on its own 
merits and making its own way in the least protected part of the journey of 
making a meaningful contribution in the world.  
 
Ultimately this metaphor has its limitations but the important takeaway is how 
various stages of development built onto each other with increasing complexity and 
sophistication during a long-term process of skill development. 
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3.5.   Limitations 
 
Participant (+R) vs. Observer (+S) role tensions 
 
As a full participant, the field worker was considered a strategic partner in the idea 
emergence, development, change, adaptation and transformation of all five 
collaborations. It is commonly stated that this type of immersion has its drawbacks as 
on a rational level it can distort and influence project data and outcomes, and on an 
affective level it can distort perceptions of reality. To this argument this thesis offers 
two retorts: On a rational level, full active participant emersion this benefitted the 
study by allowed for higher levels of access to observations, interviews and archive 
material as well as ultimately trust. In the majority of the collaborations the field 
worker committed to the functional process outcome in the interest of the 
collaboration regardless of having been granted research access to also study the 
process around the idea transformation. The researcher had therefor already 
established a set persona, sincere interest and made professional contributions to the 
collaboration before the onset of it being identified a potential case study in most 
cases. On an affective level this fully active participant level also benefitted the study 
as it allowed for a first-person confessional account. Having the single-person in-
depth reference point as a constant comparison increases the value of perceived 
relative themes evaluations. It also stands to reason that the degree to which this one 
individual field worker was able to influence and effect project development (with a 
fairly constant philosophy on change management and a dominant strategic stance) 
constitutes meaningful data for analysis in itself. 
 
 
Scientific (+D) vs. Ethical (+C) objectives tension  
 
Possibly a more relevant a concern would involve conforming to the deontological 
ethical rules of Newcastle University’s Ethics Review Board while maintaining the 
highest possible level of scientific truthfulness in capturing the naturalistic 
emergence, change, development, adaptation and transformation of complex ideas. 
To that end this thesis aspired to "abide by standards of professionalism and honesty; 
our efforts must strive to earn the respect and trust of both research participant and 
the public at large" (Ruane, 2005: 16) 
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Inherent rights of participants have been considered with privacy, respect, equal 
treatment and informed consent. Informed consent was obtained and the right to 
refuse and a confidentiality agreement was in place (Bedard and Grendron, 2008). 
Remaining truthful about the intent about the research was of no concern in this 
specific thesis. Tracking the transformative properties of an idea was also not a 
conflict with the objectives of the fieldworker sincerely and truthfully committing to 
objectives of the idea development as a part of a greater leadership collective. 
 
What was however a source of tension in this specific deontological ethical construct 
was that each of the collaboration’s ideas had already emerged and matured to a 
point of general viability because the detailed ethics paperwork required a high 
degree of specificity. Though this ethics administrative restriction may have 
precluded some observations from being included as data for scientific analysis, this 
did however not preclude archives of historic documents (as secondary data) from 
being used, nor interviews (as primary data) about historic moments in the 
development of the idea, and rescued valuable scientific data from being discarded. 
The Ethics Board approved the first four collaborations’ inclusion June 2014, and the 
final collaboration’s inclusion January 2015. Yet, in Part II each of the collaborations 
will present each collaboration’s unique point of engagement by the field worker 
which is different from this ethics approval date and truthfully constitutes Day 1 in 
the journey specific to the fieldworker entering the arena as a full participant. 
Scientifically this represents the most truthful snapshots about the idea’s 
evolutionary journey that could be presented and constructed out of the scope of 
permitted data.  
 
 
Participants (+C) vs. Actors (+D) tensions 
 
A second deontological challenged balance between conforming to rules and 
remaining scientifically truthful involve the estimated 367 of participants and actors 
naturally and unexpectedly encountered along a journey of five inter-organizational 
relationships in development. In some contained environments, the solutions were 
simple. For example, in the most extreme scientifically and ethically ideal setup, 
Collaboration 3’s gatekeepers allowed the use of audio-visual recording technology 
and workshop attendees’ received the information and consent form in their 
welcoming packet. They were fully aware that they were being recorded and observed 
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as a part of a research process on emerging innovation and had the option to opt out. 
Nobody opted out. However, in Collaboration 2, a very similar workshop setup, 
gatekeepers did not approve the use audio-visual recording technology for this 
specific research study (but did approve its use for institutional research). They did 
however approve the use of handwritten notes and research participant consent was 
provided. They also made workshop outcome report available to this thesis 
afterwards. And then there was yet a more extreme version of a similar scenario with 
dramatically different social-political rules that needed to be considered. For example, 
in Collaboration 4, a Health & Safety Board of Directors ‘workshopped’ entering into 
an inter-organizational partnership with the software start-up. In this example 
though it may have been ethically appropriate to include a form to request the use of 
board deliberations in the pursuit of capturing data for the emergence or adaptations 
of an idea during potential partnership discussions. However, it would have been 
wholly inappropriate to put this research study’s ethics interests ahead of the focus of 
the board on potentially forging a partnership with the start-up. To address these and 
similar concerns interviews and archived documents were once again deployed to re-
construct the snapshots of importance to maintain the highest possible level of 
scientific integrity. Furthermore, concerted effort was put forth to respect and 
anonymize geographic areas, organizations, and departments. Specifically, for 
individuals, role descriptors were used instead of names and non-relevant specifics 
were generalized while important context were maintained (Denscombe, 2010: 339; 
Maxwell and Beattie, 2004). This applied to both research participants as well as the 
important naturalistic actors who were instrumental in shaping the trajectory of ideas 
but were not actual research participants.  
 
 
Public (+R, +C) & (+S, +D) vs. Private (+S, +C & +R, +D) level data access tensions 
 
This also leads onto the limitation of not having identical access to observations, 
interviews and archived materials for comparative purposes. Especially in light of the 
fact that communication mediums were included amongst the themes makes this 
limitation worth addressing.  
 
To address this limitation, concerted effort was put forth to first obtain at least some 
representative samples of more individualized one-on-one archived material which 
did not include the field worker as a participant as was especially the case in 
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Collaborations 1 (e.g. email correspondence) and Collaboration 4 (e.g. audio visual 
informational interviews with experts). As it turned out both of these collaborations 
were driven more by smaller one-on-one dynamics relative to the other 
collaborations. A second method for addressing this limitation (and getting the 
necessary information because Collaboration 1 & 4 was driven less by communal 
interactions) included formal and informal conversations periodically over the course 
of the project development. In more formal collaborations with bigger organizations 
like Collaborations 1 & 2 this would include a 3-hour drive in the car on the way to an 
off-site project development meeting about instructional cultural constructs of 
executive management with intermediary decision-maker facilitators (C2), or almost 
monthly 20-30-minute telephone calls and/or emails with 5 questions about the one-
on-one access (C1). And in more informal collaborations with smaller organizations 
or start-ups where trust levels increased over time it included temporary password 
access to an organization general info email account to observe patterns in one-on-
one conversations (C4) after the email server service had been discontinued and 
listening and observing teleconference conversations as a non-participant (C5). 
 
Socio-Political Observation (+S, +D) vs. Intended Projection Tensions (+R, +C) 
Finally, when working with world-class expert strategists and specifically studying 
their socio-political interactions, a layer of complexity is added when it is also 
important to close the feedback loop. This is important both ethically and 
scientifically, but also offers concerns that need to be recognized and addressed 
especially if the field worker’s perceptions of the participants’ behaviours are: a) what 
participants believe they projects, or b) not the intended socio-political behaviour 
they wish to see represented in writing.  
 
Addressing the discrepancy between field worker and participant perception on 
behaviours is not too complicated in the context of this research undertaking. If 
during the process of closing the feedback loop, the fieldworker is rationally 
convinced that their perceptions need to be adjusted, then either faulty notes or 
memories get corrected or improved, or they get duped on something they were not 
very sure of in the first place. However, if the field worker does not agree the parallel 
data can be placed alongside for the reader to decide.  
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Addressing the issue of socio-political representation can be more cumbersome. If 
the researcher can improve the socio-political to also represent the decision-maker in 
the light they wish to be presented without changing data or findings another layer of 
valuable data has been added. However, if the wishful participant representation 
conflicts with the field worker’s perception of the data and thus contaminates the 
research findings then due consideration should be put forth to remove the 
information all together out of respect for the expert. In such a situation, it should 
however be explicitly mentioned that data has been removed. Collaborations with the 
greatest risk of this conflict would include collaborations with a more responsive 
stance that is especially politically astute like Collaboration 2 and 3. 
 
3.6.  Conclusion  
  
Contrary to the dominant modes in which emergent innovations are studied, this 
thesis is not framing it as extension of individual creativity nor experimental design 
in controlled environments. Instead Chapter 3 unpacks how the problem based 
framing research led to the methodology of naturalistic full-participant confessional 
ethnography over five collaborative case studies of experienced strategists embarking 
on the development of a new (potentially transformation) idea. It also specifically 
addresses how and why both rationally and behaviourally rich data sources were 
included for analysis, and openness to ambiguity was intentionally maintained to 
remain true to strategic decision-making under uncertainty conditions that strategic 
practitioners (and many researchers) naturally encounter.  
 
First the methodological implications of the working framework for the research 
design was drawn up. By allowing for collective representations of innovation to be 
collected within the context of a dynamic morphogenetic analysis, it was argued, the 
more iterative mode of conceptual theory development could be employed which 
would also parallel the strategic practitioner (and researcher’s) dialogue between 
theory and data. The goal was ultimately to evolve a collection of theories, keywords, 
frameworks, concepts and language of description to take the study of emergent 
innovation to the next level.  
 
Chapter 3 also unpacked a rigorous 24 step analysis process used not only in the 
triangulation of data (observations, interviews and archived materials), but also 
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leveraged diverse stakeholder vantage points on the research data to inform the 
construction of the strategic decision-making model and theory.  
  
Concluding Part I, the successive Chapter 4 will discuss and model as construct 
informed by the evolution of strategy theories and models over the course of the last 
century of strategy theory development. It will specifically look at emergence of new 
concepts informing the transformation of the field in its attempt to inform and 
contribute to practitioners positioning organizations in stronger positions for 
stronger decision-making under uncertainty and specifically dealing with the 
environmental emergence of the second industrial Consilience in mass 
manufacturing as well as the emergence of the third industrial Consilience of the 
digital and information age challenging the integration and consideration of 
additional constructs in the concept uncertainty. 
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PART II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMPERICAL 
DATA 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
COLLABORATION 1 
THE BLUE CHIP  
GENERAL COUNSEL CONTRACTING INITIATIVE  
 
 
I officially joined the project days after it was conceived by an International 
Association President (an ex-MNC executive) and the corporate legal counsel of one 
of the most renowned financial companies in the world. I got the invitation from the 
Association President over the phone while he was on layover in London’s Heathrow 
on his way to Finland and Switzerland. My Day 1 on this project was Wednesday, 
October 18, 2013. 
 
Over the year that this temporary collaboration was in full focus the intent was that I 
keep in touch with key strategists electronically to monitor the evolution of the how 
central tenants emerge and then physically be present and record all aspect possible 
without being intrusive at the two-day workshop where twenty or so members of the 
team come together to hash through the questions regarding standardization of 
complex contacts and standardizing their terms. Though numerically the contact 
does add up to more than twelve points of contact over the course of a year the 
distribution, formats, mediums and intensity took a surprising turn from the 
expected. Part of the reason for the changes from the initially conceived collaboration 
strategies was indeed centrally important to this thesis as the collaboration was 
observed planning for higher levels of efficiency, and contending with stretch goals on 
timing and level or partnership collaboration not meeting their initial high standards. 
What however did not change was the impressive list of some of the powerful MNC 
from a diverse cross-section of sectors that was at the table on day 1 included: 
banking and finance, pharmaceuticals, oil and gas, and consumer packaged goods. 
There was also little doubt that telecommunications and major computing companies 
would ultimately join. (Which was indeed the case). It was very important to the 
international non-profit serving as an intermediary that the specific companies’ 
anonymity be protected.  
 
Relative to the other four collaborations the contact on this collaboration changed 
most from what was expected. The contact medium for me and the participants were 
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highly centred around technology that bridges international divides and cuts down on 
costs. The duration to complete the specified initial goals took the shortest amount of 
time. It is also amongst the top collaborations where trust and expectation 
management was best managed. 
 
The year 2013 marked a higher point in the economic recovery, but a lower point in 
the populous perception of publicly traded blue chip companies. Internationally the 
energy surrounding the grassroots ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement had started to 
subside, only for its media coverage slot to be supplanted by an avalanche of news 
stories about unscrupulous corporate ethics with actions varying from international 
money laundering to embezzling CEOs.  
 
It may not have been as a result, but rather an extension of the situation, that 
strategic decision-makers in multi-national corporations (MNC) were more 
generously allotting resources and opening up to institutional change from the nexus 
of their general counsel departments. At least, this was the opinion of legal counsel at 
one of the strongest banks in the world and he made this speculative statement to a 
room of his peers. No-one in the room openly signalled they thought otherwise. The 
internal landscape was primed for change. 
 
In deciding what and how an investment in change should be brought about for MNC, 
Collaboration 1 (C1) followed the journey of a group of diverse MNC general counsel 
lawyers banding together in spite of the fact that they are often also advisories during 
boardroom negotiations and on Walls Street for investment capital. As in-house 
counsel, it was the day-to-day responsibility of these highly educated legal 
professionals to negotiate the best multi-million dollar contracts for some of the 
world’s biggest companies. Periodically these lawyers came together to earn 
continuing education credit, spar on solutions that emerged in the industry, and 
socialize. Interestingly though the problem framing of Collaboration 1 did not address 
the most pressing external public perceptions of the time. Instead, like all the other 
collaborations in this thesis, the focus was on how technology was changing the 
corporate landscape. In the context of this collaboration the objective was 
standardizing the processes surrounding complex Information Technology (IT) 
contracts. 
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Snapshot 1: Power Voices on and off the Conference Call  
Day 10 
 
I had to hit the ground running. The first significant snapshot on the project was Day 
10. I cannot claim it was visually riveting. The international teleconference call did, 
however, paint a high definition picture for the project’s strategic stance at emergent 
stages of the project. A newcomer it seemed as though it was just another 
international project chat by a diverse collection of professionals located on different 
continents. Nobody was particularly concerned with orchestrating the complexities of 
international time zones and country dial-in codes because all that had been 
automated or self-selected with streamlined software. In this snapshot, the people on 
the other side of the line included: The Association President dialling in from Sweden, 
an Association Senior Director from the US, an Association Associate from UK and 
one of the project participants from France.  
 
There were, however, two very powerful presences in the discussion who were not 
actually live on the line. Throughout the conference call their philosophical positions 
and objectives with the project reverberated through what was said. Powerful 
Influencer 1 was Corporate Counsel of an International Bank who was referred to 
before in the introductory paragraph. During the conference call, he was presented to 
be the grand architect of the project. Powerful Influencer II was a respected academic 
with specialties in contract law and experience in facilitating integration discussions. 
My role as a second academic researcher did not appear to impact the discussion. In 
the literature of the collaboration brokering intermediary International Association I 
discovered that the presence of academics was in fact often projected as a sign of 
prestige and impartiality which was often communicated to its members as having 
cache.  
 
During the conference call conversation, I did not speak much. I was thankful they 
could not see me sitting on the living room couch feverishly scribbling down a 
daunting array of information into my red research notebook. This allowed me to 
play catch-up with their fast pace as I jotted down the dense jargon and alphabet 
soup of contract law acronyms for later review.   
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The most important information to be collected from this teleconference call 
concerned the strategic stance. It was clear that the strategic approach was to not 
reinvent the wheel, but instead to duplicate a process designed and tested by 
Microsoft’s Corporate Lawyers, and University of Chicago academics. The previous 
year Microsoft pursued very similar objectives when it sponsored a two-day 
workshop facilitated by Corporate Contract Law Experts at the University of Chicago. 
During this workshop MNC corporation general counsel were invited to partake in 
discussions where complex contract templates were anonymized, pricing information 
and identifier information were obscured and the content was shared to focus on the 
terms that are generally considered universal. For the new International Association’s 
version of the workshop the time and place was yet to be determined. The price for 
participation was however set: $8,000. 
 
Over the course of the conference call six summary points emerged:   
1 Long-term Objective. Take relational contracting to the next level as it applies 
to negotiating complex IT software contracts to be flexible enough to adapt 
with the changes of the uncertainty of the environment 
2 Shorter-term Objective. Create a template of IT model principles so that 
negotiation can set a default and focus energy towards the variables what 
would be unique per project 
3 Project participants. At the point of the conference call Collaboration 1 had 
two MNCs that formally committed, and four were close to committing. The 
group was an impressively diverse cross-section of industries. None of the 
marked potential collaborators were software providers. 
4 Next milestone. The grand architect of the project was to host a professional 
development gathering for corporate general counsel in London at his 
corporate headquarters. Thirty minutes were budgeted for a short 
presentation and discussion on how complex contracting can be improved.  
5 Association President goals. He set the stretch goal of acquiring nine more 
official project partners at $8 000 (pay to play). 
6 Association VP Assessment of the situation. She had a generally positive and 
boots-on-the-ground informed disposition. She shared context and anecdotes 
of how corporate lawyers thus far had been responding to the collaborative 
objective. Many who were interested did not necessarily respond by becoming 
a paying partner but were interested in the outcomes of the study. 
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The conference call fit neatly into a considerate one-hour timeslot. 
 
Snapshot 2: The ‘How do you eat and Elephant’ Debate 
Day 20  
 
On the day before Day 20 of joining the collaboration I travelled by train to one of the 
tallest and shiniest towers in London’s Canary Wharf Financial District. The objective 
was to negotiate access to nine more project partners. One of the Snapshot 1 
conference call participants was going to be in the room (apart from me) – The 
Association Associate who was supposed to deliver the 10-minute presentation. 
However, this would also be the first time I meet Powerful Influencer I whose 
presence was evident on the conference call though it was not accompanied by a live 
voice (the project’s architect). It was his headquarters that was hosting the gathering 
of in-house general counsel seeking continuing education credit with this daylong 
event.  
 
The brisk morning traffic and formalized security rituals in the lobby of the blue chip 
Multi-National Corporation rivalled that of an international airport with hundreds of 
people coming and going. Once my passport cleared security, I received security tags 
to travel up to the sixth floor on the glass elevator (with yet another security officer). 
In and around the conference room, some thirty formally suited corporate lawyers 
with ties and even a few bowties stood chit-chatting politely with an early morning 
beverage in one hand. On the dominant meeting room wall hung a classic still life 
landscape painting in an elaborate frame. The wall to the exterior was a floor to 
ceiling glass window with partially closed blinds. The room was sizable enough to 
comfortably accommodate six round tables each with six chairs. I picked a seat on the 
left front table to allow me the best possible vantage point. Over the span of the early 
morning confectionaries, the Association's presenter as well as four lawyers joined 
me. 
 
Before the presentation the Associate presenter scanned the lawyers’ employers in 
the spiral bound agenda. I remember his opening remarks being that one third of the 
companies present in that room were already members of the Association (which is 
not exclusively for legal professionals). Almost as if on cue one of the two female 
lawyers in the room pitched in. “I just want to add that I am a member and [the 
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Association] is a truly great asset to [our company]. If you are not a member, I would 
recommend you look into it.”  
 
The presentation went well. The discussion that followed was partially facilitated by 
the Association Associate and strongly influenced by the Powerful Influencer I 
(architect and host). Of specific interest to this thesis was the room discussion that 
followed. Especially interesting was the respectful push backs from two or three of 
the attending lawyers. But these were not your typical pushback. Instead of 
challenging the objectives, values or the ethics in the coordination of contract 
negotiation, dissenting lawyers wanted to know why the project was not more 
ambitious. “We see the need for the bigger overall objective, why are you focused on 
the smaller short-term objective of model principles,” challenged one respondent.  “I 
am sure more people would be interested in working on the big picture objective or 
getting involved once that is the central focus” challenged another respondent. The 
Powerful Influencer I host stood his ground: “Yes, but how do you eat an elephant? 
One bite at a time.” 
 
It was not until after lunch that the group began to focus on banter about the 
speculative high price of the painting on the dominant wall of the room. At this point 
the group was more warmed up. In a respectful taunt, it also became apparent how 
Powerful Influencer I was revered by his peers (and not only respected as the host). 
At one point, he was called ‘the highest paid person in the room’ to which another 
lawyer responded, ‘it’s actually highest paid in this company now!” The room erupted 
in laughter.  
 
Whether that ranking was true or not, he effortlessly commanded respect of those in 
the room in both informal conversational banter and formal debate. It is also in 
retrospect that I realized he was one of the first attendees to take his suit jacket off, 
roll up his sleeves and chat back and forth by leaning back in his chair and putting his 
elbows out and his hands behind his head. It was only after lunch that I realized some 
other attendees had also started to follow suit. Silk-lined suit jackets were getting 
draped over empty chair backs and dress shirt sleeves were being rolled up for a more 
collaborative work appearance. It was also after a few hours had passed that 
presenters would address the room while leaning or backwards bumping against 
  77  
walls or pillars, or adopting a classier version of the Captain Morgan stance with an 
elevated foot on the crossbar of a chair while they ‘chatted’ with the rest of the group.  
 
When visiting in smaller informal triad or quad group discussions with the lawyers 
over breaks this projection of a collegiate spirit was also pervasive. These corporate 
rivals did indeed speak to each other in very respectful, yet playful ways. They 
confessionally practiced relational repairs by reminiscing on past negotiation projects 
where they took a hard-line stance on something they personally (project to) have 
thought was an unreasonable ask. The in-house lawyers openly envied and idealized 
others’ single company careers (and vice versa), plus they even shared frustrations 
like the new wave of offshore corporate negotiations to solicit peer advice. Duos and 
triads also debated the merit of the proposed collaboration project of this thesis. And 
time and time again I observed them re-arrive at the dominant room discussion: they 
could see merit in the long-term objective, but the short-term objective and investing 
money to be a partner now might not be a reality for their company. 
 
At the conclusion of the day the Association Associate closed the feedback loop with 
an email to key stakeholders from the Snapshot 1 teleconference call who were not at 
the event. He described the same observations I made at the formal group and small 
group level as follow:  
 
“The meeting at [the blue chip MNC] went very well. The audience got very engaged 
in the subject. One push-back (from [another blue chip MNC]) was: if we know that 
most disputes, claims, problems are around scope, goals, requirements, why focus on 
the ‘legal terms’ of the contract, are we not aiming at the wrong target. [The project 
Architect] and I answered that if negotiators tell us that they ACTUALLY focus on the 
‘legal terms’ then we have to move their focus, by reducing the time spent on the ‘legal 
terms’. Equally, we do need to (as a profession) simultaneously work on helping 
people to be better at working on scope, goals, requirements. […] Two people showed 
a lot of interest in joining the project […]” 
Association Associate 
Day 20 
 
Snapshot 3: The compartmentalizing email 
Day 46 
 
By Day 46 of my participation the how the International Association’s workshop 
would be different from the Microsoft workshop template became more defined more 
defined. Who or when over the changes were made over the preceding 26 days was 
not in my field of vision when interacting via email. Once again it was a more faceless 
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electronic medium of email that was used as the communication channel in which the 
message was conveyed to me.   
 
As an intermediary, the Association could and wanted to keep the separation between 
the buyer and service provider side much clearer. Additionally, it was confirmed that 
it was not just the partnership ambition that was stated to be sizable, but also the 
timeline was very aggressive which had ripple effects on subsequent strategic stances.  
 
“We are looking to engage more from the buy side at the moment and then hoping to 
engage the sell-side thereafter.  We’d like to have the project deliverables completed 
in Q1 of 2014 although that may be optimistic – it will depend upon the engagement 
of additional participants for the project.”  
 
Association’s Senior Director 
Day 46 
 
 
Snapshot 4: Buyer-side principles documented 
Day 195  
 
“Attached please find the talking points along with the Technology Services Principles 
for [The Association]’s IT Standards Project.  These principles were developed by a 
team of our project participants from the “buy-side” perspective and we are now in 
the process of seeking comments from the “sell-side” community.  Once we receive 
that, we will revisit the proposed principles. “  
 
Association Senior Director 
Day 232  
 
May 1, 2014 marked the official conclusion of the IT Standards buyer side principles 
document. In the tight run-up to the first quarter 2014 deadline and goal of 15 
partners, both stretch goals had been slightly relaxed and in the process of getting as 
close as possible to the stated goals one noteworthy alteration was made to the 
Microsoft workshop templates: instead of hosting a two-day workshop where the 
partners worked through the principles in-person, the intermediary association 
assessed that enough trust existed between the MNC partners to conduct the 
‘workshop’ long-distance over technology. In a phone interview with the Association 
Senior Director a few days later we spoke about the communication mediums used. 
She explained that they (she) had been relying primarily on online correspondence, 
but it took a lot of prodding and probing: “…some conference calls, some phone calls, 
and in-person meetings, but hundreds of emails”. 
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Ultimately the IT-buyer side partners constituted half of what the team was aiming 
for as the initial six committed, and only two more joined in the last few months. The 
new strategic stance of using asynchronous emails also considerably decreased the 
expected expenses compared to a workshop. Ultimately, however, the Association 
President explained one partner did drop out “due to funding reasons.”  
 
 
Snapshot 5: The launch of seller-side principles 
Day 217 
 
Three weeks after the Buyer-side process concluded, the Seller-side discussion 
commenced. In reviewing the back and forth email correspondence between one 
‘prospect’ IT service provider and the intermediary Association leadership a few 
patterns emerge. 
 
First there is evidence of offline one-on-one conversations that predated the formal 
email ask for partnership. Second, in this instance the correspondence and 
confirmation of commitment occurs fast over the course of four back and forth replies. 
Third, the conversation that starts on a midday on a Friday continues through into 
the weekend and into afterhours. Fourth, personal touches like addressing the person 
by their first name are evident as well as linguistic warmth signals. A fifth and final 
observation is that all members on the Association’s relay team are not copied into 
everything automatically. It starts as a personal conversation between the Association 
president and Assistant General Counsel and ultimately builds up to a carbon copying 
in of the Association’s Senior Director.  Towards the end of the weekend the 
conversation concludes with the Association’s Senior Director not carbon copying in 
the Association President on the finer details of the talking points.  
 
In observing the dynamics of the chosen communication medium, it is fundamentally 
apparent that even though email was used as compared to a more data rich face-to-
face channel, the detail and precision of email does also provide helpful proof for 
systematic and controlled thinking that would be harder to absorb had the dynamic 
been more abstract and conversational. However, this means a need for deliberate 
effort to be put towards circumventing what could be perceived as detached efficiency 
coldness. 
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“[Blue Chip MNC] will be one of three 'pilot' suppliers to review these proposals and 
thereby inform and influence next steps. The pilots have been selected based on our 
perception of the more reasonable and balanced companies in the sector! 
 
Association President 
Day 217 
 
 
Snapshot 6: Opening the telecommunications line 
Day 250  
 
One of the important conversations to discuss the broader context of a cryptic email 
received a few days earlier was initially set to take place with the Association’s Senior 
Director on Day 235. However, development in Istanbul, Turkey resulted in another 
cryptic email stating “Training is running longer.  Will need to reschedule.” email. It 
was not until Day 250 after the Association’s annual European conference that that 
things could be clarified. An interesting surprise twist was also in store.  
 
We started out crossing our ‘t’’s and dotting our ‘i’’s on the Information Technology 
project, establishing the context details specifically associated with the seminal 
emails of the previous two snapshots. The updated timeline set the goal on wrapping 
up the buyer-side input during the next month or two. However, somewhere in the 
middle of that discussion emerged an unexpected new thread. The Association was 
about to start a second similar project. This was not unexpected as by now I have 
heard several MNC in-house counsel express an interest in going wider than the 
contracting principles, but that was not the direction the project was moving. In fact, 
a new industry sector was being pursued: Telecommunications (and IT was now 
officially referred to as the pilot). Also, this round, instead of returning to the 
Microsoft blueprint that this project was initially built on, the team was planning on 
repeating this Delphi email communication strategy that emerged even though the 
association articulated “we have trouble getting the partners to collaborate.” 
 
The phone call lasted 30 minutes. 
 
 
 
Snapshot 7: Coffee with the president 
Day 255 
 
On Day 255, after over 75 emails and several hours of being in or on a phone line with 
him, I finally got a chance to have coffee with the Association President.  
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Of the dozens of emails, not all pertained to this specific project. The Workshop 
where we connected in-person was in fact one of the many other new projects he was 
considering launching. The list of potential initiatives was impressive, long, diverse 
and unique - which is why I am not offering details as identifiers.  
 
His short, cryptic, and to the point emails sold and pitched ideas without elaborate 
fanfare or details that could be construed as excessive. In some instances, this writing 
style meant a recipient missed some high viability ideas as was the case when the 
Association President pitched a book project in an email I was copied in on. It was 
several weeks later when I asked the Advisory Board Member (to whom the question 
was addressed) if he and the Association President were pursuing the publishing 
project because it sounded promising to me. The Advisory Board member had no 
reference of what I was talking about but revisited the email. Ultimately the team 
successfully closed on the book project with one of the leading publishing companies 
in the world. 
 
In-person the Association President and I talked not only about the IT complex 
contacting project at hand, but also the Telecommunications project that was to 
follow the same DNA blueprint. In conversation, it turned out a third more distant 
mutation of the same concept was also getting ready to launch in the energy industry. 
At the point of the conversation he was so immersed in that third iteration that he 
could recall the dates of the energy industry conferences EMEX in October and Excel 
in November and asked if I would be interested in attending to represent the 
Association because of my background and interests in the evolution of the energy 
sector. 
 
 
Snapshot 8: OJ with the board director. 
Day 256 
 
At the same workshop where I met the Association President I also met one of the 
Association’s Board Members. When I first saw her, I did not know who she was. She 
was young, international, pregnant, on crutches, and visibly days away from her due 
date. In other words, she was the perfect candidate for being underestimated.  
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However, underestimating her potential could not last long. Once I had a chance to 
have orange juice with her at a post-workshop networking event at the Art Museum, I 
learned about her life narrative. Her double PhDs which served as a creative solution 
to a visa obstacle. She focused her project management case studies on solving 
problems that seasoned professionals deemed impossible on mega projects. Also, the 
fact that she had recently earned a performance award in a male dominated field. I 
would list her as amongst one of the most interesting people I have ever met because 
her ability to defy expectations of socially constructed norms with results to back it up. 
It was no stretch to see how she would be at home on a team with a successful track 
record of rapid fire new initiative launces. But a question lingered in the back of my 
mind: how does one reconcile the methodology of how the Association President and 
Board Member go about introducing and developing new strategic indicatives with 
that of the systematic, controlled and detailed orientated lawyers?  
 
I allowed the question to marinade as I too moved on to my next innovative project. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
COLLABORATION 2 
 
THE ELITE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY INITIATIVE 
 
 
Like the Blue Chip General Counsel in Collaboration 1 (C1), this second group of 
strategic decision-makers (C2) were also responding to the aftermath of the world 
financial crisis. However, contrary to the nosedive of average stock prices at publicly 
traded MNC corporations, the top tier British Universities were up in enrolment and 
flushed with cash. A new 2012 national law impacting specifically British Higher 
education opened a floodgate of global students. Of concern, however was also the 
fact that the new 2012 law increased student tuition of British citizens and the long-
term implications of undergraduates graduating with debt waved a cautionary red 
flag over the impact this might have on non-traditional students furthering their 
studies. Like the blue chip corporate general counsel collaboration (C1), the higher 
education collaboration (C2) may have used economic and regulatory changes to 
open the strategy conversations in search of innovation, but once inside the decision-
making chambers it was apparent that here too technology was a dominant driver. 
 
I officially joined this initiative after the project architects decided it was time to open 
discussions to a broader and more a diverse cross-section of the stakeholders of the 
university community. On Aug 28, 2013, I responded to a closed group community 
Facebook posting requesting participants interested in joining a distance education 
steering committee. Twenty-four hours later a Student Council Representative 
emailed me on behalf of a staff member and informed me that they are excited to 
have me on-board. My Day 1 of being a part of this initiative was Wednesday, Aug 29, 
2013. 
 
Initially the collaboration signaled that developments would be conducted through 
in-person meetings as well as workshops and focus groups over the next year. Similar 
to Collaboration 1 the projected timeline was closely adhered to, but unlike 
Collaboration 1 the format did not change. What however did change was the 
ballooning requests or needs for joining more task forces, attending more group 
meetings and number of workshops being added onto the periphery of this project.  
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I attended 100% of the events that I was invited to and actively sought out to be 
involved in the spin-off meetings that had the most promise to materialize more and 
different positive outcomes. Of the spin-off non-invited meetings, I was also able to 
get information, reports and brain storming charts from a number of the others 
formal peer interactions. One of the important groups (Diversifying our Portfolio 
Steering Committee) met quarterly for a few hours, another central group (Changing 
the Learning Landscape Task Force) met every two months over the last six months 
with a two-day retreat off campus, yet other meetings (Workshop I and II) were 
intense day long marathon of workshops with different stakeholders, as well informal 
bigger group meeting work sessions often scheduled shortly before bigger group 
meetings that needed deliverables. Like with collaboration 1 I also intentionally 
sought out opportunities to have more informal contact to visit with key strategic 
decision-makers over beers or while driving back and forth from retreats. Ultimately 
the contact resulted in high spikes of multiple days of intense formal contact that 
lasted hours and demanded undivided attention followed by a couple of weeks of no 
contact.  
 
Even though Collaboration 2 lasted a similar amount of time (one year) the intensity 
and level of contact, the volumes of data, the number of people involved, the 
comparative in-person contact (for researcher and peers) vastly outnumbers that of 
Collaboration 1. In this specific case, this high level of workload was not a reflection 
on the level of success or even complexity of the initiative being addressed. Instead it 
appears to be a reflection on the culture of collaboration and turf protection 
mechanisms as new initiatives stand to threaten a status quo inside on organization 
full of high achievers. Though participants in collaboration 1 was also marked by top 
achievers in a different field collaborating, the mechanisms for trust worked better in 
the first collaboration. This was also reflected in the permission access to record as 
video and audio recording was not permitted, but handwritten notes were. 
  
Ultimately this project reflected the most standard and expected protocol for going 
about collaboration and development of new initiatives. It was also in the formal 
documentation of reports, minutes, press releases and presentations that the 
strongest verifiable elements of this collaboration emerged that could be 
independently corroborated. 
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Snapshot 1: Around the boardroom table with faculty heads 
Day 16  
 
The first meeting was on Day 16.  Just like the shiny skyscraper in London, the new 
state of the art glass University administration building required me to flash 
identification in order to get access to the elevator to take me up to the crammed 
board room. At least two people had to sit on the late comer chairs outside the inner 
circle of the conference table. Though I knew from the list of invitees I was (once 
again) at the bottom of the food chain, I was not one of the corner-chair-sitters. I was 
there early. The meeting kicked off with apologies for even more people who were 
unable to make the special meeting.  
 
Leading the meeting was a University Executive Administrator. I did not realize who 
she was at the time, but she comfortably stood out in the room (or possibly on 
campus) as the best dressed woman. Classic conservative. Neat. Stylish. Impeccable 
no matter what your personal style preferences were. She gently and neutrally 
introduced the concept of the MOOCs supplemented by a staff member short 
overview of some basic third party research on the topic she had stapled together and 
passed around for attendees to review. 
 
What was specifically of interest for the purpose of the thesis was the responses of the 
people in the room to the question: “Should the University get involved in MOOCs?”.  
 
The first responder was the University Finance Director. He was formal and 
conservative in his suit and tie very similar to the formality classification of the 
University Executive Administrator, but just a little less creative. His response was 
surprising. In my experience as an executive I had grown accustomed to the Finance 
Director’s role being that of a voice for moderation, caution and temperance. This 
Finance Director was different. He was a force for change. He confidently expressed 
his opinion that the financial position of the University is sound and that this should 
be leveraged to invest in new financing streams because today’s position with the elite 
Universities may not exist into perpetuity sticking exclusively to patterns of the past. 
He was not explicitly endorsing MOOCs, but he was clearly advocating for expanding 
horizons. 
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The second set of two responders were nondescript and did not offer much of a stance 
or a philosophy. But when the faculty senior administrators started chiming in the 
positions became interesting and clear. First was the Senior administrators at Faculty 
A. Two of them. I knew one of them from an unrelated project. We did not see eye to 
eye then, and as expected we did not see eye to eye during this round either. Both he 
and his faculty counterpart thought the benefit to their department would be 
negligible. They did not perceive it as worthwhile to their specific field. “Maybe we 
can dip our toe, but I cannot see the point of a research-intensive university 
immersing in this.” This gave the senior administrator of Faculty B seated in the late 
comer section the space to also express his doubts.  
 
At this point it was appropriate for Faculty C representative to state a position. I 
believe she was addressed specifically for her opinion. It was a calm and articulate 
woman with an alto voice who decided to share as a matter of a fact that the Medical 
Faculty have been doing non-traditional online teaching for about ten years. 
 
I could have left it at that, but it felt at the time that those who I perceived to be the 
heavy weights in the room had just dismissed the idea and closed the book. I felt as if 
I needed to speak up. First I tried to tackle the value that MOOCs could possibly have 
to a research-intensive university. I explained the importance of access to new data, 
studying how people learn, flipped classroom pedagogies. I also tried to address the 
community impact criteria so critical in the British REF evaluation system. When I 
was done, I felt a silence hang over the group. Maybe I came across a little too 
strongly. I felt uncomfortable. 
 
Walking out the door the immaculately dressed woman politely thanked me for 
offering my opinion. Traveling down the elevator the medical sciences faculty 
member also politely thanked me for speaking up. I appreciated the two kind people 
that made me feel better for stepping over the line. 
 
 
Snapshot 2: The press release surprise 
Day 35 
 
On Day 35, two weeks after the meeting where it seemed like a room of senior 
administrators indicated that MOOCs are not a new frontier, an understated email 
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arrived in my inbox. It was a bulk email to the stakeholders in the Snapshot 1 meeting. 
The email was cryptic. Only two words: “Please see” followed by a link to a news 
release. I almost did not even open it. 
 
As the email subject indicated, the University was getting involved with a new 
company. And then came the reveal in the opening paragraph of the press release: 
 
“The growth of [New MOOC start-up] continues as telecommunications giant [name] 
signs up to sponsor massive open online courses (MOOCs) for professional 
development, while three more world-renowned universities join the consortium.” 
 
Press Release issued Oct 1, 2013 
Day 34 
 
Amongst the three “world-renowned” universities were the one where I personally 
witnessed a lukewarm reception to the ideas of getting involved in MOOCs from that 
roundtable of senior administrators. 
 
The press release concluded with a quote from the University Executive 
Administrator who facilitated the discussion in Snapshot 1: 
 
“Our partnership with this [MOOC Start-up] will allow us to expand our existing suite 
of online programmes with the launch of two MOOCs in 2014. [Our] University 
started delivering online programmes over ten years ago and we now offer a variety of 
health-related courses ranging from Clinical Trials to Oncology. We have also recently 
launched a programme in Ageing which is one of the University’s major research 
themes. This new venture will enable us to reach new audiences to give them a taste of 
[our] University’s wide ranging subject expertise.” 
 
A few months later I asked the staff member who forwarded the press release how 
many of the people in that snapshot 1 meeting were aware of the possibility of this 
MOOC partnership actualizing a few days later. She answered very definitively 
without elaborating: “Two.” I could not tell for sure from her answer if she was on the 
inside or outside, but she clearly also thought about this with some amusement.  
 
The senior administrators who had expressed their doubts about getting involved in 
MOOCs never attended consecutive meetings. Their names were also not amongst 
those who apologized for absences indicating that they had been replaced by ‘less 
senior’ level faculty administrators who were more enthusiastic about the potential of 
MOOCs.  
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Snapshot 3: Keeping up with the Joneses meeting 
Day 135  
 
The second Steering committee meeting on Day 135 was in a corner conference room 
with more windows, on a higher floor of the building, and which included probably 
double the number of attendees compared to the earlier one with the Faculty heads.  
 
Also, as was appropriate, the meeting started with a review of what other Research 
Intensive Universities were doing with distance and non-traditional education. The 
University Executive Administrator also announced at this meeting a highly visible 
symbolic gesture to the importance of this initiative by announcing it was putting 
distance and non-traditional education on the front page of the University homepage. 
None of the other top 23 elite British universities had done that to this point.  
 
Further discussion visibly focused on what the other Universities had done and what 
should be done to not fall behind. This baseline and threat of what other Universities 
are currently doing and moving forward on would over time become a very strong 
referencing point as one of the stronger institutional mobilizers for change turned out 
to be fear of losing status as an elite university in relation to the peer group’s 
evolution. 
 
 
Snapshot 4: The “low hanging fruit” meeting 
Day 212 
 
Possibly the most revealing meeting on the strategic stance of this project happened 
on Day 212. By now two special workshops with outside facilitators had been hosted 
to get student and academic/staff input through three highly structured and 
informative Steering Committee meetings, and the assembly of a small special task 
force which had conducted a two-day retreat to work with the National Leaders 
Council in enhancing the quality and tools of education in Great Britain. I had been 
involved in all of these. Three MOOCs showcasing a general interest six-week course 
from each of the three academic faculties were also in development. I was not 
involved in these, but as it turned out I knew two of the instructors. I was well 
acquainted with both the Medical and Engineering Faculty’s MOOC instructors via 
this and other unrelated projects. 
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It was in preparation of the presentation at the second of three two-day retreats that a 
meeting with the University Executive Administrator was requested and granted. 
Invitees included the three-core people who had committed to attending the retreats. 
In descending order of who sent the most emails they included: 1) the project 
management staff member who owned one of the most artistic red coats I have ever 
seen. She was also the person who had sent out the press release in Snapshot 2. 2) the 
sharply dressed and articulate orator whose title was Head of Quality in Learning and 
Teaching, 3) myself. Also in attendance was an academic from the Engineering 
faculty who was not able to do the retreats but did partake in local taskforce 
development meetings. I do not remember his attire so I assume it was perfectly in 
line with what professors typically wear. 
 
The meeting commenced with a quick reference to intuitional financial commitment 
to this initiative. First and foremost, the University Executive Administrator made a 
point to share with the group that they were in the process of budgeting for the next 
academic year and she had money from one account that she was going to transfer to 
the development and execution of this initiative. This news served as a nice 
energizing boost.  
 
Another interesting side note announcement she made was that days earlier a 
separate committee had approved and granted autonomy to a group in the Business 
School to develop a HybridMBA program as a combination online-offline degree 
offering to launch September 2015. Days later I also sought out and volunteered to 
join this initiative in my capacity an instructor for the traditional MBA students. 
 
In the special meeting with the University Executive Administrator there was a 
central question: did she prefer an approach that is (i) a new and bold symbolically 
distinctive new pursuit of funding streams outside traditional student education, or 
(ii) a small, gradual systematic and quiet approach that leaves most processes in 
place as they are? 
 
The Head of Quality in Learning and Teaching took the lead in this discussion and 
walked the line flawlessly. He gave both sides equal consideration. The Project 
Manager followed in her boss’s footsteps in that and her personal preferences were 
  90  
also not evident. The Engineering Faculty member made the bold choice to express 
his preference. He preferred the small, gradual, changes ultimately resulting in better 
outcome. The University Executive Administrator concurred. “I hate to say it, but I 
think we should just go after the low hanging fruit. For now, at least.”  
 
At this point that I spoke up again. I wish now that in my researcher role I could have 
asked why she hated but preferred the careful route, but instead I spoke out as a 
participant in the project role and advocated for a bolder stance. Up to this point I 
had perceived that workshops, steering committee meetings and breakout 
discussions time had been dominated by the issue that the University IT system was 
built for the traditional student and that any deviation from that required manual 
overrides that caused innovators and responsive problem solver to hear a 
disproportionate number of “No’s” for requests to innovate and diversify revenue 
streams because it was too labour intensive for University clerks to deviate. If a new 
hierarchy framework could be built or at the very least a new parallel power system 
could be introduced to not just default to antiquated IT systems, better solutions to 
existing problems may organically emerge throughout the university. Though they 
were polite about it, my words did not have much of an impact. The decision had 
been made.   
As projected by the Head of Quality in Learning and Teaching, the meeting took 
about 90 minutes. 
 
Snapshot 5: The final blackburn off-site meeting 
Day 257 
 
At the final of the three 2-day retreats, I started to get a clearer understanding of the 
institutional politics that I had been so casually neglected to get acquainted with 
before recklessly espousing my own opinion in group meetings. It was not until Day 
257 that I was able to have this much-needed conversation during a work session 
with the Head of Quality in Learning and Teaching and the Project Manager in his 
department.  
 
By this time, we had spent hours together in formal meetings and presentations, but 
also informally had gotten to know each other while traveling and dining together. 
There was no doubt in my mind that both the Head of Quality and Project Manager 
were excellent ambassadors for new product development. The Head of Quality had 
  91  
launched and successfully executed on radical projects at the University that ran 
counter intuitive to traditional expectations, but was backed up by customer driven 
market research. He had also empowered his teams to be at the cusps of innovation 
as his industry evolved over the past 20 years. Several national awards from industry 
bodies echoed that he was not just catching up with the Joneses in the initiatives he 
headed up, but that he was the Jones’s Head of Household. Internally the University 
also rewarded him with promotions and interim positions when administrators had 
left. 
 
Likewise the Project Manager was a creative force. Outside of her university 
responsibilities she launched international communities online, set trends in the 
hobbies she was engaged in, and was a natural creator. Inside the university 
organizational structure, I had concerns that her contract structure was not set up to 
make the most of her creativity. She was employed on project by project basis and 
thus fundamentally incentivized to let any project last as long as possible to pursue 
career security. If many other staff members in her department were employed on the 
same basis, it would explain a statement that she made several times over the course 
of a year: “Once a pilot project launches it just continues. There is no system 
mechanism for pulling it back in. It just launches and lasts forever”. 
 
The two university political veterans were also able to offer other institutional context 
on getting initiatives to be approved. In an organic alternating dialogue, they 
explained that the University Finance Director was a big proponent of launching 
massive financial investment projects. He is especially fond of new skyscraper 
building or high tech addition projects. He did very well on those but wanted rational 
systematic evidence on where the new revenue streams will come from. This made 
sense based on what I have observed in meetings up until then (as well as in the 
context of the three new skyscraper campus additions that was being erected in the 
last few years). They conveyed that positivist research and data needs to be a part of 
any sales pitch for investment. Arguments for strengthening the University brand 
equity does not typically do the trick, but the first MOOC to launch’s high quality 
promotional video was surprisingly convincing in winning him over a few days earlier. 
The University Business Executive still needed persuasion. These were some of the 
task force’s toughest Executives who needed to be won over with the Steering 
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Committee’s Report and Recommendations that were supposed to be the deliverables 
at the end of the process. 
 
Possibly in response to overhearing the conversation (but maybe not) one of the 
National Project Managers leading the Change Management workshop lectures 
signalled to the University Project Manager (who was also a family friend of the 
Project Manager) that they have some money left over in their annual budget that 
could be used for outside facilitator workshops. In the past, they had both been 
involved in ‘journey mapping’ and thought that an expert in that method who also 
lives in the area would be a good outside facilitator. 
 
I was not familiar with “journey mapping” so they explained it as envisioning positive 
outcomes by soliciting and documenting first-person narrative perspectives of a 
shareholder that can help convey end-user, developer or administrator’s vantage 
points to decision-makers. Videos, photographs, narratives, timelines, blogs could all 
be a part of the binder of evidence that could be provided to the Executive Steering 
committee to help them see the possible future in a tangible way. I was not convinced 
that this was the way to go. It sounded like an affective approach that focuses on 
feelings and motivations, when they just finished described the Finance and Business 
managers as strategic decision-makers who demanded (and responded better) to 
more rational and cognitive approaches when they engaged in decision-making under 
uncertainty activity.  
 
Snapshot 6: The Journey Journal Workshop 
Day 331 
 
On Day 331 two independent sets of journey mapping workshops were ultimately 
facilitated by a young energetic male outsider who was described as an expert in 
specifically journey journaling. The location was a classroom with flexible table and 
chair configurations in one of the most historic buildings on campus. Each workshop 
had about 15 participants. All the familiar faces I expected to see were there, as well 
as attendees I have never met before. I was pleasantly surprised by the calibre of 
pioneering thinkers who decided to participate.  
 
In casual conversation with faculty attendees they spoke of their pioneering new 
technologies and methodologies in their classrooms as if it was common to push the 
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boundaries and experiment. Staff member attendees were ready and enthusiastic to 
explain to me how reoccurring problems highlighted in the past year of steering 
committee meetings could be solved from their points of view. This was in my 
opinion an impressive group of alpha movers. Also, as expected, a professional crew 
of ex-BBC members including a camera man, interviewer and producer (now 
employed by the University) whisked attendees away every few minutes to do an 
interview for the video deliverables to the executive committee. 
 
Two factors in this meeting were specifically of interest to this thesis in this meeting: 
(1) how had the workshop organizers decided to frame the problems to be solved in 
the session, (2) how different would the two independent group’s strategic stance be 
on solutions.  
 
Not surprisingly, the problem was framed as in the spirit of low hanging fruit. Only 
short-term priorities were of interest. “What is the 3-4 most important barriers in our 
organization?” Table 6.1 captures a summary of the workshop participants’ 
independently generated and voted lists of the biggest barriers.  
 
Group 1 Barriers Group 2 Barriers 
• Strategic Focus 
• Non-Emphasis on Non-
undergraduates 
• Integrated systems 
• Time to develop classroom content 
• Lack of investment and support 
• System (non-standard) 
• Strategic vision not clear 
• High level support 
• People are busy 
Table 5.1. – Higher Education (Collaboration 2) Workshop 2 outcomes 
 
The two independent workshop sessions recommended essentially the same list of 
next steps needed. Specifically, of note, was the fact that in both sessions of alpha 
movers a short-term priority was the need for longer-term planning.  
 
 
Snapshot 7: The Final Steering Committee Meeting  
Day 376 
 
On the final meeting of the quarterly steering committee meetings the usual things 
happened. A big group of 20 – 30 invitees from a cross-section of the university 
congregated in a room with lots of windows and a big conference table (configuration) 
that tied everyone together in progressing though a prearranged agenda with guest 
speakers on various topics and no action items.  
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At the final meeting the presenting guest speaker was the leadership of the Office of 
International Students. The speaker made clear that in a collective effort this was the 
best ideas for how diversification could occur from the perspective that it is an 
internationally acclaimed and respected University and this specific department’s 
mission was to strengthen this international position.  
 
An impressive list of about a dozen ideas was thoughtfully presented. Each idea was 
substantiated with feet on the ground insight on the international market and student 
base. Many of the ideas also pre-emptively flagged when and how the University 
historically pursued a similar idea that did or did not work out and an explanation for 
the department’s opinion for why. I liked all the ideas! The problem was a) all ideas 
could not possibly be pursued, and b) there was no structured mechanism for me or 
any person on the steering committee to reflect our support (or oppositions) based on 
our feet on the ground experience. Many of the ideas for diversification were very 
subject to non-consideration (or not full consideration) because the normative 
‘leadership’ behaviour process in the room was passive. It was also at this final group 
meeting that it occurred to me that strategically the input-output decision-making of 
the diversification steering committee did not rest with this collective of 20-30 people. 
On the input side, there was an agenda control filter that was not influenced by the 
steering committee leadership, nor would the steering committee report output to the 
executive board be driven by the steering committee. In the context of the steering 
committee structure we were the huddled masses and not strategic decision-makers 
on the topic we were recruited for. 
 
To discredit this point of view I tried to recall the descent that had happened in the 
room over the course of the year. Sure, the steering committee meetings had allowed 
for a space to speak up if one dared to break the safe consensus cocoon that was 
carefully spun. And yes, speaking out against the status quo did happen. Once. It was 
at this final meeting. One of the faculty leaders publicly criticized the MOOC 
organizers from Snapshot 2 for allocating disproportionate resources to his faculty’s 
MOOC compared to the MOOCs from the other two faculties that were to launch over 
the next few weeks and months. Maybe publicly stating key performance indicators 
helped, maybe it hurt. At the time the faculty whose MOOC was about to roll out had 
secured 13,000 sign-ups when the average MOOC in the collaborative platform 
system at the time had received only 5,000 – 6,000 sign-ups.  
  95  
 
This juxtaposition did however illuminate an alternative explanation for this large 
group’s long-term involvement. It was possible that some in the room were positively 
charged to become and stay involved opportunistically to drive broad change for the 
University as a whole. However, it may also be possible that another percentage of 
the people in room was negatively charged, and motivated with a watchdog vigilance 
for how they (or their department) would be impacted adversely or unfairly by 
imminent change. For the latter group, it was about protecting interests and 
resources from philosophical stances that could be shifting. 
 
 
Snapshot 8: The greenlit HybridMBA program 
Day 630 
 
As signposted in Snapshot 4 there was still the matter of the Online-Offline 
HybridMBA program that was being pursued. Unlike the three MOOCs that received 
in the facility of a quarter million pounds of resources and dedicated central 
University support to develop content over the course of about a year, the 
HybridMBA model looked much different. The HybridMBA’s chief architect was a 
Senior Administrator in the Business School with a unique portfolio of senior 
management level industry experience at blue chip multi-national corporations. 
Though the chief architect was a Steering Committee member he and the Business 
School Director had not attended the first handful of meetings or any of the 
University’s central workshops. They had however been conducting their own 
independent series of meetings and workshops. I attended many of these Business 
School meetings too and received photos and summary reports when I was not 
invited to attend.  
 
The HybridMBA’s solution to the concerns of the Marketing Department was to 
partner with a recruiting firm on campus as a separate entity. Their solution to 
concerns of the IT and Billing Department was to use SalesForce separately. The 
HybridMBA team’s solution to faculty’s concern regarding time limitations in content 
development was to keep the faculty hiring and contracting practices separate. And 
their solution for the Virtual Learning Environment was to use Moodle instead of 
Blackboard. Many of the issues that the big steering group had spent multiple 
sessions and hours discussing seemed to be discussed as casual information bullet 
points in this Business School group. 
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In several conversations leading up to the snapshot Skype conversation with the chief 
architect of the HybridMBA program, he shared with me details on the new practice 
based pedagogy that he built into the program and the new untested technology 
solutions. Two months earlier he had successfully gotten board approval on all of this. 
I had also studied the pedagogy very carefully for an unrelated project and was 
surprised to hear him explain that during the board approval process few if any 
questions were raised about the pedagogy because all the attention was on the new 
technology and structure. When we caught up for Snapshot 8 it was Day 630. 
 
The chief architect was Skyping-in with me from his hotel room in Dublin at a 
conference. From his voice I could hear he was tired. He also explained that for the 
last couple of days he had not been sleeping properly. The fact that he had an 
important meeting with the Director of the Business School earlier that day may have 
had something to do with it.  
 
As it turns out our usual five-point research project agenda on practice based 
pedagogy that I forwarded was not the only thing on our agenda, some new 
administrative developments on the HybridMBA were to be discussed too. He 
explained to me that after the meeting with the Director of the Business School 
earlier that day, that the HybridMBA pilot that was scheduled for take-off four 
months later has been ‘temporarily put on the shelf’. The related programs had the 
same outcome too.  
 
The reason, he explained from his point of view in polite but deeply disappointed 
language, was at its core a disintegration of the partnership with the recruiting 
company. The differentiating solutions of this independent pilot group had tied them 
to a partner that did not come through for them. He firmly expressed belief that there 
was still hope for the program to take off the following academic year. However, 
going forward, it would be a product of the traditional MBA program. He had been 
offered a new role that he considered even more exciting. “I feel much better now,” he 
reflected. “I have a list of about 30 or 40 [innovation things] I may do in the new role, 
so I am excited.”  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
COLLABORATION 3 
 
THE DISTRESSED LOCAL AREA’S  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE 
 
 
The third group of strategic decision-makers (C3) had a comparatively longer history 
of economic crisis to contend with. Specifically, the government and economic 
developers on the project persisted in framing the central problem statement over 
multiple observations, and over various iterations of the strategic stances, because of 
the need to address multi-generational unemployment. Here too the recent economic 
crisis provided a new resource and interest pool for collaborations and solutions. As 
was the case with the Collaboration 1 (Corporate General Counsel) and Collaboration 
2 (Higher Education), the formal rationalization got overwritten in feet on the ground 
discussions. An impressive and diverse collection of the geographic area’s industry, 
education and community leaders, as well as internationally esteemed professionals 
were brought together, but again the problem framing morphed into the causes, 
interests and expertise of the socially dominant contributors around the table. 
Collaboration 3 (Economic Development) ultimately also serves as another example 
where technology played a central role very similarly to technology solutions which 
dominated Collaborations 1 and 2. 
 
Though Collaboration 3 is presented third in the list of empirical data chapters, it was 
in fact the first collaboration to emerge. A social scientist exploring the possibilities of 
bringing together international researchers assisting in economic development and 
city planning invited me via email to get involved in this project at a very early stage 
of conception. Day 1 following this project’s development was June 24, 2012. 
 
Initially collaboration 3 was designed to be very strongly workshop driven basin of 
data (similar to Collaboration 1) with a tight control on capturing the audio and 
visiual data for intense analysis afterwards. Appendix D shows the informed consent 
form that also ultimately allowed for over 20 hours of a very in-depth analysis on how 
vocabulary and power was used to steer outcomes that was not necessary possible to 
observe and realize in the moment of dynamic interaction. Contrary to expectation 
though it became apparent that also including data from the extended period of 
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development before the Design Thinking workshop as well as the period of 
development afterwards became very important in informing the trajectory and 
changes that truly informed the emergent innovation.  
 
Over the course of the development of this collaboration approximately 7 government 
sector employees, 14 education sector, 20 non-profit sector employees and 14 for-
profit sector serving a specific geographic area in England entered into a temporary 
collaboration. With time it became apparent that including the informal meetings 
and literature that was put together before and after the workshop was also important 
to the emergence and trajectory of the innovation. This also resulted in being the 
collaboration with the longest lead time (two years) plus another delay in building 
momentum afterwards (again two years). Relative to the other collaborations 
minimal of the fundamental communication occurred via telecommunications in this 
collaboration. Essentially technology served as a support vehicle in arranging for in-
person meetings, yet it was via this specific collaboration’s light use of 
telecommunications that informed the foundational anchors of the M3 theory when 
on June 16, 2014 the field researcher realized how strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty has been occurring on four different socio-cognitive modes that 
stakeholders may not always see eye to eye on. In consecutive tables, this date is 
denoted as the emergence of the four modes on table timelines featuring the 
important moments of each initiative’s journey.  
 
 
Snapshot 1: Getting into a locked room 
Day 464 
 
After a few false starts over the course of more than a year, a very strange calendar 
request popped up a few days before Day 464. I received three clues:  
 
Calendar entry name: “liddi”  
Date: “Tue, October 1, 2013, 13:00 – 14:00”; and 
Location: “[university] bus school in café” 
 
The question was: “Going?” and I could select “Yes” “Maybe” “No.” As big new 
adventures typically don’t start with “No”, I selected “Yes”. But in the back of my 
mind I half expected that was not only a typo on the cap lock, but also some letter 
mixing was going on and the meeting was with me as “Lindi” and not an interesting 
new person I was about to meet. Either way, I was planning on showing up. 
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The day of the meeting ended up being a fine balancing act of meetings stacked back 
to back to back. I could budget for a 30-minute overflow past 2 p.m., but after that I 
had to run to my next meeting. As it turned out the meeting was not only with a new 
person named ‘Liddi’ but also another person that I had not met earlier. However, the 
perfect storm of a delayed arrival, upon misplaced meeting room key, friendly casual 
banter, and special accommodations request, had me biting my lip. 
 
Situational incidentals aside this was a different kind of meeting. As I was introduced 
to the new personalities, a lot of the interaction focused on who they knew. Social 
Scientist I can be defined as the person with the international rolodex of diverse 
international renowned researchers and pioneering practitioners. He was the central 
figure who brought everyone together. Consultant I also spent a lot of time focused on 
her international researcher’s rolodex, but in the group her point of differentiation 
was connections to British politicians. Non-profit Leader I also focused on political 
leaders but her point of differentiation was local city council leaders in addition to her 
non-profit leader peer group. Over the next years what the group defined as the 
problem in need of being addressed ranged dramatically. However, contrary to 
Collaboration 1 and 2, the method on how to fix problems remained fairly constant: A 
Design Thinking workshop was being planned for one or more city council who was 
willing to open the door to a collaborative conversation and were willing or able to 
commit £30,000 in long-term funding. 
 
 
Snapshot 2: Impromptu academics conferencing 
Day 703 
 
Eight months later, on Day 703, came snapshot 2. I had even less preparation for this 
meeting. In fact, it was so impromptu that the invitation came only minutes before 
the meeting. Two American friends were in town for the day to visit me so when I 
went in for the scheduled meeting, my friends opted for killing time by wandering the 
curvy and raining historic English streets. When the new meeting invitation was 
extended, I had no mobile connection to them to let them now I may be a few 
minutes late in connecting back up with them. The impromptu meeting lasted more 
than an hour. Again, I believe my disposition during the meeting must have seemed 
on edge. 
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During this meeting Social Scientist I was joined by a new Social Scientist II and III. 
Additionally, a University development officer was also a part of the group for the 
first part. It turned out the University was prepared to make major financial 
contributions into the Design Thinking Workshop scheduled for next month, and 
since a Major Metropolitan city in the vicinity agreed to be the subject of the 
workshop, the workshop got the green light.  
 
Once the University development officer excused himself after collecting the 
information that he needed, the tone of the meeting evolved into a peer-to-peer 
exploration of what this workshop could mean to academic researchers. Social 
Scientist I shared his vision of an economic development accelerator being founded 
that would not only offer access to research data once through a workshop, but into 
perpetuity as start-ups are founded and supported inside an accelerator. He 
proceeded to show a prototype of what he meant by bringing up the website of 
colleagues from a previous international university who had done exactly that. 
 
The research access angle was not new. This had been a focus for years. In earlier 
iterations of the plan it was researchers in Australia, Norway, Wales, and Portugal 
that were his collaborators. The uniting thread between them at this earlier time 
however was not an accelerator but a technology platform. The access he was 
granting to Social Scientist II (a Human Resources expert) and Social Scientist III (a 
freshly minted PhD graduate and new faculty member in entrepreneurship) was new, 
and so was the idea of the accelerator. 
 
He concluded by explaining how fifty hand-selected community and national leaders 
would be invited to the meeting. Each of the primary partners were allowed ten 
invites. The categories were a fairly equally distributed among:  
a) City affairs 
b) Education 
c) Non-profits 
d) For-profit stakeholders 
e) Development associations 
 
On Social Scientist I’s list, he made special note of construction professionals in 
construction from London who would be at the workshop so a new elaborate building 
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could be built to suit needs. He also shared that an expert in accounting and legal 
contracting would be coming so that shared professional services could be established 
for start-ups.  
 
At the two-day workshop I also had the chance to visit one-on-one with both Social 
Scientist II and III. I was surprised to learn that both attended without having a 
research objective or a clear idea of how they ultimately stand to benefit. Social 
Scientist II (the more senior of the two) summarized it well in single sentence. In 
response to the question, why did you decide to attend the workshop, he answered: 
“When a person like [Social Scientist I] tells you to jump, you just jump.” 
 
 
Snapshot 3: The risk and the cafeteria plan  
Day 723  
 
“Hi Lindi, I am meeting the leadership team from [the city] at [City Hall] tomorrow at 
10.30 at [City Hall]. It’s a last minute minute meeting but come along if you like (for 
your research).” 
Email from Social Scientist I 
Day 722 
 
It happened again. Not enough information to make a decision. This time I had a 
conflicting doctor’s appointment and I was a three-hour train ride away from the city 
where the meeting was supposed to take place. I needed more information to decide 
if I wanted to take the risk of attending this meeting. If the content of the meeting 
was ‘where to put the coffee and confectionery tables’ and ‘how many microphones 
are needed’ for the workshop, it was not worthwhile. I was in physical and emotional 
pain. I wept. It was also at the intersection of this very moment that I realized the 
common theme throughout the collaboration case studies. Needing to make decisions 
and not having enough information. Uncertainty. Ambiguity. Risk. It was not just 
keyword in an academic journal anymore. Strategic decision-makers had been 
exhibiting very fundamental differences in how they responded and strategically 
positioned to not having information or what information they focused on in light of 
not having perfect information. And I could code these to observe patterns. 
 
My response to the cryptic email was to email and explicitly request more 
information. Unfortunately, the information contained in the response did not help 
me make the decision either. Ultimately, I made the decision to attend - not as an 
informed person but as a principled and conscientious researcher. I cancelled my 
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medical appointment and packed my bags for the train. On Day 723 at 10:30 a.m. I 
was waiting for Social Scientist I in the lobby of City Hall. 
 
Accompanying Social Scientist I was a Research Assistant from another research 
subject group with an interest in design thinking. Together the three of us took the 
elevator up one floor to the Economic Development department offices. After 
checking-in with the receptionist, two economic developers stepped out and 
announced that all their conference rooms for five or more persons were in use. The 
solution was to meet downstairs in the city hall cafeteria before the lunch crowd 
showed up.  
 
In the words of first impressions expert Amy Cuddy (2011), the male and female 
economic development team exuded the perfect balance of the two qualities that 
dominates 80-90% of first impressions. The male strongly exuded competence for the 
team, while the female strongly exuded warmth on behalf of the team. This made the 
conversation develop well. There was absolutely no need for me to take a lead in 
directing the conversation as it meandered through unrelated topics that provided 
helpful background information on who the people at the table were. 
 
The conversation started with pleasantries and compliments about the beauty and 
cleanliness of the city and about the green transportation options. On cue of the 
topics ranged from school drop-off times to, familial topics of toys, and how this 
project could create a better community for offspring highlighting Social Scientist I’s 
personal long-term commitment to the project.  
 
But after about 30 minutes I started to feel that the rationalized and systematic 
components that specifically apply to framing the workshop were eerily absent. As a 
professional and experienced Economic Developer myself, I was surprised that this 
stage did not organically surface. My central interest for this thesis was capturing 
details on what specific economic development challenges the city was hoping could 
be solved by getting involved in this specific collaborative problem solving workshop. 
So after about an hour I directly asked what the economic developers hoped this 
workshop would achieve. The answer rang like a well-rehearsed buzzword in a city 
hall (cafeteria): ‘multi-generational unemployment’ solutions. In this city, the 
professionals perceived that drug abuse was at the centre of the problem. By focusing 
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on social enterprise start-ups, they could create jobs as well as add economic value if 
community generated solutions were brought about by local citizens who understood 
the complexities of the problem in relation to the people they lived and worked and 
engaged with locally. It was their hope that more local solutions might be able to 
succeed where more centrally controlled solutions passed down from London had 
failed in the past. 
 
Like the meeting with the Social Scientists in Snapshot 2 this meeting also invested a 
considerable time reviewing the list of invitees and their credentials. Towards the end 
of discussing the attendance list again, Social Scientist I turned to me almost 
disappointedly: “I thought you would take more notes on details about the attendees.” 
It seemed important to him. I reassured him that I have not only constructed an 
Excel spreadsheet with each attendee and their affiliation, but I was also monitoring 
the project website where he had asked attendees to post their biographies and 
credentials.  
 
 
Snapshot 4: The ‘White Knight’ Two-day workshop  
Day 736 & 737 
 
Finally, the big Design Thinking Workshop event arrived. It was Day 736 & 737. The 
location was a spacious modern design building. On the third floor overlooking the 
river fifty-five attendees gathered around one of nine round tables with 6-8 chairs. 
Lots of tactile and colourful toys and tools was available on-hand. This time around 
nobody was going to accuse me of not taking enough notes. As always, I had my little 
red research notebook, but in the corner of the room I also set up a recharging and 
data downloading station with a full suite of technology that I owned or had 
borrowed from friends. There was an extension cord, laptop for data downloading 
and recharging, external memory drive, iPhone for backup of audio, photos and video, 
my iPad for mostly audio, and a GoPro mounted on a hacked 360 rotating egg timer. 
I was ready for data.  
 
Leading the workshops were two international experts in design thinking. Both had 
roots in the cradle of design thinking from Stanford University Design School. But the 
younger of the two had moved back to Europe recently. They had arrived the previous 
night and had not had extensive boots on the ground experience to understand how 
the specific nuances of this specific environment might be different from that of the 
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areas they were more familiar with. They seemed comfortable with the potential that 
this would organically unfold over the course of the workshop. 
 
The first day of the workshop was mostly dedicated to training the participants in 
design thinking. The social entrepreneurship focus was a difficult fit with a 
methodology that had been homed in more tactile engineering and concrete products 
as the Stanford University and IDEO3 examples throughout the finely tuned 
presentation materials would demonstrate. During the prototype building phase 
groups were also encouraged to keep things concrete with personification of social 
problems. They were also steered away from trying to advocate system overhauls and 
instead were directed to focus on that which the people in the room had power and 
control over here and now.  
 
Nonetheless, when a room of 55 participants were asked to pick which solution from 
a of list of eight types of solutions they would like to spend their time developing, the 
attendees allocated themselves into one of three categories. Over the course of the 
two days I spent several hours with each of these three groups to understand the 
strategic stance they were developing and advocating. 
 
Group 1: Abstract System Overhaul  
(58% of attendees) 
 
Two mega groups interested in exploring this tract located themselves in the back of 
the room. Though the system development did not work so well for the Design 
Thinking framework the majority of attendees either did not understand this or chose 
not to conform to the Design Thinking framework. I was surprised to see two core 
leaders who had been invited about half of the attendees (Consultant I and Non-
profit Leader I from Snapshot 1) had chosen to join the A and B iteration of this path. 
Other participants who chose this path were generally also the leaders invited by 
these two organizers: non-profit leaders, city leaders, national and regional 
association leaders and non-educators.  
 
                                                 
3 IDEO (pronounced “eye-dee-oh”) is an award-winning global design firm that takes a human-
centered, design-based approach to helping organizations in the public and private sectors 
innovate and grow. They famously invented the first computer mouse for apple and even an 
animatronic whale for the movie Free Willey. 
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On the second day after lunch, one of the Abstract Change Group spokespersons 
communicated that every member of his group was experiencing frustration 
articulated as ‘struggling a bit’ with coming up with prototyping solutions. The 
younger Facilitator II summarized why that was expected given the strategic stance 
they took and gave them a reframed direction to try for the final 2.5 hours of the day: 
 
“You are touching on a wonderful aspect of. of design led innovation and principles. 
And this is the ability and actually the permission to reframe the problem. We are 
usually having to take this permission without actually having been given it from 
[…authority figures…] So you have the permission to reframe the problem. Absolutely. 
Ummm…maybe, go into action mode, and rather than think of what you would like to 
have, start to think on what are the things that you can do to get there. […] Then 
things become more actionable. […] You have a very complex systems approach, and I 
think you have ample opportunity to prototype, and I agree. I agree it is not simple. 
[…] I am curious to see what you are going to come up with. 
 
Facilitator II 
Day 2 
Day 2: 13:21 
Duration stamp: 01:43 – 03:14 
 
 
The few rounds of responses to his statement made it look doubtful that they 
understood what he was saying. However, eventually, Abstract Systems Group A did 
come back at the end of the workshop with prototype solutions that connected 
specifically into the accelerator group’s starting point. 
 
Right after the Abstract Systems Solutions Group A voiced their frustration the 
Abstract Systems Group B sensed that a space had been created to also voice their 
frustration. In possibly the most heartfelt plea of any workshop attendee a non-profit 
leader articulated her point of view after lunch on the final day in four and a half 
minutes:  
 
“And I am looking here, for people here today who is going to help 
my…umm…organization [A regional council of services]. When the man here 
mentioned a one-year city he spoke up about social enterprises and gave everybody 
information about [our city] and he mentioned this and that and the other .[…] I am 
the founding director of the organization and we are now […] one of those families in 
[our city] […] I want do something that is in my position when I was five or six years 
old […] and it has been nothing but hard graft.  
 
[…] So I am here today appealing. You talk about plans and you have this image, and 
you have social change in economics and one thing or another, but at the end of the 
day what we are delivering are services to children and families who are most 
disadvantaged and impoverished in the country (just this part), we delivering services, 
we are told by the authority, were told by NHS, we have taken data, we have social 
internal investment, we have our equity anox, we punch well above our weight, we 
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have about fifteen counsellors and practitioners, all qualified, most of them have been 
service users, and all of them are from [this city]. You tell me what you need and I will 
get it for you. But what I want to hear is some guarantee back. That whatever comes 
out of the day, help organizations like the one that I have founded. And I am going to 
make this public now, because not many people know, that in come November if we 
don’t get £45,000, if we don’t raise £45,000 [over the next four months], we don’t 
exist anymore. And it’s alright can we save [My Regional] Council Services, flagship 
social enterprise, but that is the reality.  
 
We take it on the chin. We say nothing. We do professional stuff, and we continue to 
deliver services to people and we pretend it’s all right. But in the mic. At least I speak 
[the regional dialect], at least I could relate to most people, I can get people brought 
in, I can go into communities I can help people wanting a chance and engage with 
communities. Dead easy. I can get you thousands of clients, that is not hard. I know 
where people are. The services that we provide were not in the right places. They were 
not that easy to get to.  
 
So anybody here, that can stand by my side, and help me to raise the money that I 
need to help the residents of [this city], the children of families and keep them 
together. I would be grateful for a glimmer of some of that.  
 
And this today, it is not about all this stuff up there (points to mind maps and 
colourful index cards with ideas), it’s about humanity, and people and [our city] 
standing together because it is an excellent community. And we are innovative. And 
we are fighters. We were the big society before anybody even came up with that. You 
know I have a thought about that. It must have been somebody in [our City] because 
we are doing it! 
 
(applause from the room of attendees that lasts 10 seconds) 
Day 2 
Duration stamp: 08:02 – 12:30 
Non-profit Leader II 
 
The Workshop’s Junior Facilitator responded to her with a hug and a polite thank 
you for giving a real-world example of who this workshop is trying to serve. He then 
moves on to another group for their group discussion feedback. At an aggregate level 
or collective leadership level, her call for action never got directly addressed. 
 
 
Group II: Incubator Space  
(26% of attendees) 
 
Like Group I, this solution also saw the emergence of two independent smaller 
groups addressing the same solution. Though the Social Scientist I who initiated this 
effort was visibly neutral during the workshop by not sitting down at any table and by 
roaming the room with a camera, this was the idea that he had been prepping his 
attendees to develop beforehand. It was thus not surprising that his workshop 
invitees and special invitees who travelled up from London and were social scientists 
or researchers at his department at the university who predominantly populated 
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these two teams. The group also contained the consultant invitees. Equally important, 
the male and female city Economic Developers split up and joined these two 
iterations of the same idea.  
 
What was not said was most important in this segment. None of the workshop 
attendees introduced, discussed or developed doing a maker’s community. The 
closest that discussion came to that option was during closing remarks of another 
group’s idea (which was also unrelated to the maker movement). The Junior 
Facilitator verbally interjected:  
 
“The high street idea triggers some idea. Some friends of mine in Trondheim. We 
have the highest engineering density in the whole of Norway and we don’t have a 
single maker space in the city of Trondheim. Why? I don’t know. It’s a bit strange. So 
a couple of students decided to take matters into their own hands and they spoke with 
the city council and they actually got a building which is on the [main downtown area 
walking street] that is supposed to be demolished in a couple of years. But they got it 
for five years. They don’t pay rent and three story two sub story building and they 
have enormous amounts of space and they are just setting up a maker doing space 
with this café with everything and they are really right in the centre and they putting 
their project into the window. Whenever you pass by there is some cool stuff 
happening which is, which is quite nice.”  
Junior Facilitator 
Conclusion Day 2 
Timestamp: 15:30 
[Duration: 09:35 – 10:49] 
 
The reason this case study is documented in the snapshot is that unbeknownst by 
anyone in the room at the time it would ultimately subsume all the developments of 
the workshop and the Facilitator’s Idea would ultimately became the definition of the 
next strategic stance from hence forward. 
 
 
Group III: Youth Entrepreneurship Training Program  
(16% of attendees) 
 
The final and smallest iteration was also the only group to embody the core principles 
of grassroots bottoms up design thinking. I joined them during their final breakout 
discussion outside on the patio in the English mid-summer sun. 
 
To the person each of the attendees found a way over the course of a few minutes to 
showcase their diversity. The eight persons who picked this track all had boots on the 
ground experience in teaching at different education establishments, worked with a 
range of different level and aged students, and had expertise in different subject 
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areas. In interactions, they listened supportively with verbal and nonverbal 
affirmation and tried to take on-board new diverging ideas to make them fit into 
broader baseline ideas. They also spent a considerable amount of time looking at 
their project from multiple points of view. Even when youth, University students, 
university lecturers, university administrators, and executives would need the project 
to be structured in a specific way to increase likelihood of buy-in, they would 
seriously consider if things could be changed or altered to increase success. In 
verbally articulated language, they were inventing (and calling copyright) on new 
words like ‘new bottom’ and creative metaphors. For example, they considered 
themselves a ‘dark horse’ compared to the other collaboration teams in the workshop. 
Their best central idea was their ‘white horse,’ the one that was most underestimated, 
but had the best potential was a ‘Trojan horse.’ Their collection of ideas was a ‘stable 
of horses’ and due to the early phase in the development phase the majority were 
coined as ‘ponies’.  
 
The most interesting phenomena observed was that the smallest group was also the 
only group where an idea was conceived and developed over the course of two days in 
alignment with design thinking principles. During the group’s conclusion remarks to 
the bigger group of attendees the spokesperson made another empowered 
announcement that the internalization of self-efficacy had also been achieved. He 
explained that this project would be moving forward regardless of the broader 
workshop group’s support and invited those who wanted to stay involved to get in 
contact with him. This was fuelled by a positive response from the small subgroup a 
few minutes earlier:  
 
“I will go away and write this up, actually, and circulate it to everyone. Yeah, you all 
have my [business] card so if you can just send me your email addresses I will send it 
to everyone.” 
Various members of the group: “Yeah, yeah.” 
“And we can refine what I have written and we can pull it all together. Umm I will try 
and get that done over the weekend, some time. How about that?  
 
Lecture at University II 
Group 3 discussion Audio Day 2 15:18 
Time stamp 31:48 – 32:09 
 
I took special care to make sure he also had my email address. Sadly, the email 
synopsis and invitation to the follow up meeting never came. The head organizer also 
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did not hear that the energy and passion for the idea generated at the design thinking 
workshop sustained itself.  
 
 
Snapshot 5: The design factory  
Day 738 
 
As was arranged verbally, I arrived at the Hotel where the two facilitators were 
staying a few minutes before 9 a.m. so the core collaborative leadership team could 
meet with the facilitators before their flight back home. Nobody was around. When I 
inquired with the front desk about the location of the reserved meeting room, the 
receptionist assured me that no meeting room had been reserved. No problem, the 
group was not that big, there was plenty of seating to meet in the lobby. I sat down in 
a location that allowed me to see the lobby door as well as elevator when the leaders 
would arrive. Five minutes passed.  
 
09:04. Still nobody. Maybe I had the wrong hotel? I inquired again with the front 
desk receptionist about whether I have the correct hotel. Was this the hotel where the 
workshop facilitators were staying? Again, I inquired with the front desk. Yes, they 
confirmed. And no, they had not checked out. The front desk also offered to call the 
room. No answer. I sat down again. About five more minutes passed.  
 
09:09. Maybe there was an email reminder or change in plan? I checked my emails. 
Nothing. I shot the Social Scientist I organizer a quick email: “At Jury Inn [Hotel]. 
Nobody at reception can help id where the meeting is being held. Please advise.” Five 
more minutes passed. No response. 
 
09:14. A text appeared from the female Economic Developer. She apologized for 
running late. Relief. I did have the time right. Location might still be wrong. 
 
09:19. The male Economic Developer walked in through the lobby door. Relief. I did 
have the location correct. We sat down and while we wait for the others we visited 
about his perceptions on the two-day workshop. In his mind, we were still firmly 
working on solutions for the multi-generational unemployment. I picked up some 
statistics that I wished had been was communicated at some point in the workshop: 
“population of the city proper is 200,000 (1 million in the greater metropolitan area). 
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Unemployment is 3,000, which is high but not completely out of line with the rest of 
the nation. The number that is concerning to his team was that five times as many 
people (15,000) are registered as sick and disabled. The impact of this number puts a 
very different strain on this government’s city council as opposed to most other 
councils. We chatted for approximately 30 minutes. 
 
09:52 Non-profit Leader I walked past us from the patio on her way to the restroom. 
She explained that she, Social Scientist I and Research Assistant have been meeting 
with the two workshop facilitators out on the patio outside overlooking the river. We 
joined the party outside on two hard parallel wooden benches. The two workshop 
facilitators (from snapshot 4) and Research Assistant (from snapshot 3) sat together 
on one side. The Social Scientist project leader and Non-profit Leader I (from 
snapshot 1) sat on the other side.   
 
Over the course of the next 15 minutes the female economic developer and then later 
the Consultant I (from Snapshot 1) also arrived. The same content gets repeated 
(three times) by the Senior Workshop Facilitator every time late comers join the 
group. It is very important to him to articulate why scepticism in the process was 
unfounded. It turns out during the concluding night’s social function that scepticism 
with the process had been a core topic of discussion. One after each other the 
leadership collective at the table reassured him that they were not doubting the 
process like other attendees may have indicated. 
 
A few minutes later the Senior Workshop Facilitator’s taxi arrived to take him to the 
airport. He departs. 
 
Next the Junior Workshop Facilitator pushed what he called his number one 
takeaway that he wanted to leave the group with. The need for ‘a product.’ An artefact, 
a prototype, a story so it can be presented in a very direct way. This would also make 
communication ‘tangible’. 
 
Today words that he used as a metaphor a day earlier in his concluding remarks to 
the Workshop group also became “tangible.” The “create the space” metaphor became 
“create the building and bring people together,” “create an environment for doing not 
talking.” “Tools” become “I give you access to a 3D printer, wood, material…this is 
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why I like the maker scene so much. Suddenly you put the power in the hands of the 
user. This is something you all should consider.” We were now explicitly back full 
circle to the idea he presented to the broader group in the last few minutes of the 
workshop. 
 
The Social Scientist’s response at first seemed like he was just reporting on how he 
believed that the Professor Emeritus who made a presentation on the last day after 
lunch would be the key in executing a ‘pushing from the top’ execution for this 
initiative. A meeting between the two of them was scheduled to take place that 
evening: 
“The objective of the meeting is to ask him “What are we going to do, what is the 
product? I have no fucking clue what the product is going to be. Now, now I don’t 
need to know. This is a co-created product. One of the things I am going to say to him 
is, this is, (knocks on table) at least some product we can be done together, the 
university and the city. Not a centre, but something around enterprising society. It is a 
space, you know. 
 
Again, we were back full circle to the incubator idea that he pitched to his invitees 
before the event. In vivid detail, he continued to explain how the different stake 
holders he has brought to the workshop will contribute to the space: 
“It has space at the top where people where organizations can rent spaces for limited 
amount of time, the social enterprises get these spaces free, but they are mixed in 
there with industry people trying to work on innovation ideas, you know. Downstairs 
we have the design thinking living lab. And in the lab, we deal with those different 
aspects that we talked about so with [my special guests from London] we will get legal 
experts […] around mentoring and advice on accounting, we will have IT which we 
will have through our contacts through Cisco, skill building through the university, 
with all our people like [Consultant I] who are doing these things globally. […] So, 
what we are going to do is we are going to find an old disused building. We will get 
our students at the university to kit it out. It will not cost us much.” 
 
In response, the Non-profit Leader I and Research Assistant chime in over top of 
each other: 
Community Non-profit Leader: “Building, yeah that is right. As soon as you find a 
building I can start the application for funding.” 
Research Assistant: You know that Exact 100 has got a digital, something like this? A 
space happening in [the same Metro area]. Because they could bridge those together. 
If you want to involve them…? So, they have a presence there as well.” 
 
A this point the Junior Facilitator II also chimes in with a cautionary tale that every 
year one team builds a collaborative digital space. “We give them tools and skills but 
we try not to push them in this direction, implying with his tone that is not the 
recommended way to go. Many of these projects fail.” The Facilitator then builds onto 
the picture with more vivid details: 
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“Have your meetings in the space. We have a beautiful conference room with a coffee 
machine but I have board meetings in the space with what hammers and the banging 
where something is happening. So they can smell they can see what is happening. 
 
Don’t buy expensive furniture from steel cage or whatever your British equivalent 
would be. Put some table saws down. Give the guys some wood and some paint.”  
 
To this the Social Scientist responds again with references to his social network: 
“Give me ten creative university students and they will go around […] and they will 
find us everything we need.” He gestures to Consultant I and references an 
acquaintance they have in common:  
“[He] is an artist. He will fill it up with art and stuff for us. We can make this happen. 
And a lot of the kitting out, the painting. I can make it a university project. Where all 
the different faculty come together and do an assignment. And they will buy into it. 
And we can make this happen. We could have this done. We could have this built and 
done if you give us a building in, this time in eight months.  
 
In reference to the Junior Facilitator’s recommendation of providing the paint and 
wood and materials for volunteers to fix the space, the Social Scientist affirmed again 
via his social network:  
“I have got that. I have contacts with the CEO of B&Q. I can say, just gives a little bit 
of …£300 worth of stuff. And we have people who come in there like [the prototype] 
and we will help them quantify their stuff. We will give them students.” 
 
The Junior Facilitator then directs the group to a good case study that he considers 
world class: Aalto Design Factory, a Finnish university sponsored maker space. The 
maker space idea is reinforced again.  
 
One by one the leaders intuitively start giving their verbal confirmation that they are 
on-board. In a few instances they are once again talking overtop of one another: 
Consultant I: “This is exactly what you need to do.”  
Male Economic Developer: “Get children involved and let them see what is 
happening.”  
The Social Scientist connects this back to the Junior Facilitator’s theme of always 
collecting data on projects for research publication: “I am hoping that two or three 
papers can come out of this.” 
Female Economic Developer: “We done something like this for artists two years ago, 
but the project had to stop as the building was unsafe.” 
Research Assistant: “Great. Call that artist project the pilot and build onto that.” 
 
There was energy as the group pitched how to keep momentum using Public 
Relations and the media. There also seemed to be a consensus that the product 
needed to be so clear and tangible to greenlighting decision-makers. It also needed to 
be ambiguous and vague to the public and media. The logic was that if these masses 
knew too much they could prevent a vulnerable project from getting off the ground. It 
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would be better to wait for tangible results and success stories before letting them in 
on the details. 
 
 
Snapshot 6: Meeting with the Guru  
Day 743 
 
Five few days later there was no more doubt as to the product. As was conceived 
before the workshop it was indeed to be an incubator space. There was also no more 
doubt as to the type of incubator space. As discussed after the workshop, it was to be 
a maker community space. The Social Scientist and female Economic Developer 
pitched their perception on the best strategic stances for moving forward in an 
energetic dialogue (listed below as key concepts). Half way through the Professor 
Emeritus also joined the meeting. At the time of his arrival he had already been 
briefed on the developments from Snapshot 5:  
 
Social Scientist I [8] articulations of strategic stance on moving forward (in order of 
appearance): 
“…Concept needs to be broadened beyond “social enterprise” 
“…got to clip [the city council] wing…s” 
“…not think in 2-5 years but longer…” 
“…2030 horizon needs to shift, evolve…” 
“…need to be low key – to not be challenged…” 
“…need to be high profile – to get in…” 
“…structure a document…” (rephrased what Professor Emeritus said) 
“…put things in [the city council’s] language…” (rephrased what female Econ. 
Developer said) 
“…need to understand drivers…” (rephrased what female Economic Developer said) 
“…linear model on impact in the last REF…” 
“…not a top-down model but a co-production model…” (rephrase what Emeritus 
Professor said) 
“…embed in place relevant and important…” (rephrase what female economic 
developer said)  
 
The female Economic Developer [9] articulations of strategic stance on moving 
forward: 
“…council likes things that are tangible, showcase things, so they can illustrate impact, 
something to “hang your hat on”.  
 “…lot of properties…” 
“…write things and just comes back with questions in writing. It’s [better] to get in front 
of them – discussions are good – relationship, building etc.) …” 
“…leaders are very local…” 
 “…know their policy and know the boxes [the project] ticks. By this I mean when pitching 
to senior policy makers it’s important to know the policy in which the project will sit – 
which strategic “boxes” is the project meeting.  Not necessarily hierarchy, may be my risk 
averseness – having to meet the expectations of senior people, after all its public money…” 
“…two main goals/concepts: economic growth and economic wellbeing…” 
“…Memorandum of Understanding with the main local university…” 
 “…demonstrate – students involved in competition…” 
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…used words ‘incubator’ ‘refurbished building’ ‘living lab’… 
 
Professor Emeritus [22] articulations on strategic stance on moving forward: 
“…have to engage the citizens to be a civic university…” 
“…let go to experiment…” 
“…smart and inclusive growth…” (no discussion on how do you do both) 
“…escalate the conversation on the council. Escalate conversation in university…” 
“…need a good network…” 
“…start with strong documents…” 
“…getting to pure narrow town out…” 
“…collaborate with University of Finland in Helsinki to get info…”  
“…correlate with what is currently happening locally and nationally…” 
“…Sell to Director of British Philanthropy Association Then Head of the Business School, 
then the Vice Chancellor…” 
“…Workshop a capacity building project – invest money in it…” 
“…boundary spanning buy-in from different people in workshop…” 
“…orchestration is a better phrase than leadership…” 
“…Make it City Council CEO’s idea…” 
“…have a long-term process…” 
“…use buzz words that work in [the city] …” (links to female Economic Developer’s idea)   
“… [Company involved with Big Lottery] is a good partner…” 
“…To be a flagship you need to be plugged into national agenda…” (Links to a previously 
mentioned female Economic Developer’s idea) 
“…You learn lessons from things that failed. Pay attention to stories on why things 
failed…” 
“…may even be worth driving down and meeting with them…” 
“…I don’t want to take things over…” 
“…would do a letter to Head of Business School and Vice Chancellor…” 
 
In retrospectively reviewing this list of rapid fire strategic tactics that were put on the 
table to progress the project, the female Economic Developer was also the only 
strategist out of the approximately forty key decision-makers across all five case 
studies to come back and request revisions: In three instances points were removed 
for it did not provide enough context for her to remember what she really meant. In 
two instances her exact words were altered to be even more politically sensitive. In 
two instances, no words were changed but words were added so that context and 
clarity was provided. In one instance a number was changed that I could have 
possibly misheard. She also linked two of the Professor Emeritus’ statements to her 
own strategic tactics. None of the changes she requested fundamentally changed the 
analysis or perception portrayed by this ethnography. This interest in managing the 
details of her words does however underscore and confirms (just as both versions of 
her quotes do) that as a strategic decision-maker she has a strong sensitivity to 
conducting herself in a politically astute manner and managing perceptions. 
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Somewhere amid the dialogue the Social Scientist also signalled that he may be 
leaving his current university for another university but he would want the effort to 
continue without him.   
 
 
Snapshot 7: Meeting in the room with the expensive coffee machine 
Day 828 
 
Two months later the group reconvened in a University meeting room with an 
expensive coffee machine that received a lot of banter attention in the informal 
portions of the meeting. The five different stakeholders around the table were each 
pushing specific objectives: 
 
Since the last contact with the female Economic Developer, three city owned 
buildings were looked at for the accelerator space. They were all vacant and in need of 
funding if they were to be brought up to city building code. It was also evident that 
she was experiencing frustration with the city real estate department which was 
“notoriously slow to get communication and decisions up and down the chain.” It was 
her department’s position that for them to be involved the City would need to take 
(keep) ownership. The University representative agreed that would be best. 
 
The non-profit leader’s interest centred on the physical space. Leading bids for 
bringing buildings up to standard and creative partnerships on available properties 
were all topics she enthusiastically contributed to. 
 
Since the last contact Social Scientist I shared an amusing tale with the punchline 
that he ultimately did not get the job offer at one of the top ranked research 
universities in the world because he wore a leather jacket to the interview. What he 
did get instead was an appointment to a National Health Service IT project Expert 
Panel. This renewed the interest in the healthcare angle which was also evident as he 
communicated his knowledge of where the most updated financial resources and 
partners are located specifically geared to healthcare. New international partners for 
parallel projects were also articulated as possible in Greece, Norway and Portugal was 
also raised. Nobody said it out loud but this healthcare focus did not overlap strongly 
with the maker space that was defined some 60 days earlier. The group however did 
build onto the new healthcare angle. 
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A new face at the Collective Leadership table was a second Local Consultant II. She 
had been present at the Design Thinking workshops and liaised primarily with the 
Social Scientist’s guests from London on the incubator concept development. In 
articulating her objectives for this project, the value of globalization came up several 
times. She, like other members of this group, also relied on her familiarity or 
association with a valuable network of people to define her as a valuable contributor 
to the group. Keywords of interest that she built her comments around included: “he 
is global, that increases value,” “branding fellowship,” “talking shop,” “power to 
create,” and “global focus.”  
 
The new University Development officer was an even newer face at the table. He 
commented aloud that he felt optimistic about the project moving forward: “A lot of 
academics say they have people [from industry interested in collaborating] but here is 
a group of people that show up in person.” The goal was to leverage his expertise and 
have the paper work for a special and sizable cornerstone European Union healthcare 
grant submission done over the next few months. The deadline was in seven months.  
 
After the meeting, two groups of post-meetings also took place on unrelated projects. 
In one corner the Economic Developer and the Non-profit leader gathered, and in the 
other corner were the Social Scientist and the Consultant II. 
 
 
Snapshot 8: Social Enterprise Place designation secured  
Day 1,506 
 
In the year following the workshop Social Scientist I accepted a position at another 
university. During this same time, the City economic development department was 
also immersed in uncertainty as redundancies and restructurations were announced. 
The female Economic Developer emerged victorious. She explained via a group email 
that included the central decision-makers who helped originate the project: 
Following the restructure, I now lead on policy and strategy for social enterprise and 
small business (so this project is still within my sights) and finally shifted a lot of the 
“noise” from my workload to be able to focus. […amongst the developments was 
securing] Social Enterprise Places status from Social Enterprise UK and host[ing] an 
event last month (that [Social Scientist I] also spoke at – Thank you) that has lit the 
Social Enterprise spark again – lots of actions and interest (we now have 
cabinet/portfolio holder buy in too!) 
Female Economic Developer 
Day 1,506 
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She concluded that she finally feels that she is now personally in a much better 
position to make strategic decisions and changes. “Risk taking is something I want to 
do, but the structure around me sometimes refrains – and quite rightly so, we are 
dealing with public money after all – however to achieve innovation, an element of 
risk needs to be taken.” I could sympathize. As a professional Economic Developer 
employed within a local government structure I have run across this very same 
obstacle when professional role objectives are not aligned to the governance structure 
- which generally designed for stable and predictable control structures and strategic 
stances optimized for the department of motor vehicles, assessor and auditor, and not 
the outlier economic development department which should be resilient and 
responsive to big shocks in the system. However most commonly the economic 
department is forced to get the job done using the playbook rules not ideally matched 
for its purpose. 
 
But the future looked bright. In the group update email, several of the leadership 
committee members operating outside the confines of government structure also 
publicly pledged continued collaborative support in resources for this cause. A similar 
level of energy and excitement towards driving change was observed and noted by 
Social Scientist I when he spoke at the event led by the female Economic Developer a 
month earlier where additional local stakeholders were getting involved with the 
cause.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
COLLABORATION 4 
 
 
THE SOFTWARE START-UP INITIATIVE 
 
 
Collaboration 4 made no mince about framing strategic stances in terms of 
technology. It was a software technology start-up. It very intentionally set out to 
capitalize on the ubiquitous access of software and specifically the dropping cost of 
video streaming technology in homes and industry. Stoking the fire in the 
background of this ambitious platform was indeed the ghosts of the economic crisis. 
Central to the project’s strategic stance was one of the founder’s self-reported 
successes especially during the first few years of the economic crisis in increasing 
profitably of a small to medium manufacturing firm by £200 million. Success by 
combining the laying-off of workers during a recession with investing in new 
production technology was one of the factors that had increased the software start-up 
founder’s comfort level with risk-taking and decision-making under uncertainty.  
 
This is likely the project that I joined at the closest point to conception. In a friend-to-
friend reconnecting conversation I challenged a Welsh executive who had lost his job 
days earlier (and undergone some personal changes in his life) to jot down what kind 
of projects he would like to do next on the back of an envelope I had given him. A day 
or two later I got a phone call. He had come up with a novel idea: why not combine 
some of the items on the list in a new way that could solve Health & Safety training 
needs. In his previous leadership positions he had observed that one in three of 
companies in a specific industry not passing Health & Safety tests yet they still got 
insurance coverage. Had he stayed on, this would have been one of the value-added 
projects he tackled. Why could he not do this as an independent entity? May 8, 2013 
was Day 1 of this project when I got the call that he had come up with this idea for a 
software start-up. 
 
The fact that this collaboration had its roots in a friendship allowed for access to 
informal communication and “ideas still under development” that would otherwise 
have been hard to obtain. This is also a dominant component that sets the last two 
collaborations apart from the first two collaborations. In fact, the Welsh executive 
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had mentioned at one point that in previous positions he had a history of pre-
planning brainstorming sessions out so that he can create the illusion of subordinates 
thinking they are coming up with ideas when they are in-fact being coached on 
emergent discoveries he purposefully intends for them to make. Additionally, he self-
reported a very intentional relational conduct with subordinates and peers that keeps 
them at an emotional distance. And though this ethnography provided inside access 
to unplanned moments around a barbecue and beers with his children present, or 
speculative chatting in transit, his guard was always up and I have no doubt that I 
was branded as a potential enemy. Not necessarily because of my role as a researcher 
in this capacity, but specifically what damage I could potentially do in taking control, 
ownership, intellectual property or equity away from him. At least that is how the 
laxk of trust manifests during the first phase of the collaboration’s development. This 
concern (of me and others specifically stealing the company’s ideas and starting a 
competing business dissipated over time) but fundamentally the guards stay up over 
the full three years of immersion.  
 
After the first few series of tight deadlines and successes contact was especially high 
with daily in-person or digital engagement during the first six months to make the 
most of the windows of opportunity that emerged. But once the resources close to me 
in the North of England dried up he sought out opportunities to start replicating this 
same type of successes in the South of England and also moved there for much of the 
time. After this first six months mark contact thus gradually tapered down to visiting, 
skyping or making a phone connection about once a week. At this time, the energy 
around the project also became increasingly testosterone driven as ex-military, fire 
fighters, and manufacturing plant managers become the primary collaborators. I 
made a point to attend important meetings in-person like the negotiation with a 
University in the South of England’s Health and Safety board, but predominantly 
sources of access became informal conversations with the Welsh Executive, and 
corroborations with his ex-marine son that became increasingly involved as I stepped 
back. Additionally, the list of data media included a diverse range of access to all 
emails sent from the company’s primary email account, letters on formal letterhead 
from partner organizations, and estimated 2 terabytes of hours and hours of unedited 
(and edited) raw audio and visual two camera setup footage interviewing (potential) 
collaborators.  
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Of the five collaborations, I recognize that Collaboration 4 would be the collaboration 
that in spite of my broad informal communication channel access could potentially be 
the least trustworthy. This is not due to a lack of diligence in corroborating or 
triangulating data from various sources’ point of view, but instead the missing pieces 
that was not politically appropriate for me to pursue what really happened because I 
was an insider to the initiative. The potential collaborations’ public showcase of 
strong emotions followed by avoidance in so many instances was surprising and as an 
ethnographer analysing that aspect of the reoccurring pattern still lingers. Overall 
this collaboration also features the most small bursts in successes, yet the overall 
collaboration could not quiet succeed in pulling the ambitious vision through over a 
period of three years to a synergy where the outcome was greater than the sum of the 
parts. This is the collaboration that I am most aware of the fact that there may be 
clarifying developments or info that may intentionally been withheld from me as a 
researcher-participant.  
 
 
Snapshot 1: Winning a two-in-one prize 
Day 83 
 
Maybe it was tongue in cheek, maybe not, but the Welsh Executive maintained the 
belief that the only way the world will take you seriously was to express important 
lists as having three components. Not two, (that is too few) not four (that is too many), 
just three. It should thus also be no surprise that the company’s initial strategic 
stance adheres to this rule: 
“What this company needs are three experts on our team: 1) a Heath & Safety certified 
expert, 2) a videographer expert, and 3) a software programmer expert.”  
Welsh Executive 
 
He was fully aware that I fundamentally disagreed with this narrow philosophy as I 
am a strong proponent of balancing the broader concepts of market demand and 
proof of concept financing to a similar weight to technical skills, but the technical 
focal point was repeated enough times for me to start framing communication and 
solutions in his terms.  
 
Over the first year, balancing these three strategic priorities would dominate the 
course of action. His stock and trade in manufacturing had been operating with high 
volume, with low defects, and state-of-the-art-technology. And so, a big portion of 
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this quest for perfection and precision also carried forward to the new venture even 
with low volume streams in a fairly unrelated field to manufacturing. 
 
In his own words in the first draft iteration of the business plan, the Welsh Executive 
marketed himself as having “some Health & Safety responsibility in manufacturing 
plants” (Business Plan Summary, Aug 9, 2013) where he had been employed before. 
He made no mention of any skills in videography or computer programming, but to 
be fair he did own a pricey Cannon camera with the high grade red band and enjoyed 
photographing nature as well as family and friends. He had also worked with 
software programmers to design custom solutions for the manufacturing plants in the 
1990’s, but he had no formal training in that area either. 
 
I had even less skills in these three technical focal points, yet I had opportunistic 
ideas for solutions. The first solution that I pitched him revealed he had a shockingly 
high level of distrust of others. And that list of “others” included me.  
 
In snapshot 1 my first idea addressed both the Health & Safety as well as quality 
videography footage need. As a doctoral student and university lecturer I had access 
to resources not accessible to the general public. If he legally considered me a co-
founder, these resources would also be accessible to him. He was intellectually open 
and curious to explore where this could lead, but legally he was calculatedly cautious, 
slippery in his vocabulary and then downright refused to put in writing that this 
relationship was a legally defined partnership.  
 
My first clue to this distrustful disposition came when I suggested partnering with my 
three PhD engineering friends with whom I had been collaborating in building a 
prototype for a social renewal solution in a business plan competition. Our project 
was on the rocks. What started out as a commercialization plan for new cutting edge 
renewable water treatment technology got watered down over the course of four 
months to the lowest common denominator of a eco sustainable coffee shop. I needed 
to stop this descend. 
 
The competition and training initiative did allow for a small budget to build a 
prototype. It also had an opportunity for an expert network connection to the rest of 
the university. As a university ‘project’ it also had facility access to unique advanced 
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machines and work spaces. A special showcase event that could be a launching point 
of the next phase was also scheduled for two months out. And it had the potential of 
gaining access to up to a £5 000 start-up grant. It took over a month’s gentle nudging 
and reassurance to convince him to at least meet my project partners.  
 
A single one out of the three frayed PhD partners showed up to the meeting. The 
meeting went very well. In an email to the rest of the team the Civil Engineer PhD 
shared his opinion: 
“Dear team just like Lindi mentioned, I had the privilege of listening to [the Welsh 
Executive], I must confess the concept is fantastic and can make a very good 
commercial project. The idea is very relevant to the [area].  Its development is also 
well advanced. There's also ample room for us to fully participate in its execution and 
get something ready for submission […] I would really appreciate it if we all try to 
organise [another] meeting. 
 
Lindi with respect to the deliberations yesterday, I was able to secure authorization to 
interview lab users in 2 of our labs in school pending possible dates to be announced 
by us. I'm yet to hear from [utilities company] and [the other business where I have 
contacts].”  
Civil Engineer Ph.D. student 
Day 83 
 
The project went from strength to strength. The group signed on and the two 
interviews mentioned in the email exploded into eleven interviews. Each interview 
was in a different lab with expensive and dangerous machinery. Each interview 
showcased a different science, with different hazards, different expert articulating 
Health & Safety from their personal point of view. From in front of state of the art 
DNA machines to working atop of dangerous skyscrapers where few had set afoot. 
And in each one of these unique locations we videographed a different Health & 
Safety professional explaining and demonstrating the best way of dealing with these 
extreme terrains including vivid narrative examples.  
 
The University Health & Safety department also gifted us six beginner level lesson 
plans that were expertly designed and detailed that could be converted into prototype 
lesson plans for general organizational as well as specialty lab, shop and construction 
site use. They also endorsed the concept of an integrated online Health & Safety 
learning platform that can provide workers/staff/contractors with tracked levels of 
mastery and badges that follow them from university to work, and could be carried 
forward into their careers as their responsibilities for the Health and Safety of others 
increased. This would cut down on the common complaints about being able to 
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substantiate that content was understood (with a quiz); space and time constraints 
are resolved (by making content available asynchronously online); ensuring that new 
updated training gets completed at the right level and time (with an individualized 
course completion tracking system). The University Health and Safety office 
furthermore sponsored the prototype showcase event to the public and provided pens, 
bags, banners and more educational material. The University also provided £1,000 to 
build a first prototype to demonstrate the concept. 
 
But somewhere in the background of all the success that came together in a matter of 
39 intense days was a lurking, lingering deep dissatisfaction. “You say these people 
are not going to stealing the idea because their focus is on their PhD but you don’t 
know. For all you know [the Bioengineering PhD student] has a father or an uncle 
that is a lawyer. They are your friends. You need to make sure the non-disclosure 
agreement gets signed.” All members signed with no hesitation. What was more 
concerting to me is that this person I considered a friend evaded attempts I made at 
explicitly defining our legal equity position. He seemed perfectly comfortable morally 
with the idea of me sinking money and time into the project receiving no equity or 
assurances of a partnership level of respect. Control seemed to be very important to 
him. 
 
 
Snapshot 2: The guitar with a broken bridge 
Day 153 
 
The Snapshot 2 initiative, started out in parallel with the Snapshot 1 initiative and 
addressed the third need for a quality software programmer. As it turned out, I had a 
friend in Silicon Valley who had started up a fair number of software businesses. 
Maybe, just maybe I should introduce the two men to see if they hit it off? Maybe the 
Silicon Valley Entrepreneur (and software developer) could come in as a partner? 
This idea turned out to be a catastrophe.  
 
Over the course of 3 months they interacted via Skype and email 7 times. I listened to 
them talk on Skype. The conversations sounded polite to me. But there was no trust. 
From neither side. The Silicon Valley friend estimated the cost of building the 
platform’s phase I would be to be around $44,712.50 for and estimated 12.775 Man-
Months. That meant ($3,500/man-month). At least that provided a benchmarking 
starting point. 
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By Day 123 the Welsh Executive had already started dabbling in computer 
programming as he put together the prototype site and videos for the University 
Entrepreneurship competition showcase. I forwarded him a link to a local computer 
programming club. Maybe we should check that out for leads to computer 
programmers or resources? He agreed.  
 
Ultimately, he attended alone because I had a scheduling conflict. At the computer 
programming club meeting he made an important discovery: He didn’t want to get 
“fleeced” by some computer programmer who controls his code. The issue was once 
again trust. He decided to call up a computer programmer that he knew personally. A 
person he trusted. An ex-colleague from a ‘low-level university’ that is young and not 
too wise about the world, but had a good heart. Via text the ex-colleague accepted the 
invitation to join us for a tapas dinner at a tasteful upper end restaurant in the Lake 
District. It went well. Five in-person meetings followed over the course of five weeks. 
We even met his girlfriend. Every meeting lasted for hours. He seemed to be on the 
verge of accepting a 20% equity partnership deal with a 20/20/60 split in equity. But 
something was off. This time it was I who did not trust the ex-colleague. The Welsh 
Executive painted the ex-colleague to be a ‘good guy’. A loyal principled man. If there 
was a snake in the grass it was because of his ‘controlling girlfriend’ but I did not 
perceive this in the contact that I had with him in informal meetings.  
 
The reason I had a different perspective on the loyalty of the ex-colleague was that 
because he openly ridiculed his current CEO (a man he knew the Welsh Executive 
despised). He bragged about how he waited until a new software project was at a 
crucial make or break point and then proceeded to renegotiate his salary to be the 
second highest paid employee in the organization. He jokingly volunteered to steal 
industry mailing list contact information for the new start-up. The Welsh Executive 
wrote this off as either informal banter or “that controlling girlfriend of his put him 
up to it.” I agreed that she conducted herself in a smart and calculated way. And at a 
surface level he appeared to be casual and easy-going. But I was not sold on his high 
trustworthiness. 
 
Late in the afternoon on Day 153 came the phone call. The ex-colleague and his 
girlfriend had invited us for dinner at their home. The invitation came so late that I 
had already finished dinner. Driving over I made a prediction: this was the end of the 
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line. This partnership was not going to happen and they were going to communicate 
that tonight over dinner. The Welsh Executive was more optimistic but conceded 
something was off. If this was the end of the line that “controlling girlfriend” was 
behind it. 
 
Their home was beautiful and comfortable. The girlfriend explained that they had 
recently joined a local fresh foods co-op. Every week they got a surprise box of 
seasonal vegetables. They never knew what would be in the box, but they are assured 
that it is always full, diverse, fresh and in season. That sounded nice. The impromptu 
dinner was inspired partially from this week’s veggie box. While the girlfriend was 
cooking dinner, the men sat at the kitchen table talking about guitars. The ex-
colleague brought out an old Hoffman with a classic non-traditional body. It had been 
in the family for a couple generations. The ex-colleague explained that he knows he is 
not a very good player, but he loves playing. The problem was there was something 
wrong with the bridge and it needed restringing. The ex-colleague explained that he 
had taken it to a few guitar shops to get some issues fixed but it looked like they had 
filed things down inappropriately and unevenly so the guitar was in worse shape than 
before. This was not the first time this guitar was brought up in conversation. The 
Welsh Executive owned seven guitars himself. He also thought he could fix and 
restring that guitar for the ex-colleague.  
 
Shop talk happened over dinner and extended into coffee and biscuits in the living 
room afterwards. The ex-colleague proposed a new idea. He was concerned that 
programming the platform himself would be hard on evenings and weekends. His 
solution was to keep his full-time job but engage the services of a friend currently 
between contracts to program the platform over the next three months and be ready 
for beta testing that I could offer with 150 participants in six months. The ex-
colleague could supervise this contractor every evening after work and explained that 
the going rate would be £15,000 for the three months. With the dollar-pound 
exchange rate at the time it was the costlier software programmer proposition. The 
Welsh Executive listened carefully and told him he would get back to him.  
 
Throughout the evening I felt something was off. I could not put my finger on what 
exactly went wrong. Though the chat was future-orientated and included specific 
plans there was something unsettling. But then as we walked out the door the ex-
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colleague entrusted his family guitar into the hands of the Welsh Executive. “Give it a 
shot. See what you can do with the bridge. I will get it back from you next time.” I was 
blown away. Clearly, I was wrong. Clearly, he was vested in a long-term partnership.  
 
A day or two later the Welsh Executive confirmed via text message to go ahead and 
contract the programmer classmate of the ex-colleague. The agreement was accepted 
as proposed that night of the dinner. However, the ex-colleague was never heard from 
again.  
 
In closing the feedback loop with the Welsh Executive to ensure this snapshot was 
presented accurately he reflected on the exact moment this specific big shift 
happened in trying to find a computer programmer vs. becoming a computer 
programmer himself. For him the moment happened a couple of weeks after the 
guitar moved into his home and communication with the ex-colleague ceased. He 
recounted his snapshot vividly: I (the fieldworker) was standing on the stairs when he 
asked me if I think he should just learn how to code and do all the platform 
programming himself. He recalls his words as: “You know I will descend into a black 
hole if I try to build the computer platform by myself?” He says he doesn’t think I 
quite grasped the impact of that moment. Apparently, my response was light and 
encouraging. But the impact was clear to him and he decided to continue with the 
challenge by teaching himself to code.  
 
 
Snapshot 3: Finding a new port of entry 
Day 337  
 
After the business plan competition ended without a win, my university’s interest in 
extending resource support also dried up. However, the blueprint for the strategic 
stance had been cast. If this 3o,000-person university would not be the partner with 
whom to develop and prove the Health & Safety prototype, then a similar university 
elsewhere could be the one? Senior Health & Safety department officers had already 
admitted in correspondence that they were trying to do a very similar thing on their 
own. Was this not proof that there was a market? The prospect of collaboration was 
shut down despite a very generous offer: 8-hours of staff time to do video interviews 
and discuss platform needs in in exchange for three Health & Safety videos. 
Apparently, the cost was too high. The department’s deputy director explained her 
position in the following email: 
  127  
I apologise if you got the impression from my staff that this is a project that we would 
be able to run with now.  To be clear, [our department] have not got anytime this 
calendar year to do any work on this. Even a mini collaboration isn’t a priority for us. 
[…]  
 
I am not sure if you aware but the Staff Development Unit (SDU) are already working 
with a provider to produce e-learning including film clips.  I suspect they will have 
been through a tender process for this training provider. Here is the link to the 
induction videos they have done [embedded link] We have been involved in 
producing a fire safety video with them which will be rolled out shortly. […] 
  
If you are still interested in working with [the Department] in future, please can you 
get back to me around Easter time next year. 
 
Deputy Head of University Heath & Safety Department 
Day 156 
 
 
An inquiry for a meeting was indeed made around Easter the next year. The 
Department ignored the email this time.  
 
At the same time, similar deals with other universities were pursued. Like before it 
was a student project request and interest in Health & Safety that opened the door to 
a meeting. This time it was the Welsh Executive’s son, a final year undergraduate 
student and Marine reservist in the South of England who made the connection. 
 
Over the course of an academic year the Welsh Executive systematically gained access 
to a few hours of interviews on camera from the university’s Health and Safety 
employee, received access to background roll footage of persons interacting in 
different university environments, and produced the first induction lesson for 
incoming students, custom made to this University’s priorities. The tone was light 
and cool, but serious without being oppressive as Health & Safety messages often 
tend to be. It was purposefully a point of departure from the doom and gloom videos 
often found online. 
 
One year and two weeks after the inception of the idea, on Day 378 and a full 
academic year since contacting the University’s Health & Safety employee the duo 
were at last granted 15 minutes to present their video, idea and proposal to the 
University’s Health and Safety Commission. The specific objective was to get them to 
commit to piloting the basic platform with one induction video to the incoming 
Freshmen class in September 2014.  
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I travelled to the south of England to support and observe this important moment. 
The Welsh executive had by this time made the South of England the focus of his 
start-up’s media headquarters.  
 
A board of 15 university academics and administrators sat in a room configured with 
a modular rectangle table. Upon the Health & Safety Director’s and ex-marine’s 
recommendations, the young 21-year-old reservist marine and student was to make 
the presentation. I was familiar with the content of the presentation so I focused on 
observing the board’s non-verbal language. The new board president (who had been 
elected one meeting earlier) was visibly not focusing his attention on the presentation. 
He seemed almost irritated by not even looking up during the video clip. It was 
possible that he had seen the video before and made up his mind, or he generally did 
not see the value of moving training online.  
 
After probably 15 minutes the student was cut off and the board president requested 
the three-person visiting party wait in the lobby while the group conferred. I was 
worried that the cut-off was so abrupt that they did not even understand the 
proposition. Five minutes later we were invited back in, asked a few questions, and 
informed that the Director would inform us of their decision. Their response came 
after the goal start date had already passed. A series of back and forth vague attempts 
to escape a commitment to another meeting was ultimately met with: “Sorry, the 
non-authoritative tone of the video is not right for our students.” Fixing the tone and 
style did not seem to be the solution to restoring the relationship either.  
 
 
Snapshot 4: Drinking from the fire department watering hose  
Day 184  
 
During the same academic year that the relationship with the Southern England 
University partnership was being pursued with in-person meeting with open agendas 
every few weeks, the Marine reservist student also pursued alternative paths. He lived 
across the street from a Southern England Fire Department. On Day 184 he walked 
across the street and met the Fire Chief who also happened to be an ex-marine. The 
Marine reservist student explained that he is a part of a team that is working on a 
series of Health & Safety videos for the local university. The Chief explained that they 
are absolutely interested in the connection with students living off-campus to 
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communicate fire prevention messages. They enthusiastically nominated a young 
fireman to appear on camera as spokesperson to connect with a student demographic. 
In reviewing the footage, the young fireman looked more the part than he sounded 
the part as spokesperson, but progress was being made – more expert videos. 
Additionally, the Fire Department also provided special access to training events and 
practice burns where firefighters strapped GoPro cameras to their chests and helmets 
and were then challenged to contain a fire, scale a building or unroll a hose in a short 
amount of time. The videographing duo assured me the footage was not sped up to 
appear more impressive. It was truly exciting to be able to feel like you were traveling 
into a dangerous unknown situation while being safely behind a first-person 
projection of danger. 
 
The Fire Department contributed an estimated 16 hours of footage to the start-up. 
There was even talk of a small financial contribution for videos that could be used. 
When the Fire Chief accepted a new position, the resources and access dried up too. 
 
 
 
 
Snapshot 5: Biggest hospital in Europe lifts the fire curtain 
Day 276 
 
As luck would have it, the Fire Chief was recruited to join the Health & Safety team of 
the biggest hospital in Europe. And a part of the first set of initiatives that he was 
responsible for was a Fire Safety video. He knew just the people for the job. In writing 
he promised a small amount of funding to be available, “[…] but not enough to buy a 
Ferrari.” 
 
Over the course of two intensive days, the Welsh Executive and the Marine Reservist 
got access to a variety of special interest points in the hospital. By now the investment 
had been made in another identical high end Cannon camera, an identical Apple 
Desktop and the full top of the line video editing suite had been made. Additionally, 
two small water and extreme heat GoPro action cameras had also been acquired. And 
even though the Marine Reservist graduated University, he turned his focus to 
becoming a full-time employee on the Health & Safety start-up with his Welsh 
Executive dad, renting a space in the South of England as a base for the Media 
company to keep on developing prospects.  
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A few weeks after the final video was completed and hand delivered to the hospital, a 
damaged torn envelope arrived in the mail from the Hospital’s Board of Directors. 
Inside was a letter from the Health & Safety Officer on behalf of the Hospital Board of 
Directors thanking the team for the high-quality video. Unfortunately, the board was 
not able to pay them for their services or contract them for future work at this time. 
 
 
Snapshot 6: Biggest fire training college needs emergency videographer 
Day 418 
 
However, all was not lost. While still on the hospital campus in Snapshot 5, the ex-
Fire Chief got a fire inspection visit from an old friend (another ex-marine) who was a 
trainer in fire and explosion analysis at one of the biggest fire training colleges in the 
world. They chatted informally and they learned the fire training college was located 
on a 500-acre (2 km²) campus in central England. The space hosted practical 
“learning labs’ where planes, trains and automobiles as well as buildings and shipping 
containers (with a variety of different types of content) would be put in situations that 
ignite fires and explosions. Per the Fire Training College’s mission statement, they 
aim to provide: “leadership, management and advanced operational training courses 
for senior fire officers from the United Kingdom and foreign fire authorities,” so fire 
rescue teams can learn, practice and improve decision-making under uncertainty on a 
controlled campus. The Expert Fire Trainer shared that their on-staff videographer 
would not be able to do one of the training sessions and with the Ex-Fire Chief 
friend’s endorsement he would be willing to gift that opportunity to them. 
 
At first the videographing duo saw this opportunity to get access to rare and even 
more dramatic footage of when things go wrong. The novelty and authenticity of 
being able to see what happens to fire and explosions in real-time was sure to 
maintain attention and leave an impact with Health & Safety learners in run of the 
mill companies. It could be an important point of differentiation. They jumped at the 
chance to fill in and prove they could provide quality work in extreme and difficult 
and dangerous conditions with a one-day turnaround on videos. 
  
Day 418 marked the first success of what would later be extended into an invitation to 
do a series of weekly filming over the course of the summer and into the autumn of 
2014. After an intense two-days’ work at the Fire Training College I caught up with 
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the Welsh Executive on the phone. He gushed about the size of the campus, the 
surprising speed at which a fire can destroy things, the explosion that they had caught 
on camera when a fire was starved of oxygen and then someone opened a window. 
The Marine Reservist once told me that he feels most alive when he is training and he 
gets to activate and launch a live grenade. It is the rush of energy to perform and 
make the right decisions when the stakes are high. I was hearing the same energy of 
feeling alive and in awe from the Welsh Executive.  
 
By Fall the money was still not up to market standard but the logic for continuing was 
that they had gained rare and quality footage. Their skill and speed in capturing 
cinematic moments in high pressure live shoots as well as editing and colouring 
videos to a high standard had dramatically improved. During this process, the team 
also invested in increasingly advanced crane, glider and even experimented with 
drone technologies. 
 
However, the incremental value of gaining new and interesting footage different from 
the previous burn had worn off. They declined the option of continuing the 
videography past Day 548 for the small amount of money that was offered for their 
work. 
 
 
Snapshot 7: The founding of a new media company 
Day 549 
 
During the following year there was a drift away from surrounding themselves with 
expert Health & Safety access. One last ditch effort was made to connect with 
manufacturers of Health & Safety equipment in the East of England that resulted in a 
video that was showcased in the UK Parliament(?) as well as a new product launch 
demonstration period and by Day 816 these videos and the preceding videos were 
officially demo reels of a new-found media company. In reviewing the company’s 
unique selling proposition as told by the images and videos in its portfolio they 
specialized in dangerous, high stress, high stakes precision work if clients need 
videography done right the first time. But over time it started to soften. Instead of 
Health & Safety videos the duo branched a tourist attraction video, a retail import 
sales company and a health education video. None of the later products produced 
income; purpose of spending the following year doing primarily non-Health & Safety 
videos were rationalized as diversification of the product range. 
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There was also a second stated reason for the spin off media company. The Welsh 
Executive explained that his Marine Reservist son had been demonstrating a 
specialized talent and skill in the photography and filming aspects of the business. 
Consequently, the Welsh Executive wanted to give his son something to sink his teeth 
into deeper and develop for himself. This Marine Reservist son however had a 
different idea - he wanted to design and craft leather goods like belts and wallets 
instead. This was also the passion that he started pursuing shortly after the media 
company was founded. However, by Day 1,108 he departed from that personal full-
time entrepreneurial pursuit too and accepted a full-time position at a big, stable and 
branded employment recruitment company in Wales.  
 
 
Snapshot 8: The overheated computer 
Day 805 
 
Like Snapshot 7, Snapshot 8 also commences as opportunities in the South of 
England started to dry up. However, differently from Snapshot 7, Snapshot 8 does 
not wither with the death of the media spin-off company. In fact, it gains momentum 
as the expert Health & Safety and expert videography (or media) objectives drop away 
to leave only expert computer programming. By Day 805 (after giving the media 
company about a year to develop) the focus and energy turned completely inward, 
which was eerily like the black hole he warned me about years ago. 
 
The Welsh Executive’s daily input of time and quality in his project did not change. 
His long 18-hour days 6-7 days a week were even more common now than when he 
was a manufacturing executive. The same level of excellence and perfection that was 
expected of teamsters was now expected of himself in mastering computer 
programming. His focus on solving programming problems so narrow and intense 
that it takes months before he realizes the prolonged daily exposure of his 
overheating laptop on his lap had been burning the skin to become disfigured and 
discoloured. Unlikely to ever heal again. The Welsh Executive had successfully built a 
software platform, tore it down, re-built it again with improved programming 
languages, tore it down, and then re-built it again. Better, stronger, leaner every time. 
Small scale beta testing confirmed the success of the technical execution of his work.  
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On Day 1,171 I learned the Silicon Valley definition of a high-level computer 
programmer. The type that is so hard to find and sought after by the big Silicon 
Valley companies. It is any computer programmer, no matter their level of formal 
education, who has been a major contributor on at least two software product builds. 
The Welsh Executive had not only been a major contributor; he had been the sole 
contributor on projects typically completed by teams of software engineers. And like 
the Welsh Executive doing the odd video here and there, he had also in the preceding 
months started coding a multi-lingual online shopping retail platform. A friend who 
had started an online retail sales company at the same time as the Welsh Executive 
three and a half years ago had outgrown her paid template storefront and needed 
custom solutions to deal with her high-volume sales and inventory management 
system. The Welsh Executive was able to not only code solutions for her but also 
transform the system to accommodate online sales from every country and every 
currency. At this moment, I realized the Welsh Executive may not have become an 
entrepreneur over the course of this journey but he had in fact transformed himself 
into becoming two of the three technical experts (a computer programmer and 
videographer) which he initially set out searching for when he intended to become an 
entrepreneur.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
COLLABORATION 5 
 
 
THE CORPORATE COACH & 
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH HOSPITAL INITIATIVE 
 
 
Finally, Collaboration 5 (C5) also initially claimed to position itself philosophically in 
the context of the economic crisis. As stress and workload demands on workers 
increased (not to mention stress on laid-off workers seeking to re-enter the 
workforce), this healthcare collaboration sought to the window of opportunity on 
taking a successful medical model for wellness intervention to corporations for 
worker wellness programs and leadership development. The Healthcare collaboration 
specifically set out to pursue problem framing outside of technology with 
geographically sensitive problem framing resulting in geographic franchise licenses 
and a strong focusing on in-person human-to-human contact. This fifth 
collaboration’s initial strategic stance resisted technology influence and put human 
elements above scaling exponentially. 
 
This is probably the hardest project to pinpoint when I joined the team. In one sense, 
it could be August 2013 when I invited a US based Public Health lead investigator and 
State Health Council Board advisor to join me at the British Science Festival. I could 
offer her an opportunity to collect primary international data using a new rubric she 
designed. The second and probably more accurate point in time was when I officially 
joined her team was a year later in August 2014. I could have worked with her team 
long-distance, but she specifically asked me to be a part of her team doing an intense 
six-week product development workshop in January 2015 in the US. I did not accept 
the offer right away. For the purpose of this ethnography Day 1 will be framed as 
December 12, 2014 when I arrived back in the US and almost daily discussions on the 
initiative commenced. 
 
Similar to Collaboration 4, there was a pre-existing relationships working on various 
projects over more than a decade that facilitated the interaction on this project to be 
on the more informal side. In fact, the core team-members trusted me so much that 
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they allowed me to live in the basement apartment on their property for six months 
while their son was in South Africa. Also, similar to Collaboration 4 the contact with 
key members of the Collaboration 5 team was almost daily and it was all in-person. In 
a few rare instances there were emails exchanged, but that was mostly to share 
reports or formal thinking that needed to be disseminated outside the collaboration’s 
core members. In the last year once I moved away, contact was still mostly in-person 
and informal, but similar to Collaboration 4 tapered down to about once a week. 
 
In this specific initiative, it is important to note that the M3 Theory was well 
developed and also understood by the Executive Coach who had a PhD herself. But 
despite the success in having the vocabulary to be able to talk about strategy more 
concretely, a theory blueprint, a clearly articulated need for a strategy that can scale, 
still the moment of inspiration and clarity for creating a transformative solution to 
wicket problems did not arrive by sheer cognitive brainpower on emersion, but lucky 
accidents and being open to better solutions. It also became valuable over the growth 
and development of this Collaboration to be able to communicate using the 
epistemology of this framework why a shared understanding of strategy should not be 
assumed as outsiders advised with good intentions on dimensions that did not apply 
to this specific collaboration. Media through which this collaboration unfolded 
increasingly to actualize its full potential included the full gamut of in-person as well 
as group based technology communication that is allowing the project to be stand tall 
as a global initiative with capacity to grow even further. 
 
 
Snapshot 1: The Aneurism  
Day -699 
 
This journey started with a heart aneurism. Not suffered by a member of the 
collective leadership on this specific project, but a young executive in his forties who 
was a client of a professional executive coach and licensed psychologist. The executive 
coach recalled the moment she realized that there was a bigger picture that needed to 
be in focused on corporate wellness:  
“I was doing Executive Coaching for Fortune 500 companies.  One of my clients was 
an executive in his early forties and a rising star. Part of the coaching contract with 
him was to determine if he wanted to stay focused in his specialization where he was 
the top global performer, or to move into a succession planning tract as a possible 
next CEO. Then he client suffered an aneurism. This lead on to him needing brain 
surgery, which lead to him needing to take a particular pharmaceutical drug. However, 
the drug interaction was not good. It was at this point that he reached out from his 
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hospital bed so that his medical team could work with me to come up with a more 
integrative solution for rehabilitation.” 
 
She goes on to explain that the executive made a full medical recovery but the 
experience was a jarring realization. In an emotional narrative of the account she 
wrote that she perceived to be the best executive coach she could be, she needed to 
pay more attention to integrative health and wellness during executive coaching.  
 
Over the next year she went on a detour of trying to partner with Universities 
pursuing large scale public health solutions. At the time, she perceived primary 
research to be the solution. It was during this time that she also discovered existing 
research from the medical community on the topic of stress, wellbeing and resiliency.  
 
To further her knowledge, she enrolled in a nine-month course at one of the leading 
research hospitals which also happened to be leading the charge in integrative 
medicine in the US. When this program concluded on Day -100 she explained that 
she was invited by the Internist who designed the continuing education program and 
authored a series of general audience health books to join him in also leading 
workshops on the topic of stress management. The invitation was expressed as a 
‘partnership’ that could extend the outreach of his program. A similar partnership 
invitation was extended to a group of hospitals in Colorado and a medical 
professional in Tennessee.  
 
 
Snapshot 2: The first $20,000 raised  
Day -28 
 
Over the preceding decade the Executive Coach also had demonstrated and 
developed her affinity for community wellness leadership. This could have been due 
partially to her role as the wife of a Mayor. Her first idea in response to the Internist’s 
invitation to partner was thus to invite him to discuss his series of general audience 
books on managing stress in her local community. 
 
Together the Executive Director and Mayor used their connections to raise money 
and in-kind donations from seven community organizations to pay the Internist’s 
travel expenses and a speaker’s fee. The Internist indicated that he typically 
commands fees of $10,000 for a set of one-hour morning and evening workshops, 
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but he was willing to accept $4,000 and all expenses paid as a favour as well as Skype 
in for five follow-up sessions over the next six months. 
 
The Executive Coach and Mayor hand-selected list of around 200 community and 
business leaders from the metropolitan area to attend one of the two offered sessions. 
Many were visited and invited in-person to receive their invitations. An additional 
estimated 100 community members with a strong interest in the topic also received 
an emailed invitation. 
 
By many numeric accounts the community event was a success. Attendance was close 
to capacity. About 25% of attendees elected to partake in monthly keep in touch 
session where the research hospital Internist Skyped into an auditorium hall of 
attendees, answered questions and explained detailed sections of his book. But most 
importantly, five companies also committed to a training contract of $15,000 with 
the research hospital’s internist to train their corporate Human Resource specialists 
in supporting their organization in resiliency and wellbeing.  
 
Based upon these responses the Executive Coach and her Mayor husband decided to 
found a non-profit to be able to do more events like this. They also decided to enrol in 
a weekend entrepreneurship workshop based on the work of Steve Blank to develop 
this concept to its best strategic iteration.  
 
 
Snapshot 3: The $10 million chandelier  
Day 7 
 
Day 9 was a big day. A week earlier I had arrived in the US from England, and a day 
earlier the Executive Coach, the Mayor, and a friend from Britain had visited with a 
lawyer about getting a 501(c)3 non-profit designation. On Day 9 we all piled into the 
same car for a three-hour trip to the world-renowned hospital where the Internist 
had agreed to meet for contract negotiation.  
 
Prior to the meeting he had sent what seemed to me as was a franchise agreement. As 
long as the Executive Coach and Mayor’s non-profit does business inside a one-hour 
driving radius of their home-base metropolitan area, he would give the non-profit 15% 
of the workshop fee for workshops that he facilitated, and he would expect 15% of the 
workshop fee for workshops that the Executive Coach facilitated locally.  
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This regional boundary made no sense to me. In fact, I was very worried that within 3 
years they would have exhausted the opportunities in the local area if the same 
workshop that he was licensing to the Executive Coach was the extent of the content. 
My recommendations were:  
1. Don’t sign a contract with geographical boundaries in this technological day and 
age with technology when everything can be so fluid,  
2. Don’t just rely on the hospital name and title of the Internist and his books for 
building your brand, develop your own original content, do your own original 
research. There are things that the Executive Coach could do better than a medical 
Doctor, so tap into that, and; 
3. Don’t expect to see a stream of revenue from corporation officers who you 
recruited for him, but he trained. There is no way to inforce the 15% royalties 
when they come back to their corporations and do internal training on the content 
you presented.  
 
In email conversation, the research hospital Internist downplayed the contract on the 
table as just cut and paste of what the world-renowned Hospital does on franchising, 
and he knows that ‘some of it may not even apply to our situation.’  
 
The leadership collective’s response to my three concerns were: 
1. The Mayor did not have an interest in the area outside the metro that he 
served. He was more interested in the local community because that would 
benefit his constituents.  
2. They liked the impressive hospital and Internist’s medical brand. They 
perceived it to open doors when they would tout and market someone else’s as 
impressive and smart as opposed to selling yourself. 
3. They may have agreed with me on this, but it was not worth picking a fight 
with a stress expert on this. 
 
The hospital complex was beautiful, tasteful, and clean. High ceilings, and art. Oh 
what beautiful, massive sculptures and collage mosaic art pieces. It reminded me 
more of a high-end hotel than a hospital. And the focus on research focus was also 
front and centre in massive golden letters on archways and special glass panelled 
‘inquiry rooms’ as people entered the main lobby.  
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The Internist came down to the lobby to meet the four of us after a long drive. His 
handshake was much milder than the tough image I got of him based on the contract 
he forwarded. He seemed surprised to see me and my 6’4 British friend with the 
Executive Coach and Mayor. In what appeared to be a gesture of hospitality he told us 
about the specialness of the hospital for a few minutes and then pointed to a big 
chandelier like kinetic glass sculpture overhanging the stairs: “How much do you 
think that is worth?” I had no clue. “$10 Million dollars. It was a gift from a world-
famous artist.” I could imagine that. That if you give one of the most famous research 
hospitals in the world an elaborate gift and just tell one person without substantiating 
it is worth a couple millions, they talk and point to it, accidently increasing the 
number of millions with every story to make it more dramatic, and before you know it 
all your similar work could easily escalate in price. And then ultimately, who will 
distrust a doctor when he says something is worth $10 million when it has not been 
appraised in 10 years. Another real-world example of example of decision making 
under uncertainty. 
 
At the end of the tour the research hospital Internist indicated to me and my friend 
that his office can only accommodate two guests so the Executive Couch and Mayor 
went upstairs with him to negotiate the contract. After a little more than an hour they 
returned. The contract had been signed as is. No franchising fees were included for 
the first year to help the non-profit get up on their feet. 
 
 
Snapshot 4: A media darling 
Day 47  
 
In the days leading up to the Product Development Workshop I was charged with 
putting together an introductory presentation of the central concept of this initiative. 
I started to put my feelers out for this Internist’s brand equity. It was apparent to me 
that I was taking a much harder lined approach to him in the negotiation phase than 
did the Executive Coach and the Mayor. They did not perceive him as manipulative 
and opportunistic, and that was what I was warning against. To be fair I had not 
heard him speak at that point, and I had not read his books either. Every quote they 
gave about this doctor was in my mind a calculated hedging of expectations and self-
aggrandizing. The fact that all the quotes came from informal conversation and 
emails did not relax my defences and distrust.  
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And then I googled him… 
 
In the days leading up to the introductory presentation I made a couple of discoveries: 
• YouTube: A video by the Internist illustrated his capacity as an author and he 
uploaded a short four-minute training video. The graphics were simple but the 
video contained professional animation narrated by his 10-year-old daughter. 
Within 4 days it had been viewed 45,376 times. For context, my personal best 
with a vested audience of 20,000 had been around 200 views over one month. 
• Huffington Post: I looked a little deeper and found that he had produced a 
Huffington Post Article that provided a link to the video. I was not able to 
determine how many times that article was viewed.  
• Facebook: I also sought out the Internist/Author’s Book traction. That too 
was an extremely respectable 15,000 at the time. For context, I was ecstatic 
when my professional social media streams passed 250 followers.  
• The Atlantic: In a completely unrelated cascade of events I also weekly check 
out the top stories in one of my favourite Research & Development magazines. 
And there he was that week. The Internalist/Author was interviewed by one of 
my favorited magazines and his story was trending as one of the featured top 
10. 
 
The Internist and Author seemed to be doing a lot of social media and public 
relations at a high-quality level. Upon inquiry, I also learned that he had paid $5,000 
to produce the video by professionals. And in the new year he had also decreased his 
workload at the research hospital to 80% to dedicate Fridays to the development of 
his for-profit Global Centre that was independent from his Hospital position.  
 
Though his books were published through the famous logo of the research hospital 
with a strong portfolio of health books, the licensing contract was with him as an 
individual. Apparently, the hospital made an assessment on the intellectual content 
and future earnings potential and because it did not meet the $25 million potential 
threshold, he was allowed to pursue it independently. 
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9.5.  Snapshot 5: A ‘building faster horses’ workshop 
Day 73  
 
Day 30 marked the beginning of an intense six-week journey for the non-profit 
organization. At this point the Executive Coach and Mayor had been joined by a 
recent graduate who had been working in customer service at a local bank. She made 
it very clear that she desired to move into marketing job functions but over the past 
two years that path had been blocked for her at the bank. She was volunteering to 
work for this non-profit start-up in the hopes that a full-time marketing position 
could result from it. The other new team member was a student who was being paid 
as an intern from a special fund for University students to gain practical experience 
before graduation. She made it clear that in this was her final semester, and that she 
already had a job secured, and she would feel more comfortable working closer to 10 
hours a week rather than the allotted 15 hours a week for which her internship had 
been approved a few weeks earlier. 
 
The philosophy of the six-week Steven Blank workshop was set in stone. It was the 
only acceptable route to entrepreneurship and the seven workshop facilitators did not 
entertain rationalized deviations off the course. In broad strokes, it was a Customer 
Development methodology:  
“Over the course of six-weeks participants follows a detailed scientific approach that 
can be applied by start-ups and entrepreneurs to improve their product success by 
developing a better understanding of their consumers. Primary to the concept is a 
balanced relationship between developing a product and understanding the customer.” 
 
In practical terms this meant that our five team members would be responsible for 
going out and finding 100 potential future customers and conducting an interview 
with them. If these interviewees could not articulate explicitly in words the function 
and results they want from your potential products/services, then you have no 
evidence of there being a market for your potential products/services.  
 
This proved exhaustingly frustrating. Executives are not inclined to admit to 
strangers that they were burned out, could not handle the stress of the job, or that 
they need training on being resilient. Likewise, Human Resource Directors of the 
major companies in the area were not inclined to admit to strangers high-turnover 
due to issues with wellness, or productivity problems due to excessive stress. But the 
workshop facilitators held firm: “We want to hear from your customers that they have 
value for the product/service.”    
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Henry Ford had a good response for this type of one-track minded strategy: “If I was 
to ask customers [at the turn of the 20th century] what they wanted [for 
transportation] they would have said faster horses.” Nonetheless the team completed 
74 interviews with business leaders explaining they are “a little busy to talk about 
‘faster horses’, or that “a better person to speak with about dealing with the aftermath 
of an employee suicide is his daughter”.  
 
Ultimately the solution for how to communicate with the workshop facilitators (and 
possibly funding agencies) came when we put this thesis’ central premise on strategic 
decision-making under uncertainty to the test. At this time, there had been about six 
months of development on the model and some terminology was still a little vague. 
The four quadrants as presenting four strategy models as defined in Chapter 4 was 
however in place. Using terminology of the Customer Development workshop each of 
the four possible stances were defined as follow: 
• Medical Model (Q1): There was 100% certainty there was a market for this 
strategic stance. We did not need to go out and ask people. The Executive Coach who 
was also a licensed Psychologist worked one-on-one with patients referred by medical 
professionals, insurance companies paid the bill, there was more demand for people 
to be seen one-on-one with her than she could handle. If worse came to worse this 
model could be followed, but only 20-25 people a week could be seen one-on-one by a 
single professional executive coach and licensed psychologist. The need was greater 
than that. 
• Corporate Model (Q2): This strategic stance was proven to have traction when 
200 community leaders a few weeks earlier showed up out of interest and 5 invested 
$15,000 into training their own staff to train and work with lower level staff members 
individually. The long-term concern with this model was that these leaders standing 
up for others tended to happen more in the 500+ employee companies. The concern 
was that the metro market would have exhausted its options to train trainers and the 
local franchise only network could collapse within three years of start-up. 
• Community Model (Q3): This was another strategic stance that was semi-tested 
with the community event. Out of 300 persons in attendance about 25% continued to 
attend the free monthly workshops with additional depth and training because they 
had time, and issues were important enough to make attending valuable. In this 
model, larger cohorts of 50 can get the benefit of the training and support system, but 
the financing would most likely be completely dissociative from the end user if 
foundations, grants, non-profits and government recognized and funded this as a 
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public health initiative. This however did work so far. The bigger question yet was if 
this model could scale. 
• Continuing Education Online Model (Q4): This strategic stance actually did not 
evolve organically. It was a process of banging our heads against the wall and asking: 
“How can this business concept scale? How can a network effect be used?” I worried 
that there was a lot of work with little return on investment if processes could not 
scale. It was at that point that the Executive Coach remembered that there was an 
asynchronous online course designed, built, and financed by the Internist/Author. 
Using that platform would not be a problem. He would probably want 50% of that 
income.” And so, the option of getting Professional Development Credits for human 
services workers became an option that could scale. 
 
Finally, the business plan was presented as having to choose between these four paths, 
and the pressure was elevated from doing only the Medical Model because that is the 
only route that would be approved by one of the “Godfathers of Silicon Valley’s 
strategic stance philosophy” on how entrepreneurs should pick strategic stances. 
 
The team won an award for most improved out of all the workshop participants, a 
good indicator that this thesis model helped them conceive of the validity of strategic 
stances beyond the values of this specific workshop. Yet all the prototyping was 
conceived and executed before the onset of the workshop. “Most improved” thus 
could only apply to communication of the idea. Interestingly the team did not decide 
which model to pursue after the workshop either. Instead they purposefully pursued 
the first three stances simultaneously over the next year. 
 
In the last three snapshots, I will discuss what happened over the course of the next 
year to each strategic stance. Since there are actually four stances, assume that 
nothing changed on the Medical Model (Q1). With the solid and secure cash flow, it 
continued partially financing the development of product iterations that had 
potential to have a greater reach and scaling capacity. However, it has been operating 
at maximum capacity consistently for two years and counting. 
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9.6.  Snapshot 6: The neighbourhood community workshops 
Day 210  
 
Due to the intense nature of the workshops on stress, resiliency and wellness 
(especially in times of adversity), it was never appropriate for me to walk into any of 
these workshops with my red research notebook. I did however see the meeting space 
donated to the non-profit to comfortably host up to 20 participants weekly on a 
Friday morning over the first summer. Contrary to the funding model conceived 
before were the Community Workshop would be funded by sponsorship from the 
third sector, participants started out funded themselves at $100 for a six-week 
program.  
 
When the summer sessions neared its end on Day 210, the group had an earnest 
discussion about how these workshops can be rolled out on a broader base. Breast 
cancer discussion groups, kidney transplants, heart attack sufferers were just some of 
the medically diagnosed starting points that came up. What followed in the fall, was 
organic growth of the community workshops as the participants themselves became 
the advocates in the centres where they had power and influence. Churches, 
foundations, non-profits, even community action committees did facilitate growth 
but ultimately it ended up being through in-kind donations of space and equipment, 
lunches, as well as marketing. Consecutive workshops launched with never more than 
30 participants at a time. Each time the participants funded their own participation. 
 
The Executive Coach was careful to not reveal too much as confidentiality and ethics 
are very important tenants in her professional conduct, however it became apparent 
that the heart-to-heart private conversations that were happening behind the 
workshop doors had impact. I say that because I could see first-hand how success was 
breeding more success as the Executive Coach received invitations to be a special 
guest speaker at breast cancer survival groups, wellness luncheons. Facilitating these 
small interpersonal groups of people supporting each other also gave her practice for 
something big and unexpected that was about to happen…  
 
 
Snapshot 7: Eulogy for a Dead Corporate Wellness Plan 
Day 294  
 
Shortly after the first summer when the success of the Community Workshop model 
started to take shape, there also arrived a big important day also arrived in the 
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corporate development model. The graduate volunteer who had been working at the 
bank had spent a lot of effort and social capital in securing a meeting with the bank’s 
top leaders. After a few postponements, the big meeting finally arrived on Day 280.  
 
The Executive Coach recalled the experience. Her energy was depleted after putting a 
lot of prep work into the presentation: 
“We could not believe what had happened. They turned us down. I could tell from the 
questions after the presentation. They didn’t get it. And I could explain until I am blue 
in the face, they wouldn’t get it. If anyone should have understood this, it should have 
been this bank… Maybe it’s the new leadership. Something changed.’ 
 
The Corporate wellness stance had not been revisited since this experience. The 
Executive Coach also explained during her feedback review of this section that that 
she “embraced the organic growth of the models that were readier for further 
exploration due to limited time and resources.”  
 
 
Snapshot 8: The Global Wellness Network germinates 
Day 240 
 
The seedling for the final snapshot germinated on Day 240 in Vancouver, Canada at 
an Academy of Management conference. I had managed to convince the Executive 
Coach to join me at one of the biggest and most prestigious Management conference 
where I was presenting some of my work on the PhD tract. I had noticed that a whole 
special interest group had formed around the topic of Management Spirituality & 
Religion. My thinking was that the connection with other researchers outside the 
Medical field would diversify her dependency from the research hospital Internist so 
she could offer something he couldn’t. 
 
Success! She attended. But the success reached far beyond the strategy I envisioned. 
It provided a network of solutions to the reach and scaling objectives that we had not 
been able to solve sitting around a dining room ‘boardroom table’ with our laptops 
and Excel spreadsheets. It opened the world. 
 
One of the sessions she attended was a session by Otto Scharmer. Coming back to the 
hotel that evening, she was energized to reveal over a healthy salad that she would 
not only buy his book but attend his free open online MOOC class Transforming 
Business, Society and Self from MIT. It was to start in a few weeks.  
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Yet she went even further. She also hosted the live broadcast of the MOOC at city hall 
to draw in community engagement and wellness solutions to address needs 
specifically for the greater Metropolitan area. I joined them for the live broadcast 
projected on a big screen in the Mayor’s conference room on the last day of the 
MOOC’s live presentation. A handful of community leaders congregated. There was 
enough space at the table so nobody was relegated to the twenty overflow chairs. 
 
During the final broadcast, she made an announcement to the community leaders. I 
knew about the announcement beforehand and was hoping (with her) that the 
leaders would have been able to see for themselves from the MIT video what had 
conspired during the past few weeks. But alas her video was not featured for 30,000 
people who had been participation in the MOOC to see. She had to make the 
announcement to the people in the room herself. 
 
A short 2-minute video showcased 24 friendly people from 17 countries and different 
time zones turning on their monitors and saying hi. They were mostly professionals, 
different ages, different career stages, but they all had something in common: they 
believed that there is value in creating a global hub for wellness.  
 
The Executive Coach explained to the community leaders how the workshop of the 
community was now scaling up. With the help of a technology and location 
sponsorship of the local University, the local geographic area was to be the virtual 
harbour for people all over the world to tune in once a month to explore topics and 
resources on wellness. An online portal would be launched where people could share 
news and info. Where they can reach out and the light will always be on somewhere 
in the world if someone wants to talk (no matter the hour). It worked.  
 
Exactly one year after the germination (Day 605) the Global Wellness Network 
sustained international interest from people from 17 countries. In her own geographic 
community, the Executive Coach also saw that her patients were increasing their 
reliance on peers who had experienced similar traumas like organ transplants, brain 
tumours, or heart attacks. They self-organized in break-out groups and talked about 
details. They then came back to the bigger group for the bigger picture philosophy. 
When I asked her if this is cannibalizing her licensed psychologist practice income 
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when the local people connected with the international people in peer support, she 
smiled proudly: “Yes, it’s great. I am booked full [three months out]. This way I can 
help more people.” 
 
Today the online-offline structure of this networked collaboration project is not only 
an ethnographic case study in a dissertation, but it is also a handbook case study for 
management theorist Otto Scharmer’s U-Theory. Two emails from a few days earlier 
described the impact that this initiative has had for them personally: 
[…] without a project like yours I was losing my energy to repeat the yearlong MIT 
course. You have re-sparked my interest if you think we can add to your efforts to take 
this next step. [He then proceeds to pitch an idea and commits his time and resources 
in developing it in conjunction with this Wellness Network]. 
 
Retired Medical Doctor and Community Organizer in a Utah, US 
Day 602 
 
May I thank you for your initiative, may I thank you for your perfect online-
workshops, may I thank you for your wisdom and all that you have given us in the last 
few months. 
Healthcare Provider from Austria 
Day 602 
 
These types of heartfelt emails or dedications to contribute to progress for the 
cause with local resources and connections are also not uncommon. 
  148  
PART III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THEORY 
EMERGENCE 
 
 
  149  
CHAPTER 9 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
9.1.  Introduction 
 
Over the course of three years, data was collected on five ethnographies. Vulnerable 
ethnographies on each of the five cases have been posted in in the preceding part in 
chapters 4 though 8.  
1. Collaboration 1: MNC General Counsel on Complex Contracting 
2. Collaboration 2: Elite Research University on Portfolio Diversification 
3. Collaboration 3: Economic Development on multi-generational 
unemployment 
4. Collaboration 4: Software Start-up on unskilled entrepreneurial launch 
5. Collaboration 5: Healthcare on global Integrated support network 
 
Chapter 9’s findings will focus on three different types of themes that emerged out of 
the data on the five ethnographies: The themes will serve as a proxy for the myriad of 
themes that could potentially be analysed in the context of the model. In the context 
of the ethnographic narratives this chapter will specifically look at categorical data as 
distinct from relational, which is yet different from dynamic. The Strategic Decision-
Making under Uncertainty model has capacity to absorb all three dimensions. 
 
In the categorical ‘theme A’, chapter 9 will specifically analyse essentialist and 
absolute categories of communication mediums. These can be counted, separated and 
grouped in a distinct taxonomy. In the relative ‘theme B’ chapter 9 will specifically 
analyse relativist and relational categories of workshops with different strategic 
stances. Though the workshops can be counted and separated and grouped the 
quantities do not necessarily constitute meaningful context in itself. In order to be 
meaningful, the philosophy of the workshop needs to be mapped relative to the 
strategic stance of the strategic decision-makers (or in some instances the decision-
making contributors to the workshop). And finally, in the dynamic dimension of 
‘theme C’, chapter 9 will specifically analyse the trajectories with which the strategic 
stances transformed the central idea over time. These can only be meaningful once 
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they are categorized, but in relation to each other and tracked over a prolonged 
period of evolution. 
 
 
9.2.  Theme A: Modes - mapping categorical communication mediums  
 
9.2.1.  Collaboration 1: General Counsel 
 
Dominant communication mediums used in Collaboration 1 in descending order or 
frequency were indicated by key decision-makers to rank: 1) ‘hundreds of’ emails, 2) 
one-on-one phone calls, 3) conference calls, 4) face-to-face meetings, and 5) some 
group meetings. This preference was partially a product of international geographic 
dispersion, partially the need to work asynchronously because of time differences, 
partially time pressures and partially the task type that required systematic and 
careful consideration of words on an evaluative basis.  
 
It stands to reason that where groups were separated from each other by computer 
screens and interacting one-on-one with an intermediary in writing or over the 
telephone would lend itself increasingly to technically rational deliberations (+S, +C) 
relative to group gatherings and in-person workshops with a relatively higher focus 
on socio-political factors. 
 
A strong example of a relatively more rational decision-making making model from 
Collaboration 1 involve Snapshots 4 and 5 where workshop participants submitted 
their responses to “Principles of a IT services” contract in writing. First the buyer side 
did it, and consecutively the supply-side had a chance to provide feedback. This 
method strongly resembles that of the Delphi method of collaborative decision-
making designed by Rand Corporation to intentionally prevent group think. 
• The Collaboration 1 (C1) dominant mode of communication via email isolated 
participants from each other and diminished socio-political factors impacting 
feedback when emails were further anonymized resulting in a dominant drive 
of coded: +S, +C 
 
 
9.2.2.  Collaboration 2: Higher Education 
 
Similar to Collaboration 1, Collaboration 2’s project development decision-making 
filtered through strong controls. Progress benefitted from situations where 
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expectations were clear with a set structure. Collaborations used a myriad of ways to 
intentionally or inavertedly make participants conform to set norms. For example, 
both the Canary Wharf Headquarters (Collaboration 1, Snapshot 2) and University 
Administrative Headquarters (Collaboration 2, Snapshot 1, 2) had multi-story 
architecture combined with explicit security check-in instructions creating a barrier 
between insiders and outsiders and possibly give insiders a psychological advantage 
in negotiations. A similar barrier was also evident but downplayed in the Social 
Scientist’s Academic Headquarters (Collaboration 3, Snapshot 1). 
 
Comparatively, Collaboration 2 however made progress on a consensus based 
development of the idea when the communication was in-person as opposed to via 
email or audio conversations. Though a fair number of emails were exchanged in 
Collaboration 2 (and 3) they less often signify pivotal moments. One major exception 
was Collaboration 2’s press release announcement. But other than that example, the 
emails were used more commonly to set up meetings or forward consensus 
documents as a formality.  
• The Collaboration 2 (C2) dominant mode of communication via big group 
gatherings with a clear structured agenda and an outside informant 
informing the group on information increased socio-political factors and 
expectations in a controlled manner resulting in a dominant drive of coded: 
+R, +C 
 
 
9.2.3.  Collaboration 3: Economic Development 
 
Similar to Collaboration 2, the dominant communication mediums of Collaboration 3 
benefitted from situations where collaboration met in-person or at the very least was 
able to be responsive to emotions or changes in expected dispositions. Formality 
made the responsiveness of the Collaboration 3 decision-making models different 
from the behavioural decision-making models. Whereas the Collaboration 2 group 
meetings were formal and structured to educate a cross-section of different 
departments on the value system that would be important for the project’s 
development, the Collaboration 3 decision-making leaned towards smaller, less-
formal and less-structured meetings. As a consequence, these improvisational 
meetings also ran much longer, and had more personalized humour and customized 
messages.  
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The execution also looked different in the dominant communication mode of 
Collaboration 1 email messages. Collaboration 2 and 3 preferred to send emails out to 
groups as opposed to one-on-one. Content in the Collaboration 2 & 3 email style was 
also shorter with less detail. However, features that distinguish Collaboration 2 
emails from Collaboration 3 were that Collaboration 2 emails were more formal and 
focus on setting an agenda the emails while Collaboration 3 emails opted to give 
enticing clues as to “some exciting development” rather than informing on the 
forthcoming news. 
• The Collaboration 3 (C3) dominant mode of communication via small 
group gatherings with an unstructured and informal agenda maintained a 
socio-political overtone but decreased control and opened the possibility 
for new and different input resulting in a dominant drive of coded: +R, +D 
(relative to C2) 
 
 
9.2.4.  Collaboration 4: Software Start-up 
 
Relative to the preceding collaborations, Collaboration 4 quite possibly relied the 
least on email and communication technology. This is counter intuitive for a software 
company, and also considering the geographic spread of the projects over England 
and Wales. The emails that did exist most strongly resemble those of Collaboration 3 
with brevity and simple objectives of setting up face-to-face meetings and projects. 
 
It also turns out that the agendas of the meetings were very unclear when I would 
inquire about them. A lot of consideration was put forth on having a gentle touch as 
to not appear too forceful and demanding. Also, worth noting is how the ambiguity 
and openness to hear what the other party had to say in face-to-face interactions 
resulted in unexpected projects being picked up over time (See all snapshots of C4 
bar Snapshot 2).  
 
Again, similarly to Collaboration 3, (and possibly reminiscent of Collaboration 1) the 
group size was small for the most part. One-on-one or two-on-one was more common 
that a small gathering. However, very differently from Collaboration 1, these very 
small gatherings were highly informal as opposed to the formality in Collaboration 1 
interaction was conducted.  
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• The Collaboration 4 (C4) dominant mode of communication via informal 
face-to-face, unstructured and small relatively decreased socio-political 
dynamics and increased surprises resulting in a dominant drive of coded: 
+R, +D 
 
 
9.2.5.  Collaboration 5: Healthcare 
 
Relative to Collaboration 1 and 4, Collaboration 5’s patterns of seeking out a critical 
mass of participants to be present at key development moments resembled that of 
Collaboration 2 and 3. However, unlike Collaboration 2 and 3 where it may have been 
a higher level of impression management when the decision is being made 
collaboratively, Collaboration 5 was possibly a more open example of that actually 
being the case specifically because participants are empowered and not just asked 
about verbally sharing input. 
 
Similar to the dominant communication mediums of Collaboration 1, Collaboration 5 
included situations where geographically dispersed groups were separated from each 
other by computer screens. However, what made a significant difference was 
Collaboration 1 could only scale linearly whereas Collaboration 5 had the potential of 
scaling exponentially. At this early stage, it cannot be confirmed to be the case, but it 
has capacity. Also, the anonymity is not the dividing factor as Collaboration 5 does 
have capacity to accommodate that.  
 
The key differentiating factor thus being that participants were empowered to also 
support each other in a network effect without the central strategic decision-maker 
running interference. The geographic distribution of the members was thus not a 
limiting factor due to the use of an open technology platform empowering was 
problem-solving and innovation at various levels. Collaboration 5’s online private 
Facebook community page where participants with similar background from around 
the world can connect one-on-one at any time of the day or night, as well as the 
monthly Zoom workshops with self-selecting breakout groups. This is similar to the 
premise that has turned over 23 software companies into companies valued at $1B 
companies in less than 10 years – a feat almost impossible before the dawn of the 
digital revolution.  
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• The Collaboration 5’s (C5) dominant mode of communication is via 
informal networked technology. It is informal in that peer-to-peer initiative 
is encouraged, and it is structured in that platforms are available to be 
accessed without permission and used as seen fit once the rules of the game 
are established. The openness to surprises thus results in a dominant drive 
of coded: +S, +D 
 
9.5.6.  Summary 
 
Whether the communication medium augmented the strategic stance or the strategic 
stance augmented the dominant choice in communication medium is outside the 
purview of this thesis. However, what communication mediums align with different 
drives when confronted with taking strategic stances under uncertainty does fit the 
scope. The summary is depicted in Figure 9.1. 
 
 
 
Contrary to expectations geographic dispersion and comfort with technology could 
not account for all decisions as a practical point of view. Most notably inconvenient 
and costly face-to-face meetings were prioritized over convenient and cheap AV 
mediums like Skype in Collaboration 3 with a strong responsive drive. And 
geographically concentrated participants still opted for the use of technology to 
increase strong systematic drives in communication. 
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9.3.  Theme B: Models - mapping relative workshops 
 
9.3.1.  Collaboration 1: General Counsel 
 
Again, Collaboration 1 mapped a purist picture of rational decision-making (+S) 
using a variation of the Rand Corporation’s Delphi method workshop. Specifically 
designed to combat group think, the communication pattern isolates and controls 
(+C) the information participants receive about each other’s thoughts on the matter 
and only shares patterns of feedback in a systematic way after it has been processed 
and anonymized to limit political contamination. (Source) 
 
Conception 
The workshop was initially conceived to be a duplication of an in-person workshop on 
the same topic hosted a year earlier by Microsoft and the University of Chicago but by 
taking “the personalities” out of the workshop it increased in rationality relative to 
past iterations of the same workshop (+S, +C).  
 
Outcome 
Reviewing the workshop outcome on a rubric of affect and reengagement this 
workshop did result in frustration for the intermediary, but the outcome was strong 
enough to replicate the same workshop with a similar group and target contracting in 
a different industry (+S, +C). 
• C1: Workshop 1 strategic stance is coded: +S, +C 
• C1: Workshop 1 strategic stance outcome is also coded: +S, +C 
• C1: Workshop 1 outcome as a success with next project launched traction: 𝑥 ≥
1 
 
 
9.3.2.  Collaboration 2: Higher Education 
 
Collaboration 2, relative to Collaboration 1, relied more heavily on managing the 
hierarchy and politics (+R, +C) to develop and likewise also opted for a workshop 
that also channels affective disposition and engaging narrative in a workshop called 
Customer Journey Mapping. During this workshop stakeholders engaging with a 
facilitator in the development of tangible deliverables like videos, blogs, photographs 
and charts what the future can and should look like to create a curated view for top 
tier strategic decision makers of the barriers faced by stakeholders (+R, +C). (Source) 
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Conception 
The use of this specific workshop was initially conceived at another workshop for 
which the university received grant funding. The Journey Mapping Workshop if done 
in the perimeters of a timeline and using a local facilitator could also be grant funded 
(free). Decision to select Journey Mapping over other alternatives seemed to be based 
on past positive exposures to the Workshop and availability of resources (+R, +C). 
 
Outcome 
Reviewing the workshop outcome on a rubric of affect and reengagement this 
workshop did result in frustration for the participants. When asked to identify the 
“low hanging fruit” barriers and their solutions two independently facilitated groups 
of participants both listed the same four item set of long-term systematic barriers 
that need to be addressed (+S, +D). This systematic and divergent outcome was also 
consistent with the self-described qualities in the first mover problem solvers who 
had been hand selected to attend the workshop on account of their quality innovation 
in their respective areas of expertise.  
• C2: Workshop 2 strategic stance is coded: +R, +C 
• C2: Workshop 2 strategic stance outcome is coded opposite: +S, +D 
• C2: Workshop 2 outcome does not have enough data to suggest it was a 
success: 𝑥 < 1 
 
 
9.3.3.  Collaboration 3: Economic Development 
Collaboration 3, relative to Collaboration 2 started out relying less on internal 
hierarchy, but turned its attention outside the organization for connections and 
resources to develop the idea (+R, +D). The workshop method of Design Thinking is 
specifically different from preceding workshop methodologies because it encourages 
divergent thinking to iterate many solutions (+D) which offers different, unique or 
variant ideas adherent to one theme while convergent thinking (+C) is used at a later 
stage in the process to narrow options down to the best or "correct" solution to the 
given problem. (Source) 
 
Conception 
Using a Design Thinking workshop facilitation to solve an economic development 
problem was in fact the constant component of the idea which never changed over the 
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course of four years. The emergence and framing of the specific economic 
development problem did change throughout the project as the stakeholders and 
resource access changed. 
 
Outcome 
Reviewing the workshop outcome on a rubric of affect and reengagement, this 
workshop did result in frustration for the majority of participants. When asked to 
identify the type of solution that they would like to work on during the two-day 
workshop, the majority of participants chose an option that was not aligned with 
design thinking’s strategic stance (+R, +D) but opted instead for working on a 
revolutionary system overhaul (+S, +D). The second biggest cohort did not adapt to 
the design thinking principles either and opted to conform and develop an idea that 
was planted before the workshop started by a leader (+R, +C). A small fraction of the 
participants did immerse into the design philosophy and expressed a very positive 
experience (+R, +D). 
• C3: Workshop 3 strategic stance is coded: +R, +D 
• C3: Workshop 3 strategic stance outcome can be grouped in three distinct 
strategic stances 
o Group 1 & 2 is coded adjacently: +S, +D 
o Group 3 & 4 is coded adjacently: +R, +C 
o Group 5 is coded the exact same: +R, +D 
• C3: Workshop 3 outcome has enough data to suggest it was a mixed bag on 
success:  
o Group 1 & 2 does not have enough data to suggest it was a success: 𝑥 <
1 
o Group 3 & 4 have enough data to suggest a 60-day traction with 
leadership also adapting to a +R, +C stance: 𝑥 > 0 
o Group 5 have enough data to suggest a positive few day traction with 
leadership not adapting to a +R, +D stance: 𝑥 > 0 
 
 
9.3.4.  Collaboration 4: Software Start-up 
Collaboration 4’s workshop’s strategic stance most closely resembles that of 
Collaboration 1. The Entrepreneurship training and competition projected a detached 
rationality and demand for conforming to a predetermined set rubric that constitutes 
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excellence in entrepreneurship culminating in a competition with financial rewards 
(+S, +C).  
 
Conception 
Using the Entrepreneurship training and competition was a peripheral incidental to 
get access to unrelated resource and it was apparent from the start that the strategic 
stances were not aligned. Launching new expertise in three different domains (none 
of which included the objectives of the expertise building objectives workshop) 
resulted in diametrically opposing strategic stances with the workshop’s (+S, +C) on 
the one hand and the strategic decision-makers’ (+R, +D) on the other. 
 
Outcome 
The access to the resources were highly effective due to joining the workshop. 
However, these resources dried up at the end of the workshop experience. Outcome 
in terms of the affect and engagement of participants towards the workshop itself 
cannot be classified as a success at this time. 
• C4: Workshop 4 strategic stance is coded: +S, +C 
• C4: Workshop 4 strategic stance outcome is also coded: +R, +D 
• C4: Workshop 4 outcome as a success cannot be confirmed: 𝑥 < 1 
 
 
9.3.5.  Collaboration 5: Healthcare 
 
Collaboration 5 was the exceptional case study in that it engaged in two different idea 
development workshops (in addition to the myriad of different continuing education 
trainings) and each of the idea development workshops had a different strategic 
stance, which had different types of pulls on the central idea.  
 
Workshop 5.1 toward the onset of the idea development was Steve Blank’s Customer 
Development methodology administered by an US university affiliated 
entrepreneurial centre. The workshop focused on rational validated learning from 
that which the customer can verbalize to a stranger and using hypothesis testing. 
Workshop 5.2 was Otto Scharmer’s U-theory via a MOOC. U-theory focuses on the 
analysis of principles, practices, and processes that differentiate among four types of 
emergence and anti-emergence: the four types differ in terms of their source (or their 
structure of attention) with respect to where their activity is enacted or performed 
from (Source).  
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Conception 
 
The Customer Development workshop (W5.1) engagement materialized with the 
perception that ‘a’ professional workshop through the local university would help 
develop the concept with structure and direction. Little to no consideration was put 
forth on whether the workshop’s strategic stance was in alignment with the 
leadership collective’s. The team visited explicitly with the facilitators of the 
workshop beforehand to gain more information but it was logistics rather than to 
understand philosophical stances that were in the spotlight. The workshop did cost 
the Collaboration money. 
 
With the U-Theory workshop (W5.2) engagement materialized on account of one of 
many continuing education initiatives. In this instance, it was attending a research 
presentation in-person at an international conference where Otto Scharmer shared 
details about his upcoming MOOC on U-Theory. There was no financial barrier to 
engaging in the MOOC. 
 
 
Outcome 
 
The Customer Development workshop (W5.1) frustrated the decision-makers using it 
to develop the idea. Following the model, the data suggested that a medical model 
should be adhered to. That was the only model where the rationalized detached 
doctors and insurance companies could articulate the need and value for the 
company. There were however two problems with this: (i) the medical model did not 
scale or offer an increase in reach, and (ii) especially in the corporate model that was 
being tested it was apparent that leadership is not likely to articulate stress and 
burnout concerns (of self or workforce) to a stranger with a notebook (+R, +C). The 
Customer Development workshop model offered no solution to either these 
limitations. The next workshop however did. The U-Theory Workshop offered an idea 
development and prototyping resource that did allow for the idea to develop and gain 
global traction. 
• C5: Workshop 5.1 strategic stance is coded: +S, +C 
• C5: Workshop 5.1 strategic stance outcome is coded adjacent: +S, +D 
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• C5: Workshop 5.1 outcome does not have enough data to suggest it was a 
success: 𝑥 < 1 
 
• C5: Workshop 5.2 strategic stance is coded: +S, +D 
• C5: Workshop 5.2 strategic stance outcome is coded the same: +S, +D 
• C5: Workshop 5.2 outcome does have enough data to suggest a positive 1 year 
of traction with leadership adapting to a +S, +D stance: 𝑥 > 0 
 
 
9.4.6.  Summary 
 
With mixed results, workshops were hosted or selected based on what was available 
at the time or in alignment with past exposure. Little to no discussion occurred in 
front of the field worker to align strategic stances of the collectives at top level 
decision-makers, intermediate level decision-makers, and workshop participants and 
the respective strategic stance of the workshop. A graphic summary is presented in 
Figure 9.2. 
 
 
Outcomes with little to no frustration were observed when the strategic stances 
aligned. This was the case in Collaborations 1 (Law), 5 (Workshop 2 with Healthcare) 
and partially also Collaboration 3 (Economic Development with Group 3). 
Measurable task outcomes on these aligned strategic stances also resulted more 
consistently in the workshop informing a next iteration that gets implemented or 
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developed further. In Collaborations 2 (Higher Education), 3 (Economic 
Development) and 4 (Software) frustration and friction was more evident when the 
strategic stances did not align. Measurable task outcomes on these non-aligned 
strategic stances also resulted in higher level decision-makers not necessarily being 
prepared to commit to the workshop and outcome.   
 
It can thus be extrapolated that if strategic decision-makers (and workshop) 
participants’ strategic stances align the outcome of the workshop has a greater chance 
of having a meaningful impact on the idea development further into the future. For 
maximizing impact workshops and workshop participants should thus not be selected 
on the basis of convenience but alignment of philosophical strategic stances.  
 
 
9.4.  Theme C: Momentum – dynamic trajectory of strategies over time  
 
9.4.1.  Collaboration 1: Contract Lawyers 
 
One of the clearest and most consistent examples of collaboration’s transformation 
over time based on a single strategic stance drive had been that of the Corporate 
Lawyers in Chapter 4’s Collaboration 1 as summarized in Table 9.1. 
 
 
 
Collaboration 1 repeatedly demonstrates a process of following the same pattern of 
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taking an existing idea and improving on that by increasing localized control (+C) 
and systematically making incremental changes (+S). This is especially evident in 
Snapshot 1 as the existing blueprint of a tried and true workshop is used as the 
baseline. We see evidence of this again about a year later in Snapshots 7 and 8 as new 
industry sectors are added on the exact same framework. 
 
In terms of changing from an ‘in-person workshop’ to an ‘asynchronous online 
workshop’ explained in Snapshot 4 we also see fertile grounds for systematisms (+S) 
increasing as participants are more isolated and individualistic online, over an 
socially normative scenario of collaborating in a round table setup where 
responsiveness (+R) to each other and striking the right kind of social awareness 
balance may soften the rationality of results. The same dampening of bounded 
rationality (+R, +C) applies to separating the Buyer and Seller side and blinding 
participants to affective factors in Snapshot 5. 
 
Finally, the process of setting clear and explicit quantifiable timelines and 
partnership level goals is another example of a controlled rational stance for moving 
strategic objectives forward (+S, +C). All of this is also consistent with the corporate 
law industry’s general tendency to train professionals in a (+S, +C) line of reasoning 
as was discussed in the industry baseline. 
 
With the specific framing and selection of snapshots the dynamic trajectory thus 
resembles: 
• C1 dominant strategic stance is thus coded: +S, +C. 
• C1 snapshots captures the movement of an idea progressing along a single 
strategic stance, however top decision-makers reveal to be naturally 
predisposed to high level +R, +D and +S, +D strategists 
 
 
9.4.2.  Collaboration 2: Higher Education 
 
Comparatively less clear than Collaboration 1’s consistent (+S, +C) drive would be 
Collaboration 2’s strategic stance changes over time. Like in Collaboration 1 the 
opposing drives are present, but in Collaboration 2 there is stronger elements of a 
duel between participating stakeholders who may not whole heartedly be conforming 
and responsive, but are politically aware of the system within which to operate. As 
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discussed in Chapter 5, the Higher Education in Collaboration 2’s snapshots and their 
respective codes are summarized in Table 9.2. 
 
 
 
In Collaboration 2 we also see a clearer institutional hierarchy (+R, +C) in play even 
when a significant amount of the collaboration is inter-organizational. The top layer 
of the organization where the true strategic decision-makers do not appear often at 
the dozens of meetings (+S, +C) over the course of idea development, but a lot of 
energy is exerted into guessing what higher layer decision-makers would consider 
acceptable ideas and evolutions on the ideas as opposed to what may be ‘a truth’ for 
the intermediary strategic maker. 
 
The intermediary strategic decision-makers’ meetings are also structured in a way 
that is large enough to be inclusive of diverse stakeholders and structured enough to 
ensure that educational conforming standards gets communicated and absorbed as 
opposed to leaving it wide open for differentiating ideas to be introduced (+R, +C) 
(See Snapshot 3). Intermediary decision-makers in the leadership team also “hate to 
say this, but [I] think we need to go for the low hanging fruit” (See Snapshot 4) which 
does not cost major system overhaul kind of financial and socio-political investment 
(+R, +C). And when collaborating with outside organizations the same strategic 
socio-political firewall is evident whether it be for doing workshops or partnering 
with entities where the relationship is already proven and well developed (See 
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Snapshot 2, 5, 6, 7). Also in the selection of the workshop type “journey mapping,” 
the code is a strong (+R, +C) as the process’ deliverables are designed to 
communicate abstract affective constructs in a tangible way.  
 
The interesting mismatch with this predominantly socio-political (+R, +C) stance is 
when looking at the historic track record of successes of the intermediary leaders (as 
discussed in Snapshot 5) as well as alpha movers that attended the workshop (as 
discussed in Snapshot 6). These groups could possibly be inhibited by politics as all 
exhibit strong evidence of rational and differentiator qualities (+S, +D) in the 
pioneering successes in their track record suggesting that the culture observed in the 
snapshots (and beyond) is not the true organizational culture but a special sub group 
strategically muffling themselves to increase the chances of innovation long-term.  
 
All of this is also consistent with the higher education industry’s general tendency to 
reward professionals based on a (+R, +C) line of reasoning as University rankings, 
membership with elite distinction groups and academic citation in peer reviewed 
journals define strategic stances to increase hierarchical climb. 
 
With the specific framing and selection of snapshots, the dynamic trajectory thus 
resembles: 
• C2 dominant strategic stance are thus coded: +R, +C. 
• C2 snapshots captures the movement of an idea progressing along multiple 
strategic stances captured. Most of the idea drivers/developers have provided 
evidence of being +S, +D, strategists, but their perception of the executive 
powerbrokers are that they are predisposed to +S, +C strategists, however on 
account of the organization’s size and focus on prestige, strategist are 
operating predominantly as +R, +C strategists.  
 
 
9.4.3.  Collaboration 3: Economic Development 
Comparatively to Collaboration 1 and 2, Collaboration 3 and 4 are even less clear 
depictions of the Responsive and Differentiating (+R, +D) Drive. Each of these latter 
case studies have their own respective twists on the concept of exploring new and 
different ways to look at solving a problem. 
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As was discussed in Chapter 6, Collaboration 3 with the Economic Development 
objective is designed around the premise that developing a strategic stance through a 
design thinking workshop has the capacity to solve problems in a way that let 
stakeholders identify what do they have control over and take actions in response to 
collaborating in a new way of framing the problem (+R, +D). With the workshop and 
it’s fifty-five attendees as the central focal point this thesis observed an unexpected 
three-way splintering on the premise of design thinking. (See summary table 10.3). 
 
The majority of workshop attendees did not conform to the workshop’s philosophy 
and tackled problem-solving discussions in a way that is more rational (+S) as 
opposed to responsive (+R). The remaining two groups all were both responsive. 
However, here too there was a splinting between Group 2’s conforming and 
anchoring to a workshop premise that was pitched to them before the workshop (+R, 
+C), and Group 3 who opened themselves to ideas and possibilities and allowed the 
experience and participants of the workshop to influence their ideas in real time (+R, 
+D).  
 
 
 
Finally, in Snapshot 6 and 7 we see the collective leadership group after the workshop 
conform to the socio-political principles of the most dominant leaders in the room 
and thus ending up with a (+R, +C) stance. As was evident when he left the table to 
join another university, the project also died. Collaboration 3 was thus rationally 
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designed to be a responsive and differentiating strategic approach (+R, +D), but 
behaviourally exhibited strongest focus on socio-political strategic stances. (+R, +C). 
 
With the specific framing and selection of snapshots the dynamic trajectory thus 
resembles: 
• C3 dominant strategic stance are thus coded: +R, +C. 
• C3 snapshots captures the movement of an idea progressing along in a tug of 
war between two adjacent strategic stances of striving to be +R, +D, but 
repeatedly defaulting onto +R, +C 
 
 
9.4.4.  Collaboration 4: Software Start-up 
Collaboration 4’s software start-up suffers from a similar fate of being forced by 
necessity to launch from a responsive and differentiating stance (+R, +D) because 
strategic decision-makers had no contacts or expertise in the areas of computer 
programming, videography and professionally designed health and safety plans yet 
excellence in each area was prioritized as paramount. As was discussed in Chapter 7, 
Collaboration 4 was bound out of necessity to use responsive and differentiating 
strategic stances as a starting point. However, as summarizes in Table 9.4 that is not 
where the strategic stance stopped. 
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Though the successes with leveraging relationships with the University in the North 
lead onto attempts to copy that same pattern with a University in the South (+S, +C), 
a whole independent stream of relationships needed to be fired up from nothing (this 
was not the case with Collaboration 1 when the same chain of buyers was approached 
to participate again in another industry in which they all purchase services. (Same 
people. Different services – IT then Telecom, then Energy.) Also, as the incremental 
value added over time diminished as a new partner’s resources of access to footage 
and training materials diminished over time, so too did the interest in sustaining the 
relationship. Once control was established (+C) a new stream of resources was 
pursued anew. (+R, +D). 
 
As the listed code of (+R, +D) does not even appear in the summary table we stumble 
into another interesting finding: when more than one strategic stance is deployed 
over the journey of a snapshot, it travels along a path of development. In the specific 
case of the Software start-up the pattern is repeated over and over in each snapshot. 
The responsive and differentiating (+R, +D) becomes a responsive and conforming 
strategic stance (+R, +C) once it enters into a negotiation phase and each party in the 
inter-organizational negotiation attempts to extract as much value out of the 
relationship as possible. Once control of the valuable resource is secured the interest 
in systematically improving that which is of value to the other party (e.g. free videos 
for the University’s use) ceases if the relationship is not negotiated to a next level of 
commitment, investment and return on investment. Therefore, the relationships of 
services provided below market value stop once the quality is to a level that 
showcases a diverse portfolio of work (+C). 
 
With the specific framing and selection of snapshots the dynamic trajectory thus 
resembles: 
• C4 dominant strategic stance are thus coded: +R, +D → +C 
• C4 snapshots captures the repeated movement of an idea progressing from a 
point of emergence to a control seeking function and then stopping to start a 
new journey anew  
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9.4.5.  Collaboration 5: Healthcare 
 
Finally, Collaboration 5 presents the best depiction of creating a Systematic and 
Differentiating stance (+S, +D) with the risk of cannibalizing its own preceding  
evolutions but looks towards the longer-term implication of immortality and being a 
next evolution platform of being regenerative. In Chapter 8 the Healthcare 
collaboration clearly and purposefully worked on developing models stimulated by 
each of the four drives (and quadrants) as presented in the summary Table 10.5.   
 
 
 
With Collaboration 5 we also start to see the implications of intentionally developing 
each of the four drives as opposed to focusing on a more simplistic monoculture.  
 
The first instance this become apparent was in Workshop 1. Instead of simply 
conforming to the workshop culture of Consumer informed product development (+S, 
+C), but building onto it, and also building the other drives out alongside 
accomplished two things: (i) it allowed workshop facilitators to observe different 
strategic stances alongside each other and not assume that the one they were 
advocating is superior in all situations, and (ii) it made the leadership collective 
aware of a hidden fourth model that should theoretically be capable of scaling. 
Granted the team stopped searching or exploring what that truly could be after 
finding an online model that the Director of Immunology had already started to 
develop, but staying open to yet more options from other experts (including 
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Workshop 2) ultimately did reveal yet another model in the same camp with more 
long-term traction. 
 
With the specific framing and selection of snapshots the dynamic trajectory thus 
resembles: 
• C5 dominant strategic stance are thus coded: +S, +D. 
• C5 snapshots captures the movement of an idea very intentionally exploring 
models in every strategic stance iteration in search of the development of the 
best option  
 
 
9.5. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 9’s findings confirm the presence of strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty stances that invites higher levels of ambiguity and thrives under 
uncertainty. Also, important in the context of social realism, it confirms the model’s* 
capacity to absorb categorical, relational and dynamic data. 
 
From the five collaboration case studies included in this study examples of enough 
data could be harvested on examples of a) communication mediums, b) workshops 
and c) different dynamic trajectories across the four quadrants of strategic decision-
making quadrants. 
 
In Chapter 10 the three themes’ implications on idea development will be discussed 
in the context of the strategic stance drives as well as the corresponding decision-
making under uncertainty quadrant.  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
10.1.  Introduction 
 
As we established in first part with the theoretical foundation for classic rational 
decision-making models (Theme 1) and behavioural decision-making models (Theme 
2) are well established areas of literature. This specific thesis aims to develop the 
more uncertain components of these respective theories as applied to the intentional 
selection of strategic stances amongst higher levels of uncertainty. In the model* 
these higher level of uncertainty ‘behavioural-type’ decisions will be referred to as 
Improvisational (Theme 3) and higher level of uncertainty ‘rational-type’ decisions 
will be referred to as Consilience (Theme 4) 
 
In the process of understanding the complexities of decision-making under 
uncertainty using a social realism lens, Chapter 9’s findings showcased the 
emergence of patterns that overlap enough to be able to draw inferences. By 
specifically focusing on the Theme A’s patterns of categorical data, Theme B’s 
relational comparatives between the workshops, and Theme C’s dynamic trajectories 
of strategic stances over time, some implications of the drives can be explored.  
 
Essentially Chapter 10 discussion will focus on the implications that this has on 
tangible aspects like selecting communication mediums, workshops and longer term 
idea development based on the results observed in this study, but the three detailed 
themes are also surrogates for the broader context of categorical, relational and 
dynamic strategy stances in development and evolution within the social sciences 
context. The implications of this will be fully explored in Chapter 12 when we focus on 
application of theory building as well as practical idea building using one hundred of 
the most seminal management theories of the past one hundred years.  
 
 
10.2.  Theme One: Classic Rational Decision-Making model (+S, +C) 
 
As expected evidence of classic decision making models which are systematic and 
conforming strategies was consistently observed. It was especially evident in 
Collaboration 1 with lawyers collaborating amongst each other in mediums and 
formats comfortable to their everyday working conditions.  
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Because the concept of classic rational decision-making is so well entrenched in 
literature this thesis will not claim to be making any surprising new revelations about 
the classic decision-making models. What is however important is that on a 
continuum it stands to be reasoned that there would be different types of rationality 
and different types of control. This thesis henceforth is looking for the other types of 
decision-making models in relation to a baseline or anchor. In this thesis 
Collaboration 1 provides a strong anchor from which to compare other collaborations 
that may exhibit strategic stances with different points of view on systematisms and 
conforming philosophies. 
 
10.2.1.  Theme A: Modes - mapping categorical communication mediums 
 
Collaboration 1 was almost purist in its application of rational decision-making 
communication mediums. By selecting to rely heavily on one-on-one emails, by 
removing non-verbal body language, intonation and tone of voice, office design, attire, 
appearance that constitutes a sizable percentage of what constitutes bounded 
rationality, participants are forced to focus very narrowly on content of what is 
written in contracts. Add to that the anonymizing scrub of the data and the end result 
is hyper content focused collaboration process. 
 
Though Collaboration 1 strategic decision-makers opted for this route as a necessity 
in saving time and money, as well as bringing geographically dispersed parties 
together, it also stands to reason that affect, politics and differentiation 
contaminating the end result diminished. However, just because it saves time and 
money for one strategic decision-making team does not mean it would have similar 
results for another team where affect, responsiveness, politics and differentiating are 
indeed important components.  
 
In revisiting summary figure 9.1. it can be extrapolated from the pattern that on more 
logical strategic stances the typed of communication mediums that would lend 
themselves well to evolving an idea to the next level on the same strategic stance may 
include mediums that relies on higher individualism and smaller groups. This could 
be enhanced by using more asynchronous technology for meetings to give 
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participants time to reflect on content individually, as well as opting for more formal 
channels and stricter deadlines.  
 
 
 
10.2.2.  Theme B: Models - mapping workshops relatively 
 
In the collection of five case studies in Appendix D through H, three different 
workshops emerged that embodied the classic rational decision-making under 
uncertainty strategic stance of being conforming and systematic (listed relative to 
each other in descending order of reliance on +S, +C): 
• W1:    Delphi Method 
• W4:    Entrepreneurship training and competition 
• W5.1: Consumer Development methodology 
 
In this specific collection of case studies workshops that generated the superior next 
iteration springboards on the idea development were less contingent on how 
controlled or systematic (+S, +C) they were, and but rather how well aligned the 
strategic stance align was with the strategic stance of the strategic decision-makers 
(managing up) and workshop participants (managing down). One of the cases to 
illuminate this point was Collaboration 5 (+S, +D) being more responsive in moving 
the idea to a next iteration on a U-Theory workshop (+S, +D) as opposed to the 
Consumer Development methodology workshop (+S, +C).  
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10.2.3.  Theme C: Momentum - mapping dynamic trajectories of over 
time 
 
Apart from Collaboration 1 where classic rationality (+S, +C) strategic stances 
dominated, snapshots of classic rationality (+S, +C) was also captured in other 
collaborations as important moments when strategic stances changed over time.  
 
In Collaboration 5 (Snapshot 3) when the contract was signed with the Research 
Hospital a predominantly systematic and differentiating team (+S, +D) conformed to 
the entity whom they perceived to have more power to dictate terms. This also 
occurred in Collaboration 4 (Snapshot 8). For two years now the software start-up 
had been predominantly entrenched in perfecting the computer programming 
backend of the platform as well as redesigning other companies’ backend components. 
This pattern of two out of five collaborations ending up on classic rationality and not 
moving back or forward, which suggests that it may be one of the more comfortable 
modes to settle into with regards to strategic stances after the turmoil of change in 
our modern Western society. 
 
Another practical finding that can be derived specifically from the classic rational 
decision-making data (but is not exclusive to this area) is the concept of maximizing 
options at higher levels of decision-making. As ideas move up in levels of 
complication and sophistication one of the side effects is that options for the next 
idea iteration do not seem to limit options under uncertainty, but rather generate 
more possible paths. This is not perceived as a paralyzing explosion of options, but 
rather a generator of multiple windows of opportunities as was the case with 
Collaboration 1 deciding to duplicate a similar Delphi method workshop with a 
similar base of blue chip companies but now move from IT services to Telecom 
Services and then on to Energy. 
 
 
10.3.  Theme Two: Behavioural Decision-Making model (+R, +C) 
 
As expected, evidence of responsive and conforming behavioural decision-making 
models was in action and observed throughout. It was especially evident in 
Collaboration 2 with higher education administrators collaborating amongst each 
other in mediums and formats comfortable to their everyday working conditions.  
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Because the concept of bounded rationality is also well entrenched in literature this 
thesis will not claim to be making surprising new revelations about these models 
either. Again, what is important is that on a continuum it stands to be reasoned that 
there would be different types of responsiveness and different types of control. This 
thesis henceforth is looking for the other types of decision-making models in relation 
to a baseline or anchor. In this thesis Collaboration 2 provides a good enough second 
anchor from which to compare other collaborations that may exhibit strategic stances 
with different points of view on responsive and conforming philosophies. 
 
 
10.3.1.  Theme A: Modes - mapping categorical communication mediums 
 
Collaboration 2 was less purist in its application of behavioural decision-making by 
making use of a variety of communication mediums but most dominantly steering 
committee meetings, and a series of different feedback workshops. Bringing sizable 
groups of key stakeholders from several different departments together in highly 
structured interactions and setting the agenda of what information will be 
communicated accomplishes two things: (i) It trains stakeholders onto the expected 
behaviour, topics of importance and appropriate conduct in the hierarchy of the 
organization, and (ii) if key stakeholders return to their respective departments and 
copy the structure and share the information, a network effect of socialization has the 
capacity to occur down the hierarchy chain of command in larger organizations. 
 
Though Collaboration 2 strategic decision-makers opted for this route as a necessity 
in involving a cross-section of stakeholders who could be impacted by organizational 
changes to establish two-way communication in event of blind spots that could end 
up being costly, there was also another financial incentive. The three development 
grants in the case of Collaboration 2 also specifically exercised the same nested type 
of responsive and conforming expectation of diversity of stakeholders at the table in 
development discussion. 
 
In revisiting summary Figure 9.1. it can be extrapolated from the pattern that on 
more behavioural or socio-political strategic stances the type of communication 
mediums that would lend itself well to evolving an idea to the next level may include 
mediums that relies on higher collectivism and bigger groups. This could be 
enhanced by using more in-person meetings to make participants respond in real-
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time and then reflect and rationalize individually later to internalize the social 
behaviour. Like the rational channels enhancing the formality and tone of the 
channel and setting strict deadlines also has the chances that collaborators would 
increase the chances that collaborators would respond to uncertain situations using 
social cues from conforming peers and behavioural decision-making models.  
 
 
10.3.2.  Theme B: Models - mapping workshops relatively 
 
In the collection of five case studies from Part II, only one workshop emerged that 
embodied the classic bounded rational decision-making under uncertainty strategic 
stance of being conforming and responsive: The Customer Journey Mapping from 
Collaboration 2  
 
Astutely aligned with the strategic stances of a traditional and entrenched industry 
operating in a pack of other elite entities (+R, +C) it may take more outside and 
environmental forces for a university to separate from the pack. Maybe the national 
industry experts are consciously aware of it and conforming, maybe they are 
perpetuating it inadvertently, but in the line of available workshops their resources 
are making available more of the same strategic stance (+R, +C). Regardless, this 
does align with top leadership’s perception on the best strategic stance even if that 
may not be internal to them either. The problem is: there is compelling evidence to 
suggest that not top management, not the intermediary decision-makers and not the 
alpha movers who were a part of the workshop (+R, +C) are intrinsically aligned to 
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socio-politics, but they are astute enough to know that rules of the game demands 
they need to be responsive and conform.  
 
This is however not the case in Collaboration 3. Though the Design Thinking 
workshop is constructed from an improvised decision-making under uncertainty 
strategic stance (+R, +D), it left itself wide open and vulnerable to controlled socio-
political interference (+R, +C). And that is exactly what happened. So, whereas 
Collaboration 2’s stakeholders responds and conforms to ‘the rules of the game’. 
Collaboration 3’s strategic decision-makers may (unadvisedly) stack the deck in their 
favour by (inadvertently) stating ‘different rules of the game’ to workshop 
participants, while strategic decision-makers still (inadvertently) play by a different 
set of rules to ensure key decision-makers benefit (or maintain interest) in the 
development of the end result.  
 
To unpack, specifically in the case of Collaboration 3 a number of stakeholders 
decided before the workshop that an ‘accelerator’ would serve their best interest 
(Snapshot 3), during the workshop (Snapshot 4) a number of people developed the 
idea, and after the workshop (Snapshot 5) the group of decision-makers 
(inadvertently) maintained the perception that was the best idea and carried forward 
an iteration of the idea ‘accelerator-maker space’ when in fact that was not even an 
idea that the workshop participants developed. That is not to imply that 
improvisational (+R, +D) strategic stances do not exist as will be fully discussed in 
the Improvisation decision-making section, however, instances do exist where 
strategic stances (inadvertently) may not be what they appear to be when control over 
public buy-in is being developed. 
 
 
10.3.3.  Theme C: Momentum - mapping dynamic trajectories of over 
time 
 
Apart from Collaboration 2 and 3 where bounded rationality (+R, +C) strategic 
stances dominated, behavioural decision-making snapshots of (+R, +C) were also 
captured in other collaborations as important moments when strategic stances 
changed over time.  
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Specifically, in Collaboration 4 and 5 the +R, +C snapshots could also be referred to 
as glamour shots as they depict the project as more prestigious and special. 
Snapshots involves artefacts (e.g. $10-million-dollar chandelier), locations (e.g. 
biggest Fire Training College, biggest Hospital in Europe) people (e.g. professor 
emeritus getting involved) and in the modern day and age social network equity (e.g. 
top 10 article or 45K likes on YouTube) that sets the collaboration’s idea on a 
hierarchy as superior by affiliation.  
 
But in spite of this glamour by association, a cautionary note is needed. Since 
bounded rationality is often cast as subservient to rationality because it relies on 
mental shortcuts and may happen below the consciousness threshold of awareness, 
mapping others’ trajectories and strategic stances with regards to responsive and 
conforming (+R, +C) may be perceived as less flattering. A strategic decision-maker 
may also downright deny occupying this field in order to not be socio-politically 
painted as manipulative or gullible. Yet, regardless if it happens above or below the 
conscious threshold this field is the essence of political sophistication in building 
critical mass, trust and loyalty to move a project to its next iteration.  
 
 
10.4.  Theme Three: Improvisational Decision-Making model (+R, +D) 
 
Presently, the more improvisational decision-making models which are responsive 
and differentiating have yet to be relayed in relation to traditional classic decision-
making models and behavioural decision-making models. As is evident when 
comparing more real-time responsive Collaborations like 2, 3 and 4 differences can 
be used to understand how higher uncertainty embracing strategic stances differ 
from more control or conforming stances. Specifically, the differences can be 
observed in terms of: categorical tools used like dominant communication modes, 
relational differences like strategic stances (philosophy) of workshops in relation to 
the different decision-makers, and dynamic trajectories over the course of an idea’s 
development. 
 
This thesis henceforth is looking for the other types of decision-making models in 
relation to a baseline or anchor. In this thesis Collaboration 2 provides a good enough 
second anchor from which to compare other collaborations that may exhibit strategic 
stances with different points of view on responsive and conforming philosophies. 
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10.4.1.  Theme A: Modes - mapping categorical communication mediums 
 
With regards to categorical communication mediums this thesis provides not one, but 
two Collaborations (3 & 4) to provide insight into categories of communication 
mediums that facilitate more differentiating as opposed to conforming or controlling 
ideas to be generated. Similar to Collaboration 2 in the behavioural application of 
bounded rational decision-making communication mediums, Collaboration 3 and 4 
still rely heavily on non-verbal body language, intonation and tone of voice, office 
design, attire, and appearance that constitute 80% of a message bounded rationality 
shortcuts. However, differently from Collaboration 2, Collaboration 3 & 4 shrinks the 
groups sizes and increases the informality to increase capacity to be able to deal with 
unexpected information, ideas or surprises. 
 
Collaboration 3 strategic decision-makers opted for communications mediums that 
were relatively more time consuming as priorities of different stakeholders over 
whom there was no direct control needed to align. Similarly, Collaboration 4 was also 
less cost effective as geographic dispersion was not treated with cheap and easy, time 
saving technology, but hundreds of hours were spent on the road to ensure face-to-
face contact was maintained. In both Collaboration 2 & 3 a deliberate premium was 
put on remaining flexible in the early stages. However, just because upfront 
investment was made in of higher cost time and energy, it did not mean it continued 
throughout. As we will come back to in the dynamic trajectory, it is especially 
apparent from both Collaborations 2 & 3 that responsive and differentiating strategic 
stances are a transitory state.  
 
In revisiting summary figure 9.1. it can be extrapolated from the pattern that on more 
differentiating affective strategic stances the type of communication mediums that 
would lend itself well to evolving an idea may include mediums that rely on higher 
individualism and smaller groups that can accommodate uniqueness. Improvisation 
could be enhanced by using more informal face-to-face encounters to give prospects 
opportunities to respond in the moment. With regards to time horizons 
improvisation benefits from the tightest possible deadlines compared to all the other 
strategic stances, but the more open ended time-horizon on the big picture the 
longer-term orientated the decision-maker can be on the solution.  
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10.4.2.  Theme B: Models - mapping workshops relatively 
 
In the collection of five case studies from Part II, one workshop emerged that 
embodied the improvisational decision-making under uncertainty strategic stance of 
being responsive and differentiating: The Design Thinking workshop from 
Collaboration 2  
 
As was touched on in the Behavioural decision-making section, in spite of this 
workshop’s improvisational stance (+R, +D) the outcome resulted in a predominantly 
behavioural decision-making outcome (+R, +C) on account of the key strategic 
decision-makers. There was however a subgroup of workshop participants (G3.5) 
who committed to following through on the improvisational iterations of the idea that 
was generated. The major finding on the outcome of this subgroup who intrinsically 
embodies all the necessary textbook qualities to have immersed in a Design Thinking 
experience, is that the enthusiasm died off within days after the workshop. 
Conversely the subgroup that adopted the behavioural decision-making stance which 
had more alignment with the project’s leadership team (+R, +C) lasted at least 60 
days longer in building and iterating on the idea. In terms of practical implication, it 
thus stands to reason that even in informal and unstructured innovation some 
successive structure, responsiveness, and conforming qualities are necessary to 
  180  
evolve a complex idea and transition it over into implementation during 
collaborations. 
 
 
10.4.3.  Theme C: Momentum - mapping dynamic trajectories over time 
 
Apart from Collaboration 4 which launched almost every new opportunity with a new 
improvisation path (+R, +D), responsive and differentiation snapshots (+R, +D) were 
also captured in other collaborations as important moments when strategic stances 
changed over time.  
 
Most notably improvisation occurred very often in Collaboration 3 as was 
characterized by the long lead time waiting for windows of opportunities to align. 
Also, the short characteristic emails that informed without context, informal tone and 
jokes in small impromptu gatherings increased the chances of spontaneous 
emergence of new and different ideas. 
 
Collaboration 2 also produced uncharacteristically unexpected improvisations with 
the formation of a steering committee who upon first meeting expectantly wounded 
the baseline of the idea of doing MOOCs in partnership with other Universities which 
had been quietly in development in the background. And then, secondly, unexpected 
improvisation occurred in response when higher level decision makers defied 
expectations by resurging the idea 2-3 weeks later with a press release that a 
commitment to the idea of MOOCs had indeed been made.  
 
Similarly, Collaboration 5 also embarked on uncharacteristically unexpected 
improvisation by throwing together a community event for hundreds of the most 
influential leaders in a metropolitan area and raising thousands of dollars on short 
notice to host an event. It can however be speculated that the reason Collaboration 5’s 
strategic decision-making team succeeded was due to the fact that as a Mayor and 
entrenched community leader duo bringing in a professional speaker from a world-
renowned research hospital the brand equity (+R, +C) was high enough to allow for 
shortcuts through the systematic channels (+S) so that board approval due diligence, 
media coverage vetting and other formal channels for establishing trust and loyalty 
were not necessary. 
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10.5.  Theme Four: Consilience Decision-Making model (+S, +D) 
  
Presently, the more disruptive decision-making models which are systematic and 
differentiating also have yet to be relayed in relation to traditional classic decision-
making models and behavioural decision-making models. As is evident when 
comparing more perpetual self-sustaining Collaborations like 5 to a tried and true 
systematic Collaboration like 1 differences can be used to understand how higher 
uncertainty embracing strategic stances differ from more controlling or conforming 
stances. Specifically, the differences can be observed in terms of: categorical tools 
used like dominant communication modes, relational differences like strategic 
stances (philosophy) of workshops in relation to the different decision-makers, and 
dynamic trajectories over the course of an idea’s development. 
 
This thesis henceforth is looking for the other types of decision-making models in 
relation to a baseline or anchor. In this thesis Collaboration 1 provides an excellent 
anchor from which to compare other collaborations that may exhibit strategic stances 
with different points of view on responsive and conforming philosophies. 
 
 
10.5.1.  Theme A: Modes - mapping categorical communication mediums 
 
As discussed earlier, Collaboration 1 was almost purist in its application of rational 
decision-making communication mediums by selecting to rely heavily on one-on-one 
emails. By removing non-verbal body language, intonation and tone of voice, office 
design, attire, and appearance that constitutes 80% of a message bounded rationality 
shortcuts or distorting smoke and mirrors are diminished. Add to that the 
anonymizing scrub of the data and the result is richly content focused. Even though 
Collaboration 5 was still rational, it is very different from Collaboration 1 in the way it 
used communication mediums.  
 
First, Collaboration 5 did engage with responsive strategies throughout. It is there for 
not a pure example of being a concentrated example of rationality. But in the way it 
used information technology communication it could be argued that it took 
rationality to the next level: hyper rationality.  
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In Collaboration 5 the one-to-one technology (e.g. email) gets replaced with a one-to-
many (e.g. zoom, Facebook, Slack) which ultimately evolves into a networked effect of 
many to many (e.g. peer support and new subgroups being formed). Specifically, 
worth noting is how the control of Collaboration 1 is replaced with differentiation and 
empowerments that allow the network to support each other on the provided 
platforms with minimal interference of an intermediary. As will be discussed in 
further detail, getting to a shared platform state would not be possible without going 
through a process of responsiveness and conforming first. Herein lies our next clue to 
be analysed in Theme C as to the dynamic qualities of strategic stances.  
 
Through Collaboration 5 we also observe the use of asynchronous technology not 
necessarily because of preventative geographic barriers, not necessarily to ensure 
anonymity, but instead to empower options associated with flexibility. It should 
however be noted that this flexibility could (as the name suggest) disrupt the flow and 
thus cannibalize a previous stepping stone in the process or the network. In serving a 
higher goal, strategic decision-makers operating in this quadrant expect and 
rationally chose that trade-off in pursuit of developing a broader goal of higher value. 
We also observe how the opposing force of responsiveness and control can be a part 
of the stance but enough freedom is allowed to not need excessive degrees of it. 
 
In revisiting summary figure 9.1. it can be extrapolated from the pattern that on more 
differentiating logical strategic stances the type of communication mediums that 
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would lend themselves well to evolving an idea to the next level on the same strategic 
stance may include mediums that rely on higher collectivism and bigger groups (who 
may have the option of subdividing). This could be enhanced by allowing for the 
option of asynchronous technology for meetings to give participants time to reflect on 
content individually, as well as creating the space for more informal channels. 
Disruptive decision-making channels benefit most from open-ended time horizons 
that look into perpetuity. 
 
 
10.5.2.  Theme B: Models - mapping workshops relatively 
 
In the collection of five case studies detailed in Part II, one workshop emerged that 
embodied the disruptive decision-making under uncertainty strategic stance of being 
systematic and differentiating: The U-Theory workshop from Collaboration 5  
 
As was touched on in the classic rational decision-making section, Collaboration 5’s 
strong alignment with the U-Theory in contrast to the frustration with Customer 
Development methodology provides insight into when the same group of decision-
makers encounters workshops with different stances on the development (or 
generation) of new ideas. Relatively speaking, when strategic stances between 
workshops and strategic decision-makers are in alignment, stronger traction and idea 
can be built.  
 
It should also be noted that specifically in Collaboration 5 the Customer development 
methodology workshop (+S, +C) was artificially adjusted by the decision-makers to 
explore all quadrants of decision-making models for the organization’s development. 
That satisfied the workshop facilitators’ criteria on immersing and committing to the 
principles of the workshop philosophy but did not produce results that aided in 
decision-making to the stakeholders. As an outcome three of the development models 
were pursued simultaneously with various degrees of success. It was not until the U-
Theory workshop (+S, +D) that the full potential of a higher quality iteration of the 
network theory model could be envisioned. As it turned out, from the U-Theory 
workshop content (as well as in practice) the development of aspects of idea 
iterations of all other decision-making under uncertainty modes of thinking are 
necessary before disruptive or evolutionary decision-making could succeed. 
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10.5.3.  Theme C: Momentum - mapping dynamic trajectories over time 
 
Apart from Collaboration 5 where hyper rationality (+S, +D) strategic stances 
dominated, disruptive decision-making snapshots of (+S, +D) were also captured in 
other collaborations as important moments when strategic stances changed over time.  
 
Most centrally everyone in the collaboration had the theoretical capacity to cause a 
fundamental shift in their industry (or cross-section of industries) (+S, +D). It was 
one of the criteria at the onset for selecting the best projects to profile emergence. 
However, projects having been in an embryonic state of conception when joining also 
constituted greater risk that a project’s full potential would not be actualized. 
 
Additionally, as was observed throughout the five collaborations, strategic decision-
makers may posture verbally for a grand vision; however, when it comes to 
implementation that vision gets ‘scaled to reality’. In Collaboration 1 the Project 
Architect responded to a room full of lawyers that the ultimate goal was to 
revolutionize the way that contracts are negotiated (+S, +D), but he prioritized 
focusing on principles for the first step (+S, +C). When the opportunity presented to 
move on to the next iteration (telecom), and the next (energy), the strategic decision-
making team chose two more times to remain with the safer (+S, +C) strategic stance 
by just replicating the model and participants. 
 
A similar situation occurred with Collaboration 2. In this instance, it was more 
challenging to gauge full intent; however, evidence suggest strategic decision-makers 
tone down their visions to get collective buy-in. This is evident in the strategic-
decision makers’ past projects on and off the job (+S, +D), in their preferred 
vocabulary when they decide to take small steps (not +R, +C), and in the strong 
awareness and response from a demographic of stakeholders who also have a track 
record of being first movers who respond to workshop invitational (+S, +D). 
 
In Collaboration 3 the big dramatic visions of what is possible are also informed by 
past experience with interesting developments over the world that could be 
duplicated locally where one platform is the generator for several more platforms of 
innovation (+S, +D). However, in this collaboration we observe the greatest 
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asymmetry of priorities as inter-organizational stakeholders come to the table with 
their own agendas and strategic stances. Economic developer interests (e.g. multi-
generational unemployment due to drug abuse) are not well aligned with academic 
interests (management research access), which were not clearly aligned with the 
(perceived) current city council interests (e.g. ‘shiny buildings’), which were not 
clearly aligned with private sector interests (e.g. consulting fees) which were not 
clearly aligned with the target social enterprise interests (e.g. £45,000 of funding 
within the next 90 days). Though there is common ground and the cross-section buy-
in, the central question of real and perceived power centres does not resolve for next 
iteration traction. 
 
Collaboration 4 similarly aspires to introduce a software platform that has the 
capacity to revolutionize the way health & safety is done at a fraction of the cost and 
an interconnected network of accountability and lifelong training (+S, +D). Yet in this 
collaboration’s situation priority is given to deliverables that have been crafted with 
perfection (+S, +C). 
 
But even in Collaboration 5 where an unexpected turn of events resulted in the 
emergence of a solution that embodies the emergence of hyper realism (+S, +D) it 
could also be said that key strategic decision-makers are all over the map with their 
strategic stance. Though they are cognizant of the impact that the evolution of the 
idea has in cannibalizing their existing steady stream of income, they are visibly 
energized about the long-term potential of the initiative on a much larger scale over a 
longer period of time.  
 
 
10.6.  Limitations 
 
Quantity 
 
As rare as it is to have five ethnographies in a single doctoral thesis undertaking, so 
too would it be having forty ethnographies. However, having higher numbers of idea 
iterations to unpack and dissect in relation to one-another would greatly aid in the 
generation of clearer category lines, more definitive relational positions on a 
continuum, and evolutionary trajectories of ideas.  
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To address this limitation this thesis also used the academic pursuit of models and 
theories in strategy and management as a proxy to expand on the central premise 
that researchers too are experts in decision-making under uncertainty when they 
write grant proposals, undertake the practical experience of contact with data, and 
write articles and books on theory and models.  
 
Throughout this monograph over 200 theories and models are being mapped in the 
attempt to gain further insight not only into strategy and decision-making under 
uncertainty itself, but also to test the categorical and relational boundaries of the 
theory. Additionally, by tracking the evolution of specifically management strategy 
over the past one hundred years a pattern in the evolution of the discipline’s theories 
became apparent. In Chapter 12 an additional seminal cross-section of management 
theories will also be mapped to address the limitations of quantity in a more 
accessible dimension of theory development and application.  
 
 
Field worker bias 
 
In Chapter 4 through 8 the confessional ethnographies provide a transparent account 
of forty snapshots of the field worker’s affective and philosophical preferences over 
the course of decision-making under uncertainty encounters with participants in the 
field. Relative to other participants and actors, the field worker resistance to 
conforming is generally high. This was especially apparent in situations where 
conforming needs/demands was especially high to move an idea forward to its next 
iteration. Thus, just like leadership collective can have a natural strategic stance, so 
too the field worker had a predominant differentiating disposition (+D). This may 
have been a necessary quality in order to introduce the two categorical addendums of 
Improvisation (+R, +D) and Disruptive (+S, +D) decision-making under uncertainty 
in relation to classic rational (+S, +C) and behavioural (+R, +C) decision-making. 
However, it may also mean that outcomes of all the collaborations were consistently 
influenced in this direction and/or reported to be perceived relatively more 
contrarian than was in actuality the case. 
 
Similarly, field notes, interactions and archived documents especially at the onset of 
the research suggest that the five research collaborations were picked specifically 
because the field worker perceived the greatest potential in these cases to document 
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emergence of a revolutionary idea that could impact an industry fundamentally (+S, 
+D). Whether that would have happened in the time allotted was another question, 
but it speaks to the criteria in project selection as well as types of biases and 
preferences. The fact that none of the initial four projects resulted in the description 
of such wish-fulfilment is a testament to temperance, leaving only the final 
collaboration as a questionable account. Seen in the context of relativity, it is however 
possible to derive value from looking at the final collaboration being the most 
revolutionary which has value because a single field worker contributed all the data. 
 
One of the quality control measures that could be applied in the Part III analysis 
portion is to evaluate writing for evidence of preference of one strategic stance over 
another. If each strategic stance is couched as having a unique and valuable 
contribution that it could make to the development of an idea, then the bias had been 
mitigated.  
 
 
Socio-political Temperance 
 
In Chapter 3 the value of closing the feedback loop with the participants in the 
ethnography was discussed extensively. It however also has its drawbacks. 
Specifically, as it applies to the perception that decision-makers want to project 
towards others who may work on the same team with them in the future. Anonymity 
has been created and assured to all participants in the context of third parties reading 
the ethnographical account, however reviewing socially sensitive dynamics and the 
field worker’s confessional personal perception has the capacity to have a socio-
political response. To that effect participants were only asked for feedback on that 
when they were in the room to experience (not related snapshots) and a selection of 
fieldworker point of views were removed before sending the snapshots to participants 
for review. 
 
 
10.7.  Conclusion 
 
The thesis thus successfully captured the more extreme phenomena of strategic 
decision-making that thrives and welcomes higher levels of ambiguity namely 
improvisation and disruptive decision-making under uncertainty. This is important 
since it constituted a significant body of literature on innovation that does not always 
get grouped with strategy. Yet data suggests that if this process of innovation aligns 
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stronger with strategic decision-makers’ decision-making under uncertainty stance, 
implication and further development of the innovative idea will have a greater 
capacity for traction into the future. It also explored the use of social realism as a tool 
for investigating a trilogy of categorical, relational and dynamic changes over time. 
This is important in application on moving ideas forward in the strategic stance that 
is preferred. But in theory, and specifically theory development this also has an 
application.  
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PART IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THEORY 
JUXTAPOSITION 
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CHAPTER 11 
EMERGENT SEMINAL LITERATURE ANALYSIS 
 
11.1.  Introduction 
In Part II the fieldworker saturated the reader in empirical data that emerged from 
eight of the most defining snapshots of each of the five projects’ journey over the first 
few years after the collaboration’s inception. It was then also towards the end of the 
most defining snapshots in Collaboration 1 to 4, that the fundamental codes emerged 
that has been alluded to but have yet to be discussed in detail. Delving into the detail 
of the codes with the scaffolding support of existing literature, theories and models 
will be the focal point of this chapter as it informed and fleshed out the emergent M3 
Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty modes, models and momentum that 
could be documented in early formation embryonic stages of collaborative complex 
problem-solving. 
 
Returning to the literature base it became apparent that studying cognitive processes 
was woefully insufficient at capturing the impact superiors and subordinates have on 
strategic positioning under uncertainty as the social component is critically important. 
Additionally, purely classifying conduct in terms of socially perceived hierarchies and 
power structures was woefully insufficient as some processes are societally 
recognized but cognitively or behaviourally rejected. Likewise deriving the theory 
based off behaviour left valuable data on the table untouched. For example, every 
workshop carried with it a set of strategic lenses that was intentionally or 
unintentionally activated for larger group collaboration facilitation. In some instances, 
the participants knew what lens they needed adapt to, in others they struggled or 
fought the expectations. All of this was data. Insight into plugging into an 
epistemological and cognitively lens that needed to be plugged into if the workshop 
was to produce momentum, future behaviour and a cognitive framework to move 
towards. 
 
Ultimately the conclusion is that it is a combination of socio-cognitive behavioural 
strategies that made up the underlying facets that is being explored in this theory and 
model. Essentially social cognition is a phenomenological process for investigating 
the cognitive process that underlie social interactions. According to the International 
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Social Cognition Network (ISCON, 2017) the major concern of the approach are the 
processes involved in perception, judgement and memory of social stimuli; the effects 
of social and affective factors on information processing; and the behavioural and 
interpersonal consequences of cognitive processes which is ideal for collaborative 
intra- and intergroup processes.  Considering this definition, the phenomena that is 
thus being attempted to be captured is a collective social-cognition on a strategy for 
solving a complex problem. 
 
11.2.  Decision-Making under Uncertainty Modes   
At the broadest level, decision theorists have identified collections of consistent rules 
sets for strategic decision-makers in uncertain environments. For the purposes of this 
study various rules were analysed, aligned across various disciplines and integrated 
when similarities or strong overlaps exist. The end result was the emergence of a 
model with four integrated dimensions. The dimensions can be regarded as pairs of 
diametrically opposite socio-cognitive strategy modes as presented in Figure 11.1. 
 
 
 
 
The first pair of modes may be (briefly) described as:  
i. systematic strategies (+S) – a dominant alignment with increasingly 
sophisticated rational cognitive processes. These processes plan, purposefully 
compartmentalize, and regulate emotions; and 
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ii. responsive strategies (+R) – a dominant alignment with increasingly 
sensitized intuitive cognitive processes. These processes are reflective, 
associative, action-orientated and emotionally expressive. 
 
The second pair of opposing modes may be described, as follows: 
iii. conforming strategies (+C) - a dominant alignment with converging by 
adapting or conveying socially perceived superior norms. These processes 
include the exploitation of existing power; and 
iv. differentiating strategies (+D) - a dominant alignment with diverging by 
deviating from the norm and empowerment for exploration. These processes 
include novelty-seeking, sabotage, risk-taking, experimentation, play, 
flexibility, discovery, and higher level innovation. 
 
 
11.2.1.  Systematic (+S) vs. Responsive (+R) Modes 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, philosophic debates specifically circling the Systematic 
(+S) vs. Responsive (+R) socio-cognitive strategy modes could be traced back as far 
as 4th century B.C. Advocating for the Systematic mode (+S), Aristotle took an 
empirical view of knowledge that values information gained through the senses and 
inductive reasoning. Plato, however did not agree. Plato made an argument for the 
superiority of the Responsive mode (+R); that all perceivable things are derived from 
eternal archetypes and are better discovered through the soul than through senses.  
 
As summarized in Appendix A, the past twenty-five centuries human civilization have 
yielded broad cross-sectional contributions to the debate on decision-making and 
specifically decision-making under uncertainty as different academic disciplines, 
functional factions, cultures, nationalities and generations weighted in. However, 
despite the advances in research methodologies and technological the debate still 
rages on (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Osman, 2004; Gigerenzer, 2011; Keren & Schul, 
2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). But one thing these continued debates did 
yield is a rich and diverse discourse on the importance of both socio-cognitive 
strategy modes.  
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Dual Process Theory 
 
Upon critical reflection of the existing body of literature at the forefront of the 
Systematic (+S) and Responsive (+R) strategy modes, as well as the wider body of 
literature beyond Management Studies, this thesis’ data empirically supports the 
predominant conclusions of the evolving body of literature of Dual Process Theory as 
conceived of by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.  
 
In a 2003 paper Kahneman summarized the accumulation of decades of research on 
Dual Process Theory he had done in collaboration with his long-time research partner 
Amos Tversky. He also purposefully integrated the work of other researchers like for 
example accepting a biological psychology vantage point and terminology that had in 
turn built upon his work such as accepting labelling the two modes System 1 (+R) and 
System 2 (+S) as suggested by Stanovich & West (2000) depicted in Figure 11.2. To 
Kahneman the definition of the two modes are ultimately:  
The operations of System 1 are typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, 
implicit (not available to introspection), and often emotionally charged; they are also 
governed by habit and are therefore difficult to control or modify. The operations of 
System 2 are slower, serial, effortful, more likely to be consciously monitored and 
deliberately controlled; they are also relatively flexible and potentially rule governed. 
The effect of concurrent cognitive tasks provides the most useful indication of 
whether a given mental process belongs to System 1 or System 2 (Kahneman, 2003: 
698). 
Other management scholars that researched and described the exact same decision-
making under uncertainty drives while describing it with a different vocabulary and 
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research methodology included Herbert A. Simon. His work focused on social 
decision-making in the context of organizations (or administration). To him the 
differentiation between the two modes was labelled bounded rationality (+R) vs. 
neoclassic rationality (+S). He explained it as follows: 
 
“Rational behaviour, in economics, means that individuals maximize their utility 
function under the constraints they face (e.g., their budget constraint, limited 
choices, ...) in pursuit of their self-interest. This is reflected in the theory of subjective 
expected utility. The term, bounded rationality, is used to designate rational choice 
that takes into account the cognitive limitations of both knowledge and cognitive 
capacity. Bounded rationality is a central theme in behavioural economics. It is 
concerned with the ways in which the actual decision-making process influences 
decisions. Theories of bounded rationality relax one or more assumptions of standard 
expected utility theory” (Simon 1976: 82). 
 
Like Kahneman & Tversky, Simon’s work made new introductions with regard to the 
Systematic (+S) vs. Responsive (+R) modes, but with Simon’s specific introduction he 
is fundamentally more concerned with the concept of values in decision-making 
processes which also links his work to philosophy and specifically the understanding 
of the relation between homo economicus and homo sociolus4. 
Kahneman & Tversky’s definitions on the Systematic (+S) and Responsive (+R) 
modes are considered the best at describing the empirically observed thesis data, 
there still remains limitations causing Dual Process Theory (and Simon’s 
Maximization addendums) to not constitute a comprehensive theory of Strategic 
Decision-Making under Uncertainty.  
 
Limitations 
First and foremost is the limitations brought about by the intentional or 
unintentional influence of one of Kahneman & Tversky’s even more acclaimed 
theories of decision-making under uncertainty theories, prospect theory (1979, 1992). 
Prospect theory was originally conceived as a critique of expected utility theory (1979) 
which at the time dominated and still today dominate academic curricula as well 
consulting firm predispositions towards decision-making and risk. The 1979 paper 
outlines several classes of choice problems systematically violate the axioms 
                                                 
4 Homo economicus (philosophies of perfect rationality of economic self-interest) has a strong overlay 
with +Q1, whereas homo sociologicus (philosophies of social construction of values, norms and goals 
to be fulfil social self-interests) has a strong overlay with +Q2. Additionally, homo biologicus 
(philosophy regarding the pursuit of satisfying physiological self-interests) has a strong overlay with 
+Q3, and homo reciprocas (philosophy emphasising human need and desire for co-operation) had a 
strong overlay with +Q4. 
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associated with expected utility function. For example, students and faculty were 
presented with a hypothetical choice problem and asked if they prefer option A or B. 
 
 
   Option A:  
        50% chance to win 1,000 
        50% chance to win nothing 
 
 
   Option B: 
        450 for sure 
 Table 11.1 – Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory Experiment 
 
The outcome of the lab controlled hypothetical choice experimental study that 
illustrated that intuitive risk averse decision (Option B or +R, +C) is predominantly 
selected above rationally and probabilistic superior outcomes (Option A or +S, +C) 
did well for furthering the dialogue between rational and bounded rational decision-
making under uncertainty, however it did little (or even negated) addressing when 
and how higher risk decisions were in fact being perused. 
 
The premise of prospect theory thus very centrally relates to the question and 
challenges associated with lower risk (+C) or higher risk (+D) associated with the 
second pair of decision-making modes, Conforming (+C) vs. Differentiating (+D) 
which is not accounted for in the Systematic (+S) vs. Responsive (+R) modes. 
 
The second limitation pertains specifically to the implications associated with 
Kahneman and Tversky’s predominant mode of research methodology. In papers, 
they openly discuss that they are “keenly aware of these problems” (1979:265) 
associated their laboratory experiments typically involving “contrived gambles for 
small stakes, and a large number of repetitions of very similar problems”. This thesis 
would not be the first to flag that this limits their generality. Analysing real choices 
investigated in the field by naturalistic behaviour as has been done in this thesis thus 
offers an important and valuable door on a broader perspective not always visible to 
the tight controlled lab environment that intentionally shut out “noise” that may 
ultimately be important data. 
 
The third limitation also pertains to the implication of control that extinguishes 
chances of innovation or emergence of new strategic stances. When a binary Option A 
vs. Option B experimental design is presented that claims to measure risk averseness 
it may in fact not be when respondents don’t get to try to renegotiate the terms and 
generate innovative solutions. When the range of decision-making options of real risk 
  196  
associated with innovation or emergent strategy is blocked out from consideration, a 
strategy research question (as is the case with this thesis) is less likely on account that 
the multiple-choice questionnaire format forces respondents to conform and adapt 
(+C) to the white coat authority figure’s expectations. True free will and risk 
associated with choosing innovation and/or new strategy as a viable course of action 
for strategic decision-makers under uncertainty is thus extinguished in many of these 
lab experiments.  
 
The fourth limitation concerns the dynamism between the two drives. How and when 
do they interact, switch and change. Granted there are significant energy surging 
around debating the questions, but it may be important that broader outlook be 
considered in moving towards a resolution. 
 
For these reasons, this thesis’ functional definition for what constitutes the 
Systematic (+S) vs. Responsive (+R) modes has omitted reference to “control” and 
also selected to not settle on Dual Systems Theory as a singular informing theory for 
the model. 
 
The Broader Body of Literature 
Analysing the Systematic (+S) vs. Responsive (+R) modes by integrating it as a 
component of a broader body of knowledge also independently affirms its validity as 
different fields utilizing different research methodologies, have different values and 
focal points. If the existence of a two diametrically opposing decision-making under 
uncertainty modes are truly in existence, it should have also been observed and 
documented outside of Management Studies. That was indeed found to be the case. 
 
From the adjacent field of persuasion in business marketing and communications 
another seminal contributing team included Richard E. Petty’s and John T. Cacioppo 
(1986) introduced the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). In this model of 
persuasion, the same two drives are referred to as peripheral route (+R) vs. central 
route (+S): 
We have suggested that there are “central” and “peripheral” routes to persuasion, with 
the “central route” representing the processes involved when elaboration likelihood is 
high and the “peripheral route: typifying the processes operative when elaboration 
likelihood is low. As Chaiken (1982) has noted, the central route encompasses her 
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systematic view of persuasion whereas the peripheral route encompasses her heuristic 
view of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986: 6). 
Most commonly deployed in scenarios where formal power does not exist, the 
elaboration likelihood model is frequently deployed in marketing strategies to 
influence and persuade in purchasing decisions. The techniques outlined in the 
model also have capacity to shape organizational cultures.  
From the field of Medicine, Roger Sperry also pioneered the idea concerning the 
functional specialization of the cerebral hemispheres. Sperry’s research participants 
were patients who opted as a last resort to control intractable epileptic seizures by 
surgically separating their corpus callosum connecting the two brain hemispheres. In 
observing the decision-making patterns of these patients, inferences on the functional 
specialization was possible: 
The left hemisphere is the one with speech, as had been known, and it is dominant in 
all activities involving language, arithmetic, and analysis. The right hemisphere, 
although mute and capable only of simple addition (up to about 20) is superior to the 
left hemisphere in, among other things, spatial comprehension - in understanding 
maps, for example, or recognizing faces. (Horowitz, 1997: 16). 
  
Once again it is evident that here too the definition of the neurological hemispheres 
aligns with the decision-making modes. The “analytical” or “logical” left hemisphere 
being synonymous with Systematic Drive (+S), and the “holistic” or “intuitive” right 
hemisphere being synonymous with the Responsive mode (+R). 
 
 
11.2.2.  Conforming (+C) vs. Differentiating (+D) Modes 
 
Exploitation and Exploration 
 
The organizational decision-making scholar whose contributions were the most 
fundamental on the concepts and distinctions between the conforming (+C) and 
differentiating (+D) modes was James G. March (1991). In March’s vocabulary, he 
introduced the modes as exploitation (+C) vs. exploration (+D) as depicted in Figure 
11.3: 
A central concern of studies of adaptive processes is the relation between the 
exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties (Schumpeter 
1934; Holland 1975; Kuran 1988). Exploration includes things captured by terms such 
as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, 
innovation. Exploitation includes such things as refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, execution. (March, 1991: 71). 
  198  
 
 
In this opening paragraph of his seminal paper on organizational learning and 
decision-making he also reveals the anchors of his work to be in economics as is 
evident with the Schumpeter and Kuran citations, as well as Holland’s connection to 
complex and biological and artificial adaptive systems. Similar to Kahneman & 
Tversky we witness how even a decade later generally accepted mainstream economic 
theory still shapes the tenants of decision-making theory’s evolution. 
 
The other two management decision-making scholars contributing specifically to 
defining the Conforming (+C) vs. Differentiating (+D) modes, repeat much of the 
same pattern almost decade later (Katsenelinboigen, 1997) and also a little over two 
decades later (Nassim, 2012). For another score decision-theorist chose to anchor 
their contributions in terms of economics. 
 
Decision theorist Aron Katsenelinboigen was actually an economist and introduced 
Predisposition Theory. With his indeterministic systems he describes the tensions 
between combinational style (+C) vs. positional style (+D) strategies in choice akin to 
strategies in a chess game. He defines it as follow: 
The combinational style features a clearly formulated limited objective, namely the 
capture of material (the main constituent element of a chess position). The objective 
is implemented via a well-defined, and in some cases, unique sequence of moves 
aimed at reaching the set goal. As a rule, this sequence leaves no options for the 
opponent. Finding a combinational objective allows the player to focus all his energies 
on efficient execution, that is, the player's analysis may be limited to the pieces 
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directly partaking in the combination. This approach is the crux of the combination 
and the combinational style of play. (Katsenelinboigen 1997:64). 
The combinational style chess is thus a very narrow, clearly defined, primarily 
material goal; and a program that links the initial position with the final outcome. 
Combinational style decision-making is thus synonymous with the conforming (or 
depending on your point of view, control) mode (+C).  
 
Conversely, the decision-making style that is counter to combinational (+C) is 
positional style (+D) which creates a predisposition to the future development of the 
position, induces the environment in a certain way, absorbs an unexpected outcome 
in one's favour, and avoids the negative aspects of unexpected outcomes. It thus also 
described the principles behind the differentiating mode (+D). Katsenelinboigen 
described it as: 
Unlike the combinational player, the positional player is occupied, first and foremost, 
with the elaboration of the position that will allow him to develop in the unknown 
future. In playing the positional style, the player must evaluate relational and material 
parameters as independent variables. ... The positional style gives the player the 
opportunity to develop a position until it becomes pregnant with a combination. 
However, the combination is not the final goal of the positional player – it helps him 
to achieve the desirable, keeping in mind a predisposition for the future development. 
The pyrrhic victory5 is the best example of one's inability to think positionally. 
(Katsenelinboigen 1997:86). 
 
In spite of Kahneman & Tversky’s definitions on the Systematic (+S) and Responsive 
(+R) modes are considered the best at describing the empirically observed thesis data, 
there still remains limitations causing Dual Process Theory (and Simon’s 
Maximization addendums) to not constitute a comprehensive theory of Strategic 
Decision-Making under Uncertainty.  The Positivist leanings of the theory also makes 
ample consideration for the subjective components of decision-making. Subjectivity, 
as Katsenelinboigen sees it, is an important factor in evaluating a predisposition. The 
roots of one's subjective evaluation lie in the fact that the decision-maker cannot be 
separated from the evaluator who evaluates the system in accordance with his own 
particular ability to develop it. 
 
The more recent addition to the conforming (+C) and differentiating (+D) 
exploration is Nassim Nicholas Taleb Antifragility Theory (2012). It is built onto his 
                                                 
5 A Pyrrhic victory is a victory that inflicts such a devastating toll on the victor that it is tantamount to defeat. 
Someone who wins a Pyrrhic victory has been victorious in some way. However, the heavy toll negates any sense 
of achievement or profit. 
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Black Swan Theory (2007) which claims that a small number of unexpected, rare, 
unknowable black swan events actually has a major effect on systems in the aggregate. 
As the black swan theory relates to decision-making theory, Taleb introduces a new 
word for which he claims no comparable word existed: antifragility. He explains that 
antifragility is beyond resilience or robustness. The resilient resists shocks and stays 
the same (+C), the antifragility systems are not only positioned to absorb the shocks 
of black swan events but actually gets better as it is positioned to recognize and take 
action on new changes to the system. Antifragile systems thrive and grow when 
exposed to volatility, randomness, disorder, and stressors and love adventure, risk, 
and uncertainty (+D). 
 
On a mathematical level Taleb defines antifragility as a nonlinear response:  
"Simply, antifragility is defined as a convex response to a stressor or source of harm 
(for some range of variation), leading to a positive sensitivity to increase in volatility 
(or variability, stress, dispersion of outcomes, or uncertainty, what is grouped under 
the designation "disorder cluster"). Likewise, fragility is defined as a concave 
sensitivity to stressors, leading a negative sensitivity to increase in volatility. The 
relation between fragility, convexity and sensitivity to disorder is mathematical, 
obtained by theorem, not derived from empirical data mining or some historical 
narrative. It is a priori" (Taleb, 2012: 19). 
 
To date the concept of anti-fragility has been applied beyond megaproject inter-
organizational collaboration, (Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier & Lunn 2016), to also 
include diverse fields like physics (Ghodrat, Komaie-Moghaddam, & Podgornik, 
2014), risk analysis (Derbyshire & Wright, 2014; Aven, 2014). molecular biology, 
(Grube, Muggia, & Gostinčar, 2013; Danchin, Binder, & Noria, 2011), transportation 
planning (Levin, Brodfuehrer & Kroshl, 2014; Isted, 2014), engineering (Jones, 2014, 
Verhulsta, 2014), and computer science (Ramirez & Itoh, 2014; Abid, Khemakhem, 
Marzouk, Jemaa, Monteil & Drira 2014; Monperrus, 2014, Guang, Nigussie, Plosila & 
Tenhunen, 2014). 
 
Yet, the combination of decision-making scholars March, Katsenelinboigen and 
Taleb’s three-decade keystone framing and enhancement of the Conforming (+C) and 
Differentiating (+D) modes are still not considered substantial enough to 
independently account for the full complexity in strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty. Though March’s starting point provides the best foundations for 
describing the empirically observed thesis data, there remains limitations causing 
Exploration vs. Exploitation theory to be combined with Dual Process Theory to 
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complete only the first two of three levels in constructing the more comprehensive 
Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty model and theory. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
The fact that Exploration vs. Exploration is in fact an organizational learning theory 
is not in itself a concern, but this thesis is advocating that a broader view on the 
theory can be adopted as it pertains to strategy and decision-making under 
uncertainty. The educational anchor actually illuminates and underscores role that 
learning, progress and development plays in increasing advanced levels of strategic 
decision-making under uncertainty. The importance of dynamism is similarly to the 
how as pointed out in the limitations of the Systematic (+S) vs. Responsive (+R) drive 
a relevant point that has yet to be addressed in the Exploitation (+C) vs. Exploration 
(+D) theory too. This component of emergence, development, adaption and 
transformation will be analysed at a deeper level with additional supporting theories 
in the final section of this chapter.  
 
A second and central limiting component of the central theory is the fact that equal 
weight is not given to systematic (+S) vs. responsive (+R) learning. When using 
methodology that behaviourally observes the outcome of decisions it is not always 
apparent how deliberate or conscious a decision had been. Post behavioural 
discussion or interviewing can help, however rationalization is likely to occur in order 
to justify action to not be perceived as less intelligent. Long-term ethnological 
embedding with strategic decision-makers does allow the behaviour to have a before 
and after context. Archived documents before the behaviour would be another clue to 
the extent of the rationalization during the learning process.  
 
A third limiting component of the higher density components of the theory that can 
ultimately be helpful in continuous advancement of the Strategic Decision-Making 
under Uncertainty model and theory is the numeric coding of organization learning. 
March assigns ‘0’ to situations where the employee does not learn to adapt to the 
culture, and ‘1’ coding when the employee adapts and integrate to a cultural function. 
This is tremendously helpful and clever to move the model into more complex 
iterations, however application wise for high level strategists or collaborations 
outside traditional hierarchies this simplistic view can be problematic for it assumes 
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that once an employee perceives or rationalizes ‘the rules of the game’ the automatic 
response is to integrate those rules. It is important to recognise that cognitively or 
intuitively seeing the pattern does not mean it is right or worthwhile to behaviourally 
integrate at the specific point in time that measurement is taking place. Taking this 
narrow presumes the employee to be an empty vessel robs us of the important role of 
intentional or unintentional ‘choice’ so integral to strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty. 
 
A fourth limiting factor of March’s specific framing on the subject is the focus on 
lower level employees as oppose to the higher level strategic decision-makers. With 
the focus, specifically on strategies Conforming (+C) may be a necessary strategy to 
prove and build in-group loyalty. This could be because thinking and responding to 
the immediate short-term protection is too important to lose or because the goal of 
the long-term future is too valuable to sacrifice now. Behavioural experiments would 
not provide insight to the strategic intent, only longer-term ethnographic embedment 
has a chance at gaining this insight. But fundamentally, more options are also 
available to higher level strategic decision-makers and thinkers, and that is why that 
would intentionally be made the focal area of this this thesis. 
 
 
Broader Body of Literature 
 
Similarly, to how analysing at the broader body of literature of neurology allowed for 
understanding the physiological mechanisms behind the Systematic (+S) and 
Responsive (+R) modes, so too non-social or even non-human biological functions of 
risk-taking explain the lower level non-cognitive components of risk taking (+D) vs. 
risk averse (+C) decision-making modes.  
 
It has long been known that primates, birds, and social insects take fewer risks when 
faced with a steady supply of food. (Dener, Kacelnik et al, 2016). But when the supply 
is uncertain, they switch strategies and take more risks. What however had not been 
known until recently is that plants also exhibit capacity for conforming (+C) vs. 
differentiating (+D) decision-making (Dener, Kacelnik et. al, 2016). 
Similar to a human stranded in a desert without resources to escape to greener 
pastures, plants also have capacity to become ‘dynamic strategists’ when resources 
are constrained. In a series of three experimental conditions, pea plants (Pisum 
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sativum) were raised in a greenhouse. In the all conditions plants were grown with 
roots split between two pots. Each pot contained the same concentration and type of 
nutrients.  
In the control condition 1 Pot A received constant high level of nutrients, and Pot B 
also received the same steady supply of high nutrients. In condition 2 Pot A received 
a constant high level of nutrients, however Pot B received variable levels. After 12 
weeks, the plants’ root mass was measured and their allocation of roots inside each 
pot. Not surprisingly, the plants were risk-averse, and grew most of their roots in the 
constant pot A. 
However, in condition 3 Pot A received a constant but low amount of nutrients – so 
low, they were below what a plant needs to survive, and Pot B received variable levels 
similar to condition 2. After 12 weeks, researchers observed that the root allocation of 
the normally risk-averse, pea plants become risk-prone when growing in dire 
conditions. 
Just like a human that may become more risk-prone under novelty seeking or 
saboteur conditions, less cognitively advanced living organisms without a nervous 
system alike may opt for risky alternative when confronted with conditions that 
challenges their own mortality, and consequentially change typical conforming (+C) 
patterns to differentiating (+D). 
 
11.2.3.  Summary 
 
Ultimately the comparative juxtaposition of the opposing modes relative to one 
another in decision-making is not novel. Also, the fact that the phenomena emerged 
in various fields under various terminology is not a detractor but rather affirmation 
of the concept and its importance as scientists apply different lenses to the subject 
under investigation. The major theories outlined herein also does not claim to be an 
exhaustive list on the presented four modes but are considered major decision 
theories of importance.  
 
What is however novel, is the overlay of different fields’ theories overtop of one 
another to clarify the strength of the similarities. An even more important novel 
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contribution that this study seeks to make include the combination of specifically the 
modes of the x-axis and the y-axis. 
 
Further confirmation of the specific combination making sense in the context of past 
theory building is the emergence of decision-making models that have emerged in 
decision theory and have been operating relatively autonomously from drives on 
account of the language not yet overlapping necessarily in decision theory and 
certainly not in sub-fields classifications. In the next section, we seek to explore 
additional evidence of these overlaps. 
 
 
 
11.3.  Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty Models 
By then combining adjacent modes a multi-dimensional model that can be viewed 
relative to other strategic decision-making under uncertainty models emerges. As 
presented in figure 11.4 these broad models overlap so strongly with the theories 
presented in chapter 2, that similar names will be used to signify that scaling up or 
down from a specific lens zoom will reveal similar fractal properties. This suggests 
that future research into the micro, mezzo and macro levels of the theory may also be 
worth pursuing. 
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11.3.1.  Classic Rationality Models (+S, +C)  
 
In Chapter 2 this thesis introduced and explored Classic Rationality the traditional 
lens through which decision-making under uncertainty is commonly explored for the 
past four plus centuries. Though it aligns very strongly with the criteria generally set 
up for natural scientific discovery it is also insufficient in dealing with the higher 
levels of uncertainty commonly associated with innovation and creativity. Ultimately 
Collaboration 1 (MNC Legal Counsel) paints a vivid picture of this model in action 
specifically via the Delphi method of highly rational deliberations. 
 
By integrating the strengths associated with systematic (+S) and conforming (+C) 
socio-cognition this type of strategies allow for technocratic strong predispositions. It 
is ideal for highly trained professionals focusing in on specific smaller components or 
subcomponents of a bigger complex problem. This part of a strategy may specifically 
be defined as a “piece of of a bigger elephant” that needs to be concurred in order to 
ultimately “eat a whole elephant by focusing on one bite at a time.” What these classic 
and common classic rationality models would be less helpful with is dealing with the 
responsive (+R) or differentiated (+D) advantages that come from being in the 
moment and reading new information in real-time, or those types of innovation for 
which historic data and context may not inform on deeply because the precedent has 
been unexplored. Figure 11.4.1 represents how the Classic Rationality Models (+S, +C) 
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appear relatative to the other options for strategic decision-making under uncertainty 
identified to date. 
 
 
The 5-Step Rational Decision-Making Model 
 
This Classic Rational model fits a five-step decision-making process. In the process of 
choosing a course of action for dealing with a problem or opportunity five steps are 
taken constituting the ideal aspirational model: 
 
1. Recognize and define the problem or opportunity – gather information 
and deliberate in order to specify exactly why a decision is needed and what 
it should accomplish.  
2. Identify and analyse alternative courses of action – evaluate possible 
alternative courses of action and their anticipated consequences for costs 
and benefits. 
3. Choose a preferred course of action – a choice is made to pursue once 
course of action rather than others.  
4. Implement the preferred course of action – actions are taken to put the 
preferred course of action in to practice.  
5. Evaluate the results and follow up as necessary – performance results are 
measured against initial goals and both anticipated and unanticipated 
outcomes are examined. 
 
Classic rationality is ideal in scenarios with higher levels of complete information, 
time and/or computational power where the decision-maker moves through the steps 
one by one in a logical and linear fashion. It also neatly lends itself to various 
quantitative decision analysis as well computer-based applications (Boutilier, 2015). 
 
• This thesis specifically sought to define a continuum upon which lower 
uncertainty boundaries with the resources and tools defined within this classic 
rationality model group is distinct from the higher uncertainty boundary as 
may be more prevalent in longer run optimization. This adjacent category of 
rationality will be referred to as hyper rationality in the context of this thesis 
and the extension is comprehensively discussed in the Consilience Decision-
Making under uncertainty models (+S, +D) – See 11.4.4. 
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11.3.2.  Behavioural Economics Models (+R, +C)  
 
In Chapter 2 this thesis also introduced and explored Behavioural or Bounded 
Rationality as a newer lens through which decision-making under uncertainty has 
been explored since the 1940s. This is pales in comparison to the four centuries of 
contributions to Classic Rational Models (+S, +C) yet has a well-established seat at 
the table when it comes to decision-making under uncertainty, especially in social 
context. Ultimately Collaboration 2 (Higher Education) collaboration showcased 
many of the strong influence formal and passive meetings and workshops have on 
getting stakeholders to conform and become increasingly accepting of a new 
inititative that could also be perceived as threatening to the status quo of established 
order and power norms.  
 
By integrating the strengths associated with systematic (+R) and conforming (+C) 
socio-cognition this type of strategies allow for pragmatic strong predispositions. It is 
ideal for strategists with the advantage of being perceived as being higher on a 
hierarchy. The key though is that the followers also need to be receptive to the type of 
capital or the exchange. This is thus harder to accomplish successfully when outsiders 
or intergroup dynamics are established that make power structure ambiguous or a 
power struggle ensue.   
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Power brokers channelling the energy of the masses in “picking low hanging fruit” is 
one of the stronger metaphors to describe this type of strategy that relies less on 
technical expertise but rather responsiveness of duplicate peers’ lenses and thereby 
magnifying the effect of followers that buy into behavioural models.  
 
Like the Classic Rational models the Behavioural strategy models is ideal for more 
predictable outcomes on account of the emphasis on innovation what is already in 
existence that can be magnified. Figure 11.4.2 represents how the Behavioural Models 
(+R, +C) appear relative to the other options for strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty identified to date. 
 
The Behavioural Challenges to the 5-Step Rational Decision-Making 
Model 
 
The behavioural decision-making model thus fundamentally challenges the rational 
decision-making five-step model. In the process of choosing a course of action for 
dealing with a problem or opportunity five steps are taken constituting the more 
commonly applied model: 
 
1. Recognize and define the problem or opportunity – the behavioural model 
contends that most often problems are not clearly defined. 
2. Identify and analyse alternative courses of action – the behavioural model 
contends that knowledge is limited on possible alternatives and their 
consequences 
3. Choose a preferred course of action – the behavioural model contends that 
satisficing takes place. This is when generation of alternative solutions seizes 
once the first alternative that appears to give an acceptable or sufficiently 
satisfactory resolution to the problem is generated. 
4. Implement the preferred course of action – on a timeline considerably faster 
than the classic rationality model. 
5. Evaluate the results and follow up as necessary – the behavioural model 
contends that post-implementation biases exist. 
 
Bounded rationality is ideal in scenarios with lower levels of complete information or 
information overload, and/or time constraints that limits the decision-maker’s ability 
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to moves through linear decision steps one by one in a logical fashion. It lends itself 
more to qualitative decision analysis as well astute politics. 
• This thesis specifically seeks to define a continuum upon which lower 
uncertainty boundaries with the resources and tools defined within this 
behavioural model group is distinct from the higher uncertainty boundary as 
may be more prevalent when behaviour is less inclined to conform to greater 
collective’s expectations or demands and instead focus inwards towards a 
smaller subsection. This adjacent category of rationality will be referring to as 
improvisation in the context of this thesis and the extension is 
comprehensively discussed in the next section Improvisational Decision-
Making under uncertainty models (+R, +D) – See 11.4.3. 
 
 
 
11.3.3.  Improvisational Models (+R, +D) 
 
In Chapter 2 this thesis also introduced and explored basic tenants of Improvisational 
Models as lens that is even newer than the Behavioural lens. The study of 
improvisation in context to the arts, drama, comedy, music and public speaking have 
been studies for centuries, but in the context of Management, it is less than 20 years 
old. It is also not formally linked to decision-making under uncertainty theory yet 
epitomizes the qualities.  Ultimately it was Collaboration 3 (Economic Development) 
and Collaboration 4 (Software Start-up) that tried to capitalize on this lens with 
interesting progressions. 
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By integrating the strengths associated with responsive (+R) and differentiating (+D) 
socio-cognition this type of strategies allow for strong creative predispositions. It is 
ideal for strategists capable of facilitating and empowering stakeholders with 
technical expertise outside of the field, and also have capacity to read and respond to 
vocabulary and objectives of a new field. The need for relinquishing power and 
making public failing safe is critical in this strategy model. So is learning fast.  
 
Unlike the Classic Rational and the Behavioural strategy models, Improvisational 
models are ideal in situations that is capable of absorbing higher levels of innovation 
capable of cannibalizing something else that had been of value once before. Figure 
11.4.3 represents how the Improvisational Models (+R, +D) as it appears relative to 
the other options for strategic decision-making under uncertainty identified to date. 
 
Improvisational Theorists’ Challenges to the 5-Step Rational Decision-
Making Model 
 
To date no overarching comparative model has been produced to juxtapose ‘5-step 
thinking processes’ between improvisation and rationality or bounded rationality. By 
recombining a number of design thinking, and other innovation theorists’ work, a 5-
step improvisation framework is expected to present along the following lines: 
1. Recognize and define the problem or opportunity – the improvisational model 
would possibly most strongly contend that most often problems are defined to 
align with the most powerful player at the table’s interests. In Design Thinking 
workshops, powerful community leaders or corporate CEO’s my intentionally 
be excluded from the (early portions) of the process to ensure the voices and 
problem framing of those with less power get a chance to be articulated. 
2. Identify and analyse alternative courses of action – the improvisational 
model theorist specializing in innovation would possibly contend that a 
purposeful pursuit should be made to illuminate positive deviance samples or 
outliers to illuminate when exceptions occur that could possibly be 
reconstructed (Miller & Wedell-Wedellsborg, 2013). 
3. Choose a preferred course of action – the improvisation model would likely 
challenge the objective itself. One way would be to revisit the fundamental 
intent with reframing the objective using different lenses. One dominant 
improvisational strategy mode would be to actively seek to prioritize that 
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which cannot be objectively quantified numerically and configured via an 
equation. This would be akin to Deming’s one of Seven Diseases of 
Management decision-making that claims that factors that cannot be 
quantified often also deserve a priority consideration (Deming, 1986).  
4. Implement the preferred course of action – the improvisation model would 
ultimately also prioritize strategic doing (Morris, 2003) as empowered 
technicians take action with immediacy on that which they have control over 
as opposed to actions that require long lead time and extensive setup in order 
to move fast with momentum.  
5. Evaluate the results and follow up as necessary – the improvisation model 
contends that the evaluative result was never intended to be perfect but 
instead be a minimum viable prototype to learn from for future iterations as 
perfection and competence is increased over time (Ries, 2009).  
 
This thesis specifically sought out ways to provide empirical evidence distinguishing 
between improvisational decision-making models and describing the impact 
improvisation specifically has in the broader context of a long-term initiative as it 
pertains to emergence, change, adaptation and transformation. This study also 
sought to define the tools and resources to promote or diminish it, as well as 
exploring its interconnectedness with other strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty models. 
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11.3.4.  Consilience Models (+S, +D) 
 
In Chapter 2 this thesis also introduced and explored basic tenants of Consilience 
Models as a lens with a very complex historic starting point and is yet to be 
introduced into Management literature. It is in pure philosophy (Whewell, 1840) and 
within the past two decades biology (Wilson, 1997) where the concept has been 
launched and relaunched into the mainstream psyche, but until today remains 
underdeveloped in Management. Like Improvisation, Consilience is also not formally 
linked to decision-making under uncertainty theory yet it also epitomizes the 
qualities.  Ultimately it was Collaboration 5 (Health Care) that relative to the other 
ethnographies gave this thesis the clearest insight into this integrative problem 
solving that can scale and grow without power used for dominance but instead for 
empowerments. 
 
By integrating the strengths associated with systematic (+S) and differentiating (+D) 
socio-cognition strategies this type of decision-making also allow for strong creative 
predispositions. It is ideal for strategists capable of facilitating and empowering 
stakeholders with technical expertise outside of the field, and also have capacity to for 
deep learning of systems and objectives from outside a collaborator’s dominant field 
of expertise. But instead of needing to relinquishing power and making public failing 
safe, consilience is driven by empowering diversity on a unified platform and systems 
of absorbing escalating scale.  
 
Like Improvisational models, consilience models are ideally positions to benefit from 
change and shocks to a predictable system. But instead of cannibalizing a player in 
the market the cannibalization in consilience models may seek to destroy and rebuild 
for greater capacity within its scope of impact. Figure 11.4.4 represents how the 
Consilience Models (+S, +D) as it appears relative to the other options for strategic 
decision-making under uncertainty identified to date. 
 
 
Consilience vs. Classic Rationality Models and Theories 
 
Like classic rationality and behavioural decision models and theories, the consilience 
model also fits the five-step decision-making process. but is more likely to be applied 
retrospectively to make sense of collective values that does not fit the norm. The 
name of the model currently in use that constitutes Consilience decisions-making 
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under uncertainty is called Ethical Reasoning and Decision-Making (Acevedo, 2009). 
In the process of choosing a course of action for dealing with a problem or 
opportunity five steps are taken constituting the ideal aspirational model: 
 
1. Recognize and define the problem or opportunity – check the underlying 
moral problems or dilemmas needing ethical analysis. 
2. Identify and analyse alternative courses of action – check implications for 
stakeholder utilities, common good, justice caring and virtuous life. 
3. Choose a preferred course of action – check that the choice reflects the best 
ends and uses the right means. 
4. Implement the preferred course of action – check consistency and integrity 
a=of actual actions verses intended actions. 
5. Evaluate the results and follow up as necessary – check actual ends and 
means versus desired ends and means.  
 
This thesis specifically seeks to provide empirical evidence distinguishing between 
Consilience decision-making models and describing the impact Consilience 
specifically has in the broader context of a long-term initiative as it pertains to 
emergence, change, adaptation and transformation. This study also seeks to define 
the tools and resources to promote or diminish it, as well as exploring its 
interconnectedness with other strategic decision-making under uncertainty models. 
 
 
11.3.5.  Summary 
 
Ultimately each of the four discussed theoretical lenses introduced in Chapter 2 also 
emerged as dominant models by which the five ethnographies approached their 
problem-solving relative to one another. Additionally, these same categories’’ 
recombination of adjacent modes make up its more complex characteristics.  
 
Most fundamentally however is the fact that the most dominant theories of decision-
making under uncertainty that has already been tied to less innovative strategies 
whereas the fundamental benefits that can be had from decision-making under 
uncertainty is indeed the unexpected, novelty and higher risk propositions that can 
also pay off the biggest rewards. 
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But despite the empirical data discovery and literature overly, there is still a 
component that is unaccounted for. This component was a very central point at the 
onset of the thesis as far as the emergence, change, adaptation and transformation of 
strategic innovation is concerned. Further integration of management concepts will 
be needed. For the purpose of this model the academic literature base of change 
management and strategy will be the core important contributors to evolve the 
strategic decision-making under uncertainty model to yet another level of 
sophistication. 
 
 
11.4. Dynamism  
 
Colloquially the responsive drive (+R) is also referred to as the reptilian brain, or 
primitive mind, so that the systematic drive (+S) can be perceived as distinct from the 
biologically more evolved rational human decision-making capacity. This is however 
a less helpful analogy. Humans, primates and birds are all capable of using both 
drives. Just like it is generally accepted that primates and birds raised for longer 
periods by their parents have a higher capacity for systematic problem solving and 
decision-making (+S) (Dener, Kacelnik et al, 2016), so too humans are capable of the 
higher-level capacity “theory of mind” and empathy (+R) relative to birds and fishes. 
 
As discussed in the broader literature surrounding the other two opposing drives, 
Conforming (+C) vs. Differentiating (+D), there is also evidence of lower level 
evolution life forms like plants have capacity for making non-cognitive decisions 
under uncertainty (Dener, Kacelnik et al, 2016). In the context of Charles Darwin’s 
general framework for comprehending the process whereby small, random 
variations could accumulate and predominate over time into large-scale changes 
resulting in the emergence of wholly novel forms ("speciation") has thus yet to be 
addressed by any of the preceding decision-making under uncertainty drives or 
models outlined. 
 
However, from the theories and models thus far one could stands to reason that over 
time as the species procreate, the individual human ages, and as a collective as a 
humanity, a society, a discipline or an organization ages the level of complexity and 
sophistication of each of the drives (as well as the models) would also have the 
capacity to improve (or die out) in its strategic decision-making under uncertainty. 
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11.4.1.  Evolutionary Economics 
The eminent social science theory that constructed a theory of how change occurs on 
atop of Charles Darwin’s theory of biological evolutions, is Richard Nelson and 
Sidney G. Winter (1982). In their Evolutionary Economics framework, they present 
the facilitating factors that drive changes as routines (+C) and technology (+L).  
 
Specifically framed in the context of organizations and management studies Nelson & 
Winter (1982) defines routines (+C) as mechanisms used as (or play a role as) a form 
of organizational control. Routines thus strongly aligns with the Conforming (+C) 
decision-making drive. But beyond that, as Nelson & Winter (1982) engages with 
discussion on how firms replicate and destroy routines, and discuss briefly how firms 
can "learn" new routines through imitations of other routines, which allows for 
factors associated with “new routines” to be considered there is thus also a discussion 
in the role that Differentiation (+D) plays in driving change before it ultimately 
moves back to Conforming (+C). With Evolutionary Economics, the thesis has thus 
now officially connected with a behavioural decision-making theory that can also 
start to account for dynamism.  
 
With reference to discussing the catalyst that opens the door to short-term 
Differentiation (+D) so that a new Conforming (+C) norm can be created, Nelson & 
Winter (1982) introduces ‘technology’. In the book’s introduction Winter specifically 
expresses an interest in realities of firm decision-making, and claims that the most 
important relate to improved understanding of technological change and the 
dynamics of the competitive process.  
This thesis’ vantage point is considerably wider than technological change but for its 
connection to the empirical data and the purpose of establishing a solid baseline on 
the dynamics component, this connection to innovation and strategy is strong enough 
to accept the more physical manifestation of the more abstract and broader concept 
of [perceived] knowledge. Nelson & Winter recognizes this too when speaking about 
‘change technology’: 
However, the connotation clearly is of knowledge "of a way of doing something" or 
"technological knowledge." Technological knowledge often is identified with a "book 
of blueprints" or with the knowledge of engineers and scientists. (Nelson & Winter, 
1982: 60). 
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This ‘technology of knowledge’ is thus a good representation of increasing levels of 
complexity and advancement (+L) but also a metaphor for representing the chaos 
and uncertainty associated with ‘constant change’. It also represents innovation and 
uncertainty that result based on the drives which could be influenced from both 
inside or outside the organization or field. 
As pictured in Figure 9.8. the phase transitions brought on by stepping up on 
‘technology of knowledge’ levels of decision-making under uncertainty can be 
referred to as Levels (+L). These would be “best of” blueprints and as will be 
discussed in detailed context of Nelson & Winter’s limitations this applies equally to 
social and technical (non-social) engineering and experimentation as simplified 
representation the Fibonacci as radiating circle on the four drives. 
 
 
Pre-dating Nelson & Winter’s (1982) Evolutionary Economics theory were 
organizational management strategy scholars like Mintzberg’s (1978) emergent 
strategies (+R, +D) which was improved highly relevantly for this specific Decision-
Making under Uncertainty Model by Moncrief’s (1997) Strategy Dynamics (+R, +C) 
to explain the dynamic interplay between the systems (or quadrants) driving 
development in relation to classic rational decision-making baseline expectation (+S, 
+C) that to this day dominates expectations of decision-making norms (in spite of 
Nelson & Winter’s strong arguments against it being the prevailing methods that 
should be taught or used by strategic-decision makers). 
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As the name would suggest Evolutionary Economics like strategy and decision-
making theory suggest it did not only used evolutionary methodology of Charles 
Darwin to evolve concepts around non-equilibrium economic principles of circular 
and cumulative causation. It ventured yet deeper into economics or rational decision-
making as Karl Marx based his theory of economic development on the premise of 
evolving economic systems; specifically, over the course of history. By the time 
Nelson & Winter started to deconstruct the theory they however made a concerted 
effort to differentiate how the theory is different from classic economics classifying 
themselves as ‘behavioural’ economists, because society at the time still perceived 
‘economics’ to be a superior and more dominant science. In the context of where and 
when this thesis was written behavioural science is in fact the dominant field, and for 
that theories are framed accordingly. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
In context of arguing the superiority of behavioural economics over neo classical 
economics Nelson & Winter frames innovation through the combination of new 
routines, through reactions to changing or changed environments or to failure, and as 
a set of heuristics that can result in routine strategies. This connects very well to the 
‘strategic stances’ that were coded and confirmed by participants at various intervals 
in the ethnographies. However, heuristics may be an excellent word to use with 
“blueprints of knowledge” in the context of complex social systems at this time of 
humanity’s evolution, however in the context of technical systems there may be 
enough man-made technical and nature-made engineering absolutes even in 
decision-making under uncertainty that the detailed code does exist in the backend. 
To continue the metaphor humans are just dealing with a desktop shortcut interface 
but if we go into the backend programming a full and comprehensive, well tested 
essentialist code is in fact in place. This does not dismiss or diminish Nelson & 
Winter’s position on heuristics being used, this broader perspective on a strategic 
stance simply allows for knowledge to be viewed as social realism to be 
simultaneously subjective and objective. 
 
Cognitive science theorist Donald D. Hoffman (2000) also takes a similar concept to 
the next level. With computer generated evolution simulations outcomes illustrate 
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that it is not perceiving ‘reality’ but perceiving ‘fitness functions’ that provides better 
(mathematical functions) that describe how well a given strategy achieves the goals of 
survival and reproduction. Understanding the strive towards the creation of this 
optimal fit for balance and momentum in a specific time and space is then also an 
important contribution that this thesis seeks to make. This also ties to the ultimate 
objective of the thesis as it starts to address the dynamic interplay where changes and 
upgrades get made to improve fit with the specific situation’s resources and perceived 
window of opportunity. 
 
The second limitation also deals with a fundamentally behavioural perspective that 
could possibly benefit from a broader vantage point. Framing routines and control 
(or power) as a dominant state may also not be incorrect, but in asking the question 
why social power, control, routines are framed as a primary objective (+R, +C) is it 
possible that an even stronger starting point could be that ‘maximizing future options’ 
under uncertainty? Considering “maximizing future options” is inclusive of 
behavioural decision-making (+R, +C) strategic stances but is also an expansive 
framework that translates especially well to rational decision-making (+S, +C), but 
also hyper rational decision-making (+S, +D), and even improvisational decision-
making (+R, +D). 
 
The Wissner-Gross and Freer’s (2013) theory starts to address this concept of 
“maximizing future options” by assuming entropy which means a system will evolve 
towards disorderliness (+D) which stands in striking contrast to the predominance in 
modern organization theory of control and conform (+C). And in this struggle, may 
lie yet another strength of the theory in generating momentum. But ultimately it is 
the strive for increasing level of complexity in order to be able to take on more 
possible futures that holds the most promise as every ring level (L1 < L2 < L3… Ln) 
moving away from the centre represents higher levels of complexity. 
 
A simple example can be summarized in the popular online game Googlewhack, an 
internet game for finding a Google search query consisting of exactly two words 
found in a dictionary, but returns exactly one search hit. The concept quickly burst 
into mainstream lexicon. In the short span of just three years the term went from 
obscurity to a Sunday Time #1 best-selling book title and comedy tour in the UK. The 
concept however was a short-lived because with every online discovery and 
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publication of a Googlewack term the game was cannibalizing itself into extinction. In 
pursuit of developmental and evolutionary strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty this thesis is in pursuit of the antithesis of the Googlewack movement and 
specifically is in pursuit of solutions that create more options long-term. 
 
The third limitation, and the reason Evolutionary Economics similarly to Dual 
Process Theory, and Exploration and Exploitation cannot stand alone to constitute 
the important components and dimensions of the Strategic Decision-Making under 
Uncertainty model is in spite of the strong illumination on the changing aspects 
surrounding decision-making (+L) low definition is given to that which is not a 
routine (+C) as is represented in the Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty’s 
differentiation drive (+D). And though the differences between behavioural decision-
making (+R, +C) and rational classic economic decision-making (+R, +C) are clearly 
highlighted (thus illuminating half of the model) this thesis is working towards 
remaining neutral on the superiority of any philosophical stance without the context 
of specific resources and objectives.  
 
The final limitation is that the model does not explicitly explore its own application 
beyond the organizational level (macro). Though twenty-two years later a general 
theory of the evolutionary economics process has been proposed by Kurt Dopfer, 
John Foster and Jason Potts (2004) as the micro mezzo macro framework, thus 
demonstrating it is possible, the Strategic Decision-Making under uncertainty seeks 
this nested emergence to be central in the construction of a cyclical recursive process 
describing the emergence, adaptation, change and transformation. 
 
 
Broader body of Literature 
 
Heightening the importance of recognizing that the internal and external 
environment is not stable, and will likely continue on a trajectory of volatility where 
change needs to be contend with is a recent study by Reeves, Levin & Euda (2016). In 
a longevity study of more than 30,000 public firms in the United States over a 50-
year span, the team concluded that businesses are disappearing faster than ever 
before. They predict that a public company has a one in three chance of being delisted 
in the next five years, whether because of bankruptcy, liquidation, M&A, or other 
causes. That’s six times the delisting rate of companies 40 years ago. Although 
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corporations may be perceived as enduring institutions, they now die, on average, at a 
younger age than their employees. And the rise in mortality applies regardless of size, 
age, or sector. Neither scale nor experience guards against an early demise. 
 
The broader literature of change management (CM) in Management Studies is also 
relevant here as the models contained therein offersapproaches to transitioning 
individuals, teams and organizations to a desired future state (Kotter, 1998). Like 
decision-making under uncertainty this can be a descriptive and/or prescriptive 
process to frame the people and organizational factors that provide the catalyst to 
change. The reason many of these theories are not used as an anchor theory for 
Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty is because it originates in management 
predominantly for the purpose of controlling (+C) groups of people and does not 
necessarily address the differentiating (+D) side. Change Management theories that 
originate in psychology proves the exception to this case as they are very sensitive to 
external traumas instigating a period of change, however the limitation with many of 
the psychology change theories are that they focus on the micro level whereas this 
model is seeking to move between the micro, mezzo and macro scales. 
 
The structure of developmental theories also offers some insight into how the 
different drives interact if we overlay generally accepted organizational development 
theories over that of the strategic decision-making under uncertainty model and 
theory. Generally, what developmental theories have in common is that development 
and progress occurs in ordered stages and in different areas simultaneously (Grivas & 
Carter, 2004). It is ultimately this combination of different areas making progress at 
the same time that also give rise to emergence. As in the case of organizational 
development theories, the growth is not likely to occur in a linear fashion, but in 
stages of increasing maturity, consciousness and complexity many similar changes 
could be observed at the micro (individual), mezzo (organizational) and macro 
(societal) level.  
 
Similar to the decision theories discussed so far various development scholars have 
also assigned different vocabulary to these stages. Appendix E outlines and codes 25 
development theories in context to the Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
drives framework. In the context of management and organizational stages of 
development the first four stages are described as follows (Laloux, 2014): 
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Stage 1: The organization as a Wolfpack 
 
Historically the most primitive form of real organization occurred in the form of 
small conquering armies. Philosophically their strategic stances favour more crude, 
often violent groups. Organizations at this stage of development tend make decisions 
under uncertainty that regards the world as a tough place where only the powerful (or 
those they protect) get their needs met. This was the origin of command authority. 
The chief, like the alpha male in a wolf pack, constantly inspire fear to keep 
underlings in line, and makes decisions down familial bond lines.  
 
Today’s stage 1 organizations are often entities at the fringes of the law. Street gangs, 
terrorist groups, and crime syndicates are often organized along these lines. In these 
organizations, the boss shares the spoils as he or she pleases, buying allegiance 
through reward and punishment. At the micro level, the individual leader frames 
strategic decision making under uncertainty around: “How can I use my power to 
dominate?”  
 
• In the context of the Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty model and 
theory the stage 1 wolf pack organization is synonymous with the 
improvisation quadrant (+R, +D) on account of the wolf pack’s capacity for 
nimble course correction and blind trust of authority figures because of the 
raw power they yield based on brutality or bloodlines that ties the group 
together. No elaborate rationalization is needed in the process of change 
because followers are driven by fear (+R). Differentiation in today’s society 
happens in the context of operating on the fringes of law (+D). 
 
 
Stage 2: Organization as an Army 
 
In the successive stage people learned to increase self-discipline and self-control, 
internalizing the strong group norms. Do what’s right and you will be rewarded, in 
this life or the next. Do or say the wrong things, and you will be excommunicated 
from the group.  
 
The Catholic Church is an archetypal stage 2 organization, complete with a static 
organization chart linking all levels of activity in lines and boxes, from the pope at the 
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top to the cardinals below and down to the archbishops, bishops, and priests. They 
thrive on order, control, and hierarchy. In organizations, the same principles 
characterize the second stage. The fluid, scheming wolf pack–like organizations give 
way to static, stratified pyramids.  
 
Today, this hierarchical and process-driven model is visible in large bureaucratic 
enterprises, many government agencies, and most education and military 
organizations. In stage 2 organizations, thinking and execution are strictly separated. 
People at the bottom must be instructed through command and control. In the stage 
2 organization salaries are tightly linked to a person’s level in the hierarchy (“same 
rank, same pay”) and there are no incentives or bonuses. At a micro level the 
individual leader asks: “How can I maintain or increase my power?” 
 
• In the context of the context of the Strategic Decision-Making under 
Uncertainty model and theory the stage two army is synonymous with the 
behavioural decision-making models (+R, +C) on account of the strong 
hierarchical structure and process created by socially constructed formal 
structure of organizational charts that explains how employees need to 
conform (+C) who’s power they need to be responsive to (+R). 
 
 
Stage 3: Organization as a Machine 
 
Starting with the Renaissance, and gaining steam with the Enlightenment and the 
early Industrial Revolution, a new management concept emerged that challenged its 
agrarian predecessor. In stage 3, the world is no longer governed by absolute, God-
given rules; it is a complex mechanism that can be understood and exploited through 
scientific and empirical investigation. Effectiveness replaces morality as the yardstick 
for decision making: The best decision is the one that begets the highest reward. The 
goal in stage 3 organization is to get ahead, to succeed in socially acceptable ways, 
and to best play the cards one is dealt. This is arguably the predominant perspective 
of most leaders in business and politics today.  
 
The commanding people also evolves: Give people targets to reach, using freedom 
and rewards to motivate them. Over the past century in this includes the majority of 
strategy models and theories as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. It also led to 
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the creation of modern HR practices, budgets, KPIs, yearly evaluations, bonus 
systems, and stock options giving rise to the idea of meritocracy. 
  
Today Stage 3 organizations can be found on Wall Street and Main Street and 
companies offer individual incentives to reward star performers. At a micro level the 
individual stage 3 leader looks at the world very much in competition with others: 
“How can we win?” 
 
• In the context of the context of the Strategic Decision-Making under 
Uncertainty model and theory the stage two army is synonymous with the 
rational decision-making models (+S, +C) on account of the strong focus on 
systematic and programmed processes that drive prosperity. Processes are 
conformed to not because of social pressure but outcome driven pressure (+C). 
Also, the perception that objective truth and values can be quantified. 
 
 
Stage 4: Organization as a Common Pool Resource  
 
Postmodernity brought yet another world view. Stage 4 stresses cooperation over 
competition and strives for equality, solidarity, and tolerance. Stage 4 organizations, 
which include many non-profits as well as companies such as Southwest Airlines, 
Starbucks, and the Container Store, consider corporate social responsibility the core 
of their mission. They serve not just shareholders but all stakeholders, knowing that 
this often results in higher costs in the short term, but better returns in the end.  
 
Stage 4 leaders have championed the soft aspects of business — investing in 
organizational culture and values, coaching, mentoring, and teamwork — over the 
hard aspects of strategy and budgeting so prized in Stage 3. Family is their metaphor; 
everyone’s voice should be heard and respected. You can’t treat knowledge workers 
like cogs in a machine. Empowerment and egalitarian management are among the 
breakthroughs they introduced. Companies generally award team bonuses to 
encourage cooperation. At a micro level the individual leader asks: “How can we 
empower more people?”  
 
• In the context of the context of the Strategic Decision-Making under 
Uncertainty model and theory the stage four common pool resource 
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management is synonymous with the consilience decision-making models 
(Q4) because different stakeholders’ voice is sought out and considered as an 
asset. On account of the strong focus on systematic processes that drive 
prosperity (+S) this stage is similar to the rational decision-making stage, yet it 
differentiates from general protocol with higher risk dispositions towards 
power and empowerment (+D).  
 
But ultimately one of the primary studies that made a tipping point contribution was 
a paper by innovation and decision-making theorists Adam Grant and Barry Swartz 
(2011). After the team reviewed every known virtue they concluded that there is no 
value or behaviour that is universally positive. In the context of strategic decision-
making under uncertainty theory and model this underscores the importance of the 
different drives’ rolls in creating instability. Binding together while pushing counter 
points apart is the very fabric that allows for moderation while adapting in order to 
responsibly facilitate the emergence of new states and change without a whole system 
collapsing into chaos. 
 
 
11.4.2.  Summary 
 
Ultimately a wide variety of theories start to provide insight on how the dynamic 
components of the drives interacting can and should work. In reviewing the literature  
There are five key takeaways from looking at the potential of the strategic decision-
making under uncertainty model as an emergent, dynamic, change and development 
theory include: 
• Dynamic interplay. Consistently with the emergent strategy theories and 
interaction patterns explored in the work of Williams (1890) Mintzberg (1978) 
and Moncrief (1997) the dynamic interplay between the systems (or 
quadrants) may be one of the catalysts of change driving development 
• Change. The importance of recalibrating to changes is expected to become an 
increasingly important component of strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty. 
• Emergence. In the context of management studies emergence is brought on by 
the recombination of a number of factors including exposure of a plan to real 
life events as well as  
• Nested. As a basic tenant of development theories speculate that emergence 
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are shifts happening on multiple levels and areas in a system so too evidence 
so far support that micro, mezzo and macro levels may be dealing with the 
same tensions in its own nest in relation to the broader situation. A general 
theory of the evolutionary economics process has been proposed by Kurt Dopfer, John 
Foster and Jason Potts (2004) as the micro mezzo macro framework 
• Increasing future options. Concept that strengthening a strategic position in 
order to maximize future options under uncertainty to adapt and respond to 
change by moving up to higher stages and levels in the model. 
• Ordered stages of development. Consistently with the time component 
explored in improvisation theory models, developmental theories also 
highlight likelihood that strategic decision-making under uncertainty may not 
just be static quadrants, but cycle through an impulsive stage one, followed by 
a socially conforming stage two, to a rationally conforming stage three, to a 
shared empowerment stage four. 
 
 
11.5.  Conclusion 
 
Ultimately this model and theory of Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty is 
built upon the literary foundations of behavioural economics, integrating and 
subsuming the three theories: Dual Presses Systems (Kahneman & Tversky, 2003), 
Exploration and Exploitation (March, 1991) and Evolutionary Economics (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). Ultimately this was not the only route to present and communicate 
the model and theory as can be observed when looking at each section’s broader 
literature from even beyond management studies where similar drives, models and 
dynamics can be observed. Relative to one another the models section also present 
how the various strategic stances can be presented relative to one another outside the 
behavioural decision-making arena. However, for the context of this specific thesis’ 
development, resources, research methods and support this method of framing the 
model was deemed the most appropriate and likely to succeed. Interesting to note 
that at the time each of the respective keystone theories were emerging each of them 
deemed it necessary at the time to present themselves in the context of the 
limitations of classic rational decision-making.  
 
Ultimately it should be noted that regardless of strategic decision-makers and 
collaborators innate strategic predispositions, the foundations of the model and 
theory can be transposed into other central philosophical starting points to be used 
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for comparing, developing and evolving strategic stances (or philosophies) in 
uncertain environments. M3’s practical contribution also extends to academia and 
offers social science, development and evolutionary researchers, (another type of 
strategic decision-makers) a new tool for developing and critically considering 
research methods. 
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CHAPTER 12 
 
APPLYING THE THEORY TO SEMINAL STRATEGY MODELS 
 
 
12.1.  Introduction 
  
If it is possible for the M3 theory and model to represent ethnographic field data 
through a unified epistemological lens the lingering question then remains what 
about existing peer reviewed strategy models that has been introduced into literature 
over the past 100 years. Should the M3 model and theory not be able to depict that as 
well? And if so, what can we learn about the emergence, change, adaptation and 
transformation of theory models over the course of the evolution of the field? How 
about the evolution of theorists who have made multiple seminal contributions?  
 
As it turns out, a holistic few on the emergence of academic and consultancy firm 
birthed strategy models would not only aid in understanding the model discussed 
thus far, it could also serve as a test. Over one hundred seminal theories and models 
of strategy are generally accepted as the keystones of the literate and in this chapter 
the thesis will connect them not only as a literature review, but also empirical data in 
the emergent process of constructing a model and theory. The reason for this is 
because like a management strategist, a management researcher’s work process 
constitutes of acts of strategic decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
Looking at a chronological account of how strategy have evolved over the past one 
hundred years would also have the added benefit of informing on how not just the 
micro level of individual models and theories build on each other but it would also 
provide insight as to how and when the best and brightest minds in strategy build on 
their own and one another’s work with new fundamental contributions.  
 
Strategy is, in essence, problem solving decision-making under uncertainty and the 
most likely approach depends upon how the specific decision makers are framing the 
problem at hand and perceiving the internal and external environment. Since the 
advent of management strategy in the 1950s, each new strategic management theory 
is still to this day most often introduced as a panacea. Conversely, this Strategic 
Decision-Making under Uncertainty Model does not claim to be the only and ultimate 
model to eclipse all models. Instead it seeks to provide a frame and code that the one 
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hundred and counting management strategies can be coded by to determine which 
strategies would be better matches for different types of collaborations. Specifically, it 
seeks to illuminate strategies in relation to each other so that they can be structured 
into a tool box for better collaboration, communication and responses to Strategic 
Decision-Making under Uncertainty.  
 
In the context of this chapter the seminal theories on strategy are also an empirical 
data stream to challenge and shape the strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
model and theory laid out in the previous chapters. 
 
 
 
As depicted in Figure 12.1. – Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty Model this 
chapter will use the quadrants to discuss and analyse some of the most important 
strategy theories and models of the last century. In order of most evolved in 
management literature to least this will include: 
• Classic Rational Strategy models (+S, +C) 
• Behavioural Strategy models (+R, +C) 
• Improvisational Strategy models (+R, D) 
• Consilience Strategy models (+S, +D) 
 
A comprehensive table of one hundred of the most seminal Management Strategies is 
available in Appendix C. What follows is definition of the strategic decision-making 
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under uncertainty model quadrant in context to strategy models that aligns strongly 
to one (or multiple) quadrant’s strategic stance over other models.  
 
 
12.2.  Classic Rationality Strategy Models and Theories (+S, +C) 
 
The ‘book smart’ answer to making strategic decisions under uncertainty involves the 
systematic and theoretical objectification of that which can be manipulated. It is also 
the default and most academically mature set of theories at this time. Reflecting back 
to the Chapter 2 Literature Review on Decision-Making theories, it is synonymous 
with the classic rational decision-making under uncertainty or technical rationality. 
Positioning can be based on superior size, technical capabilities, efficiencies and 
assuming that once advantage is obtained, it is sustainable. In most cases systematic 
strategy drives (+S) leans heavily towards the conformity (+C) quadrant, taking 
advantage of that which is perceived as predictable, stable and develops gradually 
without major disruptions. In the opposite Systematic quadrant of differentiation 
(+D) the Systematic Strategies (+S) successfully take advantage being robust and 
socially decentralized to absorb the shocks of uncertainty to tackle relatively higher 
risk.  
 
To advance using this strategy involves decision-makers employing technical 
rationality by forecasting how the market is likely to develop over time based on 
historic indicators. Then, they construct a plan to build and sustain advantaged 
positions. The hallmark of the Classic Rationalist Strategist (+S, +C) is that execution 
is to be rigorously planned and programmed.  
 
Classic Rational Strategies (+S, +C) as a type of problem solving and innovation is 
most commonly exemplified when decision-makers spot opportunities for processing 
large quantities of similar information through a set structure in accordance with 
theories like Fordism or Peter Ducker's increasing levels of efficiency. Strategy 
literature from the late 1950s and early 1960s focused more on systematic processes 
to ward off competition (+S, +C) as oppose to collaboration for productivity (+S, +D). 
Drucker’s theories would be amongst the pioneering Classic Rational Strategies (+S, 
+C) focused on pricing on the controlled. However, he was hardly alone. Specifically, 
in the field of Economics, thought leaders commonly frame problem solving and 
innovation in these terms.  
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With the introduction of Michael Porter's 'How competitive forces shape strategy" 
(1979) he challenged Drucker's price sensitivity and opened the spectrum to an 
additional suit of innovation via economic productivity and efficiency (+S, +C). 
Strategy, it follows for Porter in the context of this time and space, was a matter of 
working out your company’s best position relative not just to pricing pressures from 
rivals but to all the forces in your competitive environment.  
 
 
Theories in Action  
 
An overview table one hundred of the most seminal management strategy theories to 
date are available in Appendix C. Each theory has been coded per the Strategic 
Decision-Making under Uncertainty drives to reveal which strategic stance is more 
dominantly developed. At first glance it is apparent that to date the body of literature 
on strategy is dominated by Classic Rational Strategies (+S, +C) as 73 of the 100 
theories takes a strong a systematic (+S) and conforming (+C) stance of strategic 
decision-making under uncertainty. A summary table of specifically Technocratic 
Strategies are available in Table 12.1.  
 
Notably not featured amongst the Classic Rational Strategy models and theories are 
Management, Innovation and Change Strategies that for some reason or another not 
use the keyword descriptor of “strategy’ but is in essence a strategy. Possibly one of 
the strongest Classic Rational Strategic stances would be the father of Management, 
Henri Fayol's (1916) whose model of management defined as controlling, 
commanding, coordinating, planning and organizing. Most of these principles nestles 
well inside an extreme level of traditional planning (+S, +C) backed by a strong 
hieratical power and control infrastructure (+C).  
 
           Similarly, the Granddaddy of Strategy and Boston Consulting Group Founder, Bruce    
           Henderson's The Origins of Strategy (1989) argues for aggressive outsourcing and  
           partnering to improve efficiencies. This would be a clear example of a systematic     
      strategy, but for the word ‘collaboration’ as a descriptor would suggest that it is      
maybe a differentiation strategy (+D) or Consilience model (+S, +D) instead? The 
reason this specific model is still coded (+S, +C) is because in managing the 
outsourced supply chain relationships power and control still resides with the  
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strategist organization and the Old Power dynamic is not New Power (Hermanns & 
Timms, 2014) as was discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Henderson’s strategy would 
thus be coded as a traditional Classic rational strategy (+S, +C).  
 
Strategists who scaffolded onto building onto what you already do well include: 
Prahalad & Hamel’s (1990), Search of Excellence focusing on a few key success 
factors, critical resources, and core competencies; Bain consultants’ publications on 
making adjacency moves (Zook 2007, Allen, 2003), and Collis & Montgomery’s 
(2008) Competing on Resources. Additionally, there is also control driven strategist 
(++C) authors (with a taste for competition) who have been able to make a name for 
themselves in mainstream strategy literature include: “Hardball: Five Killer 
Strategies for Trouncing the Competition,” and its companion “Curveball: Strategies 
to Fool the Competition.” (Lachenauer & Stalk, 2004; Lachenauer & Stalk, 2006). But 
possibly most dominantly Michael E. Porter also appears repeatedly on the Classic 
Rational Strategist (+S, +C) list with at five different seminal strategies to his name in 
this specific quadrant. 
 
 
Classic Rational Models Coding Case Study 
 
An example of a seminal strategy model and theory coded as a predominantly 
technocratic strategy would be Gluck, Kaufman & Walleck (1980) Four Phases of 
Formal Strategic Planning mapped on the Model as depicted in Figure 12.2. 
 
At face value Gluck, Kaufman & Walleck’s (1980) Four Phases of Formal Strategic 
Planning is a traditional strategic planning model and theory that can be coded +S, 
+C for reasons outlined earlier. This is what we can refer to a neural state or zoom 
(+Z). However, once we take a closer look at what is planned and at what order 
during the four phases, we zoom into further detail. This act can be coded as +Z. At 
this +Z level we can also move from a ‘categorical’ to a ‘relational’ coding system 
when we observe the four planning phases relative to one another. 
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Of the four phases, Phase I: Financial Planning are most associated with internal 
control (and conformity) thus making it a relative +C code. Phase II: Forecast-based 
Planning increases the level of systematic thinking and lessen the conformity making 
it relatively more differentiating (+D). However, it is still based on internal protocols 
so it is still (+S, +C). Phase III: Externally orientated planning that in the world 
beyond the company over which there is less control (or perceptions of control) 
lessening the internal control yet again, and moving it into the external quadrant 
(++D). And finally Phase IV: Strategic Management is described to address the action 
elements as well as the flexibility of implementation thus pushing the code yet further 
to lower control (+++D) on the brink of the Experimentation Strategy quadrant (+S, 
+D). 
 
Most other famous strategy models like SWOT Analysis, Anoff Matrix and most of the 
Boston Consulting Group models of the 1980s are at their primary levels a 
Technocratic model. At their secondary level of detail coding many still rely strongly 
on Classic Rational strategies but are more likely to integrate strategies from other 
decision-making quadrants.  
 
 
Applied Classic Rational Strategy Case Study 
 
Strategic decision-maker Jack Welsh as CEO of GE famously deployed Classic 
Rational Strategies (+S, +C) from 1981 to 2001. His public philosophy was that a 
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company should be either No. 1 or No. 2 in a particular industry, or else leave it 
completely. At the time GE thus chose to focus on categories and brands where it 
could lead and obtain scale advantage, as it creates value by growing those categories. 
Over the course of Welsh’s tenure as CEO at GE, the company's value increased 
4,000% (Welsh, 2003). 
 
In many ways the Classic Rational Strategies (+S, +C) defines the field of strategy. 
The overwhelming majority of theories make their contribution to this principle in 
management studies. It is also the quadrant that are emphasized in business schools 
and thus expanded by major enterprises who hire and deploy graduates. It is also the 
categories of strategy theories what business schools predominantly teach, and major 
enterprises more likely to hire for and deploy. But specifically, for Strategic Decision-
Making under Uncertainty, a number of other dimensions are also important. 
 
 
12.3.  Behavioural Strategy Models and Theories (+R, +C) 
 
The ‘street smart’ strategy under uncertainty would not necessarily require extensive 
schooling or book reading. Instead it would read people and situations with keen 
observation and communication skills. Formal power and an elite status would also 
help. It is synonymous with the Behavioural decision models discussed in Chapter 2. 
Behavioural Strategies (+R, +C), like Technocratic (+S, +C) are inclined to gravitate 
towards lower risk propositions that seek to exploit the power and information 
currently in hand more than risking exploration beyond the current vantage point. 
The difference however is whereas the Classic Rational strategies (+S, +C) exploit the 
objectively quantifiable knowledge of things at a specific time, Behavioural strategies 
(+R, +C) seek to focus on exploiting the subjective relational social advantages more 
aggressively. 
 
In the case of Behavioural Strategies (+R, +C)) decision-makers are taking a visionary 
approach to create or re-create an environment largely by themselves. Firms 
deploying a visionary approach also follow a distinct thought flow. First, visionary 
leaders envisage a valuable possibility that can be realized. Then they work single-
mindedly to be the first to build it. Finally, they persist in executing and scaling the 
vision until its full potential has been realized. In contrast to the analysis and 
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planning of the Systematic Strategists (+S), the visionary approach is about 
imagination and realization and is essentially creative (+R, +C). 
 
Behavioural Strategies (+R, +C) win by being among the first to recognize, implement, 
and scale new visions for the possible future. This would be a more common strategy 
for big companies and entities who already have critical mass or social capital to be 
change makers in the field. These decision-makers would innovate on what they 
perceive the market wants or what they can influence the market to perceive they 
need.  
 
This type of problem solving and innovation is most commonly exemplified when 
decision makers conform (+C), and double down in an area they already do well in. 
Often it is out of fear that they will lose something when they innovate. Specifically, 
Bourdieu's theory of social practice prominently steps into the forefront and 
excellence is especially prevalent in fields of political power. Responsive Strategies 
(+R) hence looks towards socially normative rules, politics, hierarchies and is in 
essence bounded rationality to conform to the end of conforming to those with 
traditional forms of power.  
 
Compared to Classic Rational Strategies (+S, +C), Behavioural (+R, +C) are a rather 
neglected area of strategy literature partially because these theories’ have been 
emerging much later in the evolution of strategy literature. Like behavioural decision-
making theories, the interests in pragmatic strategy theories have also seen a 
considerable uptick in the last few decades. 
 
 
Theories in Action  
 
A chronological table of management strategy theories driven largely by a responsive 
(+R) and conforming (+C) stance of strategic decision-making under uncertainty is 
available in Table 12.2. A comprehensive list is available in Appendix C showing their 
relation in the context of other strategy theories.  
 
At first glance it is apparent that Behavioural Strategy theories arose early in the 
advent of Management Strategy theories similarly to Classic Rational Strategies. But 
ironically the seminal theory of Gradualism (Lindblom, 1959, 1965, 1976, 2001) 
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which deploys slow incremental steps to move an agenda forward without abrupt 
revolutionary uprisings, was not able to maintain traction with a steady supply of new 
seminal contributions in the strategy landscape dominated by Technocratic Strategies 
for the first three decades of the discipline. The introductory work of Charles 
Lindblom did however lay a strong foundation for Behavioural Decision-Making 
under Uncertainty scholars like Simon, March, Tversky and Kahneman built onto his 
strategy theory in their disciplines of management theory and decision-making (as 
discussed in Chapter 2). But ultimately, it was not until the advent of the Digital 
revolution in the 1990s that a resurgence was observed in seminal Behavioural 
Strategies. 
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Behavioural models Coding Case Study 
 
In application Roger Everett’s (1962) adaptation to change curve would be an 
example of gradualism in action whereby innovators influences, early movers, who in 
turn systematically influences early majority, which in turn influences late majority, 
and ultimately also laggards. In Figure 12.3 we observe how as critical mass increase 
traditional notions of power, control and conforming also increase.  
 
 
 
 
 
Applied Behavioural Case Study 
 
A famous case study of a big company engaging in Behavioural Strategies (+R, +C) 
would include American Express’s response to the financial crisis of 2008. Amex 
faced the triple challenge of rising default rates, slipping consumer demand, and 
decreasing access to capital. Socially they also faced a fuming stockholders and 
regulatory bodies. To survive, the company cut approximately 10 percent of its 
workforce, shed noncore activities, and cut ancillary investment. They furthermore 
also vowed to restore public trust and regulatory compliance. By 2009, Amex had 
saved almost $2 billion in costs and pivoted toward growth and innovation by 
investing in its loyalty program, entering the deposit raising business, and embracing 
digital technology. As of 2014, its stock was up 800 percent from recession lows 
(Reeves, Haanaes, & Sinha, (2015). 
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12.4.  Improvisational Strategy Models and Strategies (+R, +D) 
 
The ‘artistic’ ‘superhero’ or ‘MacGyver” strategic solution under uncertainty does not 
involve book smarts or street smarts. Instead, it requires speedy, skilful and brave 
appropriations of resources or force. This is similar to Improvisation strategies 
discussed in Chapter 2. Improvisational Strategies (+R, +D) are similar to the 
Behavioural Strategies (+R, +C) in that the strategist intuitively and with awareness 
responds to the environment and real-time information and cues (+R). However, 
what makes this higher risk compared to Behavioural Strategies (+R, +C) is the 
deviation away from social cues, structures and expectations (+D). The 
Improvisational strategist thus uses one of the rebel strategies that breaks from the 
established rhythm and perception on the socially constructed world.  
The First Mover type of decision-making is adaptive and responsive (+R). Decision-
making can be deployed because amidst uncertainty social engineering resource has 
yet to be introduced to mould the market. Prediction is often hard and advantage is 
short-lived. The only shield against continuous disruption is a readiness and an 
ability to repeatedly change. In an adaptive environment, winning comes from 
adapting to change by continuously experimenting and identifying new options faster 
than others. The sustainable competitive advantage comes from being robust with a 
series of temporary advantages. 
Improvisational strategists need to do a voluminous amount of experimentation and 
be adaptive. Tying into Pallet theory’s (Reeves, Haanaes, & Sinha, 2015), 
categorization of Firsts, collectives must master three essential thinking stages: Step 1: 
they continuously vary their approach, generating a range of strategic options to test. 
Step 2: They carefully select the most successful option to scale up and exploit. And 
Step 3: as the environment changes, the firms rapidly iterate on this evolutionary 
loop to ensure that they continuously renew their advantage.  
 
Theories in Action  
 
A chronological table of management strategy theories driven largely by a responsive 
(+R) and differentiating (+D) stance of strategic decision-making under uncertainty 
is available in Table 12.3. A comprehensive list is available in Appendix C.  
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Glancing at the summary table it becomes apparent that it was not until the late 
1970s that Improvisational Strategies were able to gain traction, and it took clear and 
direct attacks onto Classic Rational Strategies to enter the scholarly conversation. 
Also in contrast to the Classic Rational strategies that pursued seminal contributions 
in a pure context of not mixing strategic stances it is apparent that Improvisational 
Strategies recognise and also develop the role that Classic Rational Strategies play 
alongside theories that develop Improvisational Theories. Also, worth noting is one of 
the reoccurring names of different seminal contributions over the span of several 
decades would be Henry Mintzberg who specializes in this improvisational quadrant. 
 
Also featured amongst the theories coded in this list as having a strong Experimental 
Strategic stance are Discovery Driven Planning" (McGrath & McMillan, 1995) 
addressing rapidly responding to ever-evolving competitive and market changes with 
innovation strategy. This camp also includes other classic flexibility-as-strategy 
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pieces that date from the 1990s, including “Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options,” 
(Lehrman, 1998) and “Judo Strategy.” (Yoffie & Cusomano, 1999).  
 
More recent additions include “Stop Making Plans: Start Making Decisions,” 
(Mankins & Steel, 2006) which made the case for continuous strategic planning 
cycles. And finally, it includes various approaches to running established companies 
as if they were start-ups, such as Steven Blank’s “Why the Lean Start-Up Changes 
Everything” (2014).  
 
Improvisational Theory Coding Case Study 
 
An example of a seminal strategy model and theory coded as a predominantly 
improvisational strategy would be Henry Mintzberg’s (1978) Deliberate and 
Emerging strategies. Similar to Pragmatic Strategies it would also be almost a decade 
before other strategy theorists like G.L. Urban, R. Carter, S. Gaskin and Z. Mucha 
(1986) would offer models like First Mover Advantage to continue building on this 
philosophy. Similarly, it would be two decades before Moncrieff (1999) offers a 
seminal evolution on Mintzberg’s (1978) Deliberate and Emerging Strategy theory 
with a more detailed subdivision of classifications as discussed in Chapter 2. It would 
also be the emergence of this quadrant into Strategy Literature that would gave rise 
to the notion of dynamic strategies as outlined in Figure 12.4. 
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Applied Improvisational Strategy Case Study 
 
One famous practical example of successful Improvisational Strategies (+R, +D) 
would include the India-based information technology (IT) services and solutions 
company, Tata Consultancy Services as documented by Reeves, Haanaes, & Sinha, 
(2015). Its sheer size and international clout allow Tata some powers to influence 
massive social systems, but technically it operates in a regulatory and technical 
environment that is hard to predict. It needs to be responsive to influencing social 
processes but also needs to continuously adapts to repeated shifts in technology (e.g. 
the evolution from client servers to cloud computing.) By taking a responsive 
approach (+R) that focuses on monitoring the environment, strategic 
experimentation, and organizational flexibility, Tata Consultancy Services has grown 
from $155 million in revenue in 1996 to $1 billion in 2003 and more than $13 billion 
in 2013 to become the second-largest pure IT services company in the world. 
 
 
12.6.  Consilience Strategy Models and Theories (+S, +D) 
 
The (in)famous consilience strategist or scientist often adorns the cover of our 
western cultural entertainment, media, history books. These are often the underdogs 
who beat the odds, defied social expectations, or maybe even sacrificed themselves 
for a cause greater than themselves. But in randomly sampling the current (or past) 
world population, these strategists are not nearly as common as their legacy and fame 
would lead one to believe. Consilience strategies are synonymous with the consilience 
decision-making models outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
Consilience Strategies (+S, +D) are similar to the Improvisational Strategies (+Q3) in 
that both intentionally chooses a higher-risk path over a higher control strategy (+C). 
Yet, because the process is not a quick and responsive adaptation to real-time 
information (+R), Consilience models (+S, +D) brings the strategy back full circle to 
strategic stances that have longer time horizons in mind (+S) with a significantly 
lower chance of a pay-out and more interconnected dynamic parts that need to align. 
The Consilience strategist is thus the ultimate rebel strategist that breaks from the 
established rhythm and perception on resources. This type of problem solving and 
innovation is most commonly exemplified when decision-makers recognize social 
patterns according to Bourdieu's theory of social practice but then intentionally 
chooses to “play by a different set of rules” in pursuit of a win.  
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This Consilience Strategist quadrant is also the area where the literature’s logic on 
competitive strategy starts to break down. Whereas a strategy of ‘doing what 
everyone else is doing’ (+C) means a shrinking pie as new entrants take position 
and/or price wars keep pushing prices lower, overall profitability declines for the 
entire industry. This is absolutely grounds for looking at strategy as a competition or 
war. However, an example of competitors engaging in a differentiation strategy (+D) 
would be the practice of antitrust strategies were companies like Coke and Pepsi or 
employers like Apple and Google can make deals to not compete on price in the same 
week or for the same employee and in the process, destroy themselves. Such 
cooperative measures allow for the laws of gravity (and the nation-state) on 
competitive and cooperative strategy to evolve.  Differentiation (+D), as oppose to 
Conformity (+C), has the capacity to expand the pie by staking out some sustainable 
position based on a unique advantage created by a longer-term optimization strategy.  
 
Economist Paul Romer’s aphorism: “A crisis is a terrible thing to waste,” especially 
rings true amidst a situation shrouded in chaos or uncertainty as these transmutation 
strategies lend itself well to collaboratively shaping an ecosystem before the rules are 
written or re-written. This also means evolving the vantage point on traditional 
notions of social power as is commonly leveraged in (+C) strategy models. 
 
 
Theories in Action  
 
A chronological table of management strategy theories driven largely by a systematic 
(+S) and differentiating (+D) stance of strategic decision-making under uncertainty is 
available in Table 12.4. A comprehensive list is available in Appendix E.  
 
In observing the summary table, it is strikingly different from the other three 
quadrants’ summary table. First it is the smallest accounting for only 27 of the 100 
seminal contributions in Strategy to date. Secondly, even though consilience theories 
have been around since the 19th century, the advent of the first Consilience Strategy 
theory contribution was not until the 1980s. Thirdly, there is a very strong tendency 
for a theorist to not only develop the forth quadrant but also do so in context with all 
three other quadrants. Lastly, there is a clear trend of scholars collaborating when 
they make Consilience Strategy contributions. 
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Featured amongst the theories coded in this list as having a strong Consilience 
Strategic stance are strategists who innovate by doing something new. This includes 
strategies on finding or creating uncontested new markets as first articulated in 
"Creating New Market Space" and then further fleshed out in the mainstream 
minting of the concept of "Blue Ocean Strategy" (Kim & Mauborgne, 1999, Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2004). Other publications labelled seminal, include "The Art of Design" 
(Roth, 1999), "Reinventing Your Business Model" (Christensen, Kagermann, 
Johnson, 2008) and "Discovering New Points of Differentiation" (MacMillian, 
McGarth, 1997).  
 
 
 
Also, in addressing the challenges caused by disruptors are “The Empire Strikes Back: 
Counterrevolutionary Strategies for Industry Leaders,” (D’Aveni, 2002) and 
Surviving Disruption (Christensen & Wessel, 2012) detailing systematic ways to 
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determine when it is too soon to abandon your business to a disruptor (+D). Much of 
Porter's later work would also fit here.   
 
 
 
Consilience Theory Coding Case Study 
 
An example of a seminal strategy model and theory claimed outside the discipline of 
Strategy but intricately important and valuable at showcasing key components of the 
Transmutation Strategy would be Elenor Ostrem’s (1990) common pool resource 
(CPR) management strategies. Common property systems typically protect the core 
resource and allocate the fringe resources through complex community norms 
of consensus decision-making. Common resource management has to face the 
difficult task of devising rules that limit the amount, timing, and technology used to 
withdraw various resource units from the resource system. Setting the limits too high 
would lead to overuse and eventually to the destruction of the core resource while 
setting the limits too low would unnecessarily reduce the benefits obtained by the 
users. 
 
Analysing the design of long-enduring CPR institutions, the theory identified eight 
design principles which are prerequisites for a stable CPR arrangement: 
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
3. Collective-choice arrangements allowing for the participation of most of the 
appropriators in the decision-making process 
4. Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the 
appropriators 
5. Graduated sanctions for appropriators who do not respect community rules 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms which are cheap and easy of access 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize (e.g., by the government) 
8. In case of larger CPRs: Organization in the form of multiple layers of nested 
enterprises, with small, local CPRs at their bases. 
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We thus observe the theory as taking a differentiated (+D) view on power as 
enterprises of various sizes are recognized for bringing different resource to a 
collaboration. And even though ‘community rules’ need to be defined (+S), 
conformed to (+C) and graduated sanctions need to be implemented in response to 
violations (+R), it becomes evident that Revolutionary Strategies need all three the 
other quadrants as (shorter-term) building blocks for (longer-term) sustainable 
change. 
 
Applied Consilience Strategy Case Study 
One case study exemplifying the concept of Conscience Strategies (+S, +D) could 
include Novo Nordisk in a case study compiled by Reeves, Haanaes, & Sinha, (2015). 
To win in the Chinese diabetes care market during the 1990s, Novo couldn’t predict 
the exact path of market development, since the diabetes challenge was just 
beginning to emerge in China. However, by collaborating with patients, regulators, 
and doctors, Novo Nordisk could influence the rules of the game. Now, Novo is the 
uncontested market leader in diabetes care in China, with over 60 percent of the 
insulin market share. 
 
 12.6.  Grand Theories (and Theorists) on Strategy (+S, +R, +C, +D) 
 
Ultimately there are two strategy scholars whose work has shown up repeatedly in 
making new and sizeably novel contributions to Management Strategy since the 
advent of the discipline: Michael Porter and Henry Mintzberg. 
 
In many respects the two strategy scholars are different. Porter focuses on deliberate 
strategies like the 5 Forces (1979), Niche Strategy (1980), Value Chain (1985), 
Diamond Model (1990), Three Factor (1996) where the past can help predict the 
future. Mintzberg’s strategies on the other hand focuses on emerging strategies 
(1987), Formulation and Implementation (1996) which takes the vantage point that 
strategy emerges over time as intentions collide with and accommodate a changing 
reality.  Emergent strategy is a set of actions, or behaviour, consistent over time, “a 
realized pattern [that] was not expressly intended” in the original planning of strategy. 
Emergent strategy implies that an organization is learning what works in practice. 
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Though the two scholars may not necessarily see eye-to-eye on the details of models 
and theories, one important point stands out when mapping their respective theories 
to the Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty Model: Much like the field of 
strategy both these scholars have evolved over the course of their respective careers 
to also touch on each of the four different quadrants of the Strategic Decision-Making 
under Uncertainty Model.  
 
Porter’s Strategy Theory Journey 
Porter’s kicked off his career by kicking against the establishment’s laser-like focus on 
‘competition and price’ by introducing four additional competitive forces (1979). As 
depicted in Appendix E, Porter contributed many more seminal and value added 
theories over the decades with the focus initially on more complex Classic Rational 
Strategies (+S, +C) but also in later years started addressing Improvisational 
strategies (+R, +D) and Creating Shared Value (+S, +D). 
 
Ultimately it was 17 years after his first article that Michael Porter addressed the 
‘What is Strategy?’ and created five categories (1996) for strategies to be filed under: 
1. Seeking a single ideal competitive position in an industry (+S, +C). 
2. Benchmarking and adopting best practices (+S, +C). 
3. Aggressive outsourcing and partnering to improve efficiencies (+S, +C). 
4. Focusing on a few key success factors, critical resources, and core competencies (+C). 
5. Rapidly responding to ever-evolving competitive and market changes (+R, +D). 
 
Mintzberg’s Strategy Theory Journey 
Mintzberg also kicked off his career around the same time as Porter by challenging 
the establishment’s Classic Rational Strategies (+S, +C), but instead of going deeper 
into the complexity like Porter, Mintzberg instead went wider and introduced the 
responsive strategy factors (Mintzberg, 1973). A few year later he also launched the 
scholarly dialogue for Improvisational Strategies (+R, +D)6 and dynamism (+L)7  
(Mintzberg, 1987). But ultimately it was his 5 Ps of Strategy that brought the 
discipline full circle (in the context of the Strategic Decision-Making under 
Uncertainty Model) for the first time. 
 
Mintzberg’s (1978) 5 Ps of Strategy presented categorical expansions to the concept 
of Strategy that extended beyond the generally accepted ‘planning’ (which is the first 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 4.4 for a detailed discussion of Mintzberg’s Emerging and Dynamic behaviors theory 
7 See Chapter 2.4 for a detailed discussion of Mintzberg’s Dynamism Theory 
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P). To the list he added: Strategy as a ploy, perspective, pattern, and position. In the 
original 1987 theory these functions reflect distinct categories, but viewed in the 
context of the Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty Model these same 
categories can now also be observed as relative to one another based on the 
dominance of the different strategy drives. The mapped model is presented in Figure 
12.5. 
 
 
 
Strategy can be a plan (+S) – some sort of consciously intended course of action, a 
guideline (or set of guidelines) to deal with a situation (+C). By this definition 
strategy have two essential characteristics: they are made in advance of the actions to 
which they apply, and they are developed consciously and purposefully. Coded, it is 
thus systematic (+S) and a mechanism for a broader body of stakeholders to conform 
to (+C) 
 
Strategy can be a ploy (+S, +C) – as a plan, a strategy can be a ploy too, really just a 
specific manoeuvre indented to outwit an opponent or competitor. Coded, it is thus 
premeditated (+S) and an exercise or exploitation of power or knowledge over 
another conforming entity (+C). 
 
Strategy can be a perspective (+R, +C)– its content consisting not just of a chosen 
position, but of an integrated way of perceiving the world. Strategy in this respect is 
to the organizations what personality is to the individual. What is of key importance 
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is that strategy is a perspective shared by members of an organization, through their 
intentions and/or by their actions. In effect, when referring to strategy in this context, 
it primes the concept of the collective mind – individual united by common thinking 
and/or behaviour. Coded it is thus perceiving and responding (+R) with assimilation 
(+C) to cultural norms of a collective. 
 
Strategy as a pattern (+R, +D) – if strategies can be intended (whereas general plans 
or specific ploys) they can also be realized. In other words, defining strategy as plan is 
not sufficient; there is also a need for a definition that encompasses the resulting 
behaviour (+R). Strategy as a pattern – specifically, a pattern in a stream of actions. 
Strategy is consistency in behaviour, where or not intended. The definitions of 
strategy as plan and pattern can be quite independent of one another: plans may go 
unrealized, while patterns may appear without conception. Coded, the patterning 
thus moves the plan “off the boardroom shelf’ and onto to “shop floor” with action 
that responds in real-time (+R), to real threats or external factors that was not 
considered in theory (+D). 
 
Strategy as position (+S, +D)– specifically a means of locating an organization in an 
“environment”. By this definition strategy becomes the mediating force, or “match”, 
between organization and environment, that is, between the internal and the external 
context. Coded, the position is thus the marriage of that what is intended (+S) and 
practical (+R) and the differentiated position (+D) is also one more readily to 
optimize anticipated or potential change relative to high control competing positions. 
 
Most recently both Porter and Mintzberg have also converged onto Consilience 
Decision-Making under Uncertainty or Concillence Strategies (+Q4) all be it in 
radically different ways. Porter has been focusing on Corporate Social Responsibility, 
suggesting a fairly fundamental change in how corporate American runs itself. 
Meanwhile, Mintzberg has been working on Rebalancing Society: radical renewal 
beyond Smith and Marx. This convergence of two distinct branches of strategy with 
fundamentally different lenses is yet further evidence of the emergence of 
consilience in itself. 
 
As is evident from coding not only the ten combined seminal contributions by Porter 
and Mintzberg but also various other scholars in the field of Strategic Management to 
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date, is that all the different drives have at this time in history been explored and 
introduced into management literature. This serves as evidence of the existence of all 
four drives and also provides insight in types of focal points the different drives have 
enjoyed over the past century.  
 
The fact that every model and theory to this date can be classified according to the 
four strategic decision-making under uncertainty modes also affirms validity on the 
path of understanding how the model and theory come together. The emergence of 
new patterns and interrelatedness furthermore provides insight into the concept of 
emergence, development, change, adaptation and transformation itself. 
 
The four modes conceptualize relations to social constructs as well as objects or 
natural sciences in the field of management strategy. Strategies focused inside the 
field of control results in Classic Rational (+S, +C) or Behavioural Strategies (+R, +C), 
whereas strategies focused outside the field result in Improvisational (+R, +D) or 
Consilience Strategies (+S, +D). Strategies like Behavioural (+R, +C) and 
Improvisational (+R, D) Strategies focused on intuition and awareness for market 
change would have a shorter time horizon and fall under Responsive Strategies (R+) 
and finally strategies like Classic Rational (+S, +C) and Consilience (+S, +D) that 
have a more stable platform to work off and a longer time horizon can afford to plan 
and calculate investments around Systematic Strategies (+S).  
 
 
 
12.4.  Conclusion  
  
Ultimately this chapter set out to do look at strategy theories in two ways: literature 
for the strategic decision-making under uncertainty model and theory, as well as to 
review empirical data because all researchers are in fact strategic decision-makers 
under uncertainty.  
 
In the first instance, the literature confirms that the same four drives (+S, +R, +C, +D) 
and the same four quadrants that characterize decision theory can in fact also be 
represented in strategy even though the vocabulary used may different. Thus, the 
connection of linking decision theory to strategy literature is established.  
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In the second instance the chronology revealed that even though the literature of 
decision theory and management strategy did not unfold over the same timeline, both 
started with Classic Rationality (+S, +C), then moved to Behavioural Economics (+R, 
+C), and most recently strong cases can be made that seminal contributions had also 
been occurring for Improvisation (+R, +D) and Consilience (+S, +D). It is also 
understandable that in both cases academia has (and is likely to continue to) lean 
towards the systematic, objective and controlled classic rational strategies (+S, +C) 
since that is most dominantly the arena in which most scholars have been trained, 
where the higher indexed journals chose to focus, where funding agencies have 
higher assurances of lower risk outcomes. If that is true, a deliberate decision will 
need to be made to not neglect theories outside of the first quadrant, as each have a 
role to play in the advancement (+L) of the social sciences via decision-making and 
strategy. Evidence to date supports that it is through the advancement of all the 
quadrants levels of complexity, emergence of new levels of sophistication in classic 
rational strategies (+S, +C) can also be achieved.  
 
Finally, by using the four modes to code over one hundred of the most seminal 
strategy theories (and recognising that all the modes can be accounted for) also 
reinforces that the same phenomenon has been identified by other researchers even 
though different terminologies may have been used. It also addressed the concern 
raised in Chapter 3 with regards to the necessary number of ethnographies needed to 
construct a new theory. Chapter 13’s empirical data furthermore suggests that it 
would have been unlikely that a six or (additional) ethnographies would have 
illuminated gaps in basic tenants of the model that emerged from ethnographic data.  
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CHAPTER 13 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
What started out as inquiry into inter-organizational collaboration in early stages of 
collaborative relationship formation to articulate conditions that give rise to 
emergent innovation, ultimately resulted in a descriptive theory capable of 
integrating modes, models and momentum and a new epistemology being introduced 
into management studies. 
 
Philosophically this thesis commenced with a utopian philosophical position 
articulated by British philosopher William Whewell as ‘consilience of inductions’ - a 
process by which an induction, obtained from one class of facts, coincides with an 
induction obtained from a different class. Thus, consilience is a test of the truth of the 
theory in which it occurs 1840:74). More than a century and a half later the call for 
empirical evidence on how this gets accomplished from a socio-political standpoint 
once again sounded with US Medal of Science and two time Pulitzer Prize winner O.E. 
Wilson’s bestseller “Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge.” The book resurrected the 
revolutionary idea and developed it further from a biology heavy focus on the 
integration of fields.  
 
However what critics like biologist peer H. Allen Orr (Boston Review, 1998) perceived 
as the central limitation, to an otherwise well-articulated philosophy, was the need 
for a more thoughtful and explicit account of the collaboration methods leading to the 
emergent phenomena of innovation as a desirable outcome for consilience. Wilson’s 
work on the social science part of his theory was primarily theoretical as he discussed 
at great lengths complex problems like the ‘environmental crisis’ that needed to be 
addressed collaboratively. Wilson’s theoretical premise was: “If economists and 
ecologists should put their heads together to incorporate measures of environmental 
health into traditional economic indices they should be able to come up with 
solutions that do not involve the collapse of the social science.” 
 
This thesis’ started out as a response to scientific consilience community’s request for 
empirical data to shed light on the understanding the emergence of innovation in 
complex inter-organizational collaborations that need multiple stakeholders at the 
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table to solve a problem. Historically the arena of collaboration and collective 
decision-making (or problem solving) under uncertainty had been overrun by 
research on power dynamics and the philosophical underpinnings of Pierre Bourdieu 
and Stewart Clegg. These behaviourists decision-making theorists and their theory 
contributors have for decades been building up a body of knowledge on how in a 
board room full of strategic decision-makers it is the social hierarchy, not the 
objective and detached weighing of facts, that will dictate the strategic direction and 
degree of creativity in the innovation in their actions. Lower power ‘decision-makers’ 
were bound to fall in line once the more powerful strategic decision-makers made 
and marketed their decision’s point of view.  
 
Not disputing traditional notions of power in collaborative decision-making this 
thesis sought out a deviance sample to showcase the conditions that contribute to 
consilience decision-making and the emergence of higher-risk innovation. The five 
real-time international ethnographies over several years revealed that consilience 
strategic decision-making do exist and are not only rationalized retrospectively 
(Collaboration 5 - Healthcare). However, in order to achieve it, the behavioural and 
classic rational strategic decision-making under uncertainty is necessary and 
important in order to get to the more challenging consilience types of decision-
making. The empirical data also revealed that an additional higher-risk innovation 
model group exist as was observed and classified as improvisational strategy 
decision-making under uncertainty (Collaborations 3 and 4 – Economic 
Development and the Software Start-up). Neither, however, remained in that single 
mode for an extended period of time, but it becomes apparent how that mode of 
short-term decision-making also builds longer-term value. As expected Classic 
Rational (C1) and Behavioural (C2) Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
also existed and provided helpful comparative baseline points for assembling and 
illuminating complexities and interdependencies associated with each of the four 
types of Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty modes. 
 
This study concludes ultimately that opportunity exists to expand the monoculture 
view of strategy as a systematic mechanism for conforming decision-making under 
uncertainty. As was evident from ethnographic embedment with strategic experts 
across five different industries, the emergence and development of a single idea with 
potentially high velocity impact depended not only on systematic and conforming 
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modes, but also their respective polar opposite counter parts: responsive and 
differentiating modes. 
 
The M3 theory and model of this thesis introduces a descriptive framework for 
strategic decision-making in uncertain and changing environments that transcends 
the dichotomous classic rationality and bounded rationality. It weighs in specifically 
on the purposeful pursuit of higher levels of uncertainty where strategy can benefit 
with a conscious and deliberate systematic approach. This would be hyper rationality 
decision-making under uncertainty. However, it also weighs in on strategies that 
benefit from higher levels of uncertainty with impulsive and responsive approaches. 
These would be improvisation. 
 
As presented in figure 13.1, the resulting M3 theory is unique in its ability to present 
complex strategies as essentialist (modes), relative (models), and dynamic 
(momentum) to plot the trajectory of emergence, change, transformation and 
adaptation over time. The reason the theory and model can flex to accommodate a 
variety of data types is partially due to the social realism epistemology framework 
foundation wherein it has been created. 
 
 
 
This thesis constructed and assessed the validity of the M3 Theory is informed by 
three distinct but interrelated and simultaneous empirical streams of data: 
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i field data from five ethnographic case studies, with research participant 
feedback loops; 
ii the mapping of over 200 published management theories to review the 
evolution of strategic decision-making theory over the past one hundred years; 
and 
iii prototyping the principles of the M3 theory during the construction of this 
doctoral thesis. 
 
 
Practical Implications 
 
The practical implications of the thesis can be used to inform strategic decision-
making under uncertainty in a variety of domains. The strategic decision-maker 
engaged in collaborative idea generation and development can increase the 
productivity and efficiency by identifying their personal and organizational strategic 
modes, models and momentum on the type of change they are fundamentally 
pursuing. By aligning the idealized socio-cognitive strategic position with the 
communication mediums used (modes), the type of workshops selected (models), 
and the type of movement that the collaboration is comfortable with (momentum). 
Additionally, the theory can help inform on the type of lower level participants 
involved, and the choice in intermediary facilitators of the process, users can increase 
the purposeful generation and development of ideas for the right type of change at 
the right time.  
 
Similarly, this theory can be used by a variety of the strategic decision-makers: with 
researchers; those doing grant applications, ethics approval paperwork, or engaging 
with data and writing papers or books can use the vocabulary and framework to steer 
into unknown and unknowable territory with less penalty and more reward. Each 
decision-maker also stands to benefit from the framework as it applies to scoping and 
tracing unknown unknowns. To them the model provides a canvas to help anticipate 
particularities of small sample sizes, over reliance on non-representative populations, 
and perceptions of social conformity that may not align with behaviour.  
 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
Fundamentally the model offers an integrative framework from within which 
strategic decision-making under uncertainty can be conceived with higher levels of 
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clarity and an expanded vocabulary for addressing components associated with 
higher levels of uncertainty. Specifically, the model subsumes the field of innovation, 
change management and decision-making and maps well developed but disparate 
concepts in meaningful relation to one another. 
 
Adopting and extending the epistemology of Social Realism from Sociology, the M3 
Theory also makes new theoretical contributions as it introduces management 
literature to a new methodology for framing knowledge that is simultaneously 
essentialist and relativist. In the Model three layers of information can 
simultaneously be represented in the plotting of a statistical stance. The layers are: 
• essentialist modes – the mapping of a static categorical position within the 
wider uncertain environment; 
• relative models – the mapping of a particular position relative to another 
strategic stance; or 
• dynamic momentum – the mapping of the movement of a strategic stance 
over a period of time. 
 
Circling back to Chapter 1 and the broader construct of Agnoiology and strategically 
dealing with the unknown (and possibly knowable unknown), Michael Smithson 
(2016) likens ignorance to an island. As our island of knowledge grows larger and 
larger, so too the shoreline expands. In his analogy, the shoreline represents the 
intersection of knowledge meeting ignorance. As we incrementally gain ground on 
knowledge we also improve our ability to ask the appropriate questions that enable us 
to learn more thus perpetuate the cycle of learning.  
Though at the face value it may seem like combing the metaphoric shoreline would be 
a highly attractive proposition for curious strategic decision-makers, it is also worth 
noting that with the exhilaration of novelty seeking also comes the balance of failure, 
frustration and fatigue. In connecting with Thomas S. Kuhn’s (1962) The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, the strategic decision-maker’s challenge is to intellectually (+S) 
and affectively (+R) navigate this territory between the known (+C) and unknown 
(+D), directly confronting preconceptions and inconsistencies in data. Though, the 
centre of the island may present itself as safer and more certain, it cannot be assumed 
that there will always be enough space and resources to remain in the safe comfort 
zone of known knowledge with small incremental advances. It may also be 
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irresponsible to squander high capacity strategic talent by only expecting or 
demanding small incremental advances to benefit humanity long-term or when some 
developments demand a revolutionary paradigm shift. Considering the quadratic 
advances in advanced technology, social network dynamics over the last 15 – 25 years, 
and even changing global governance, the time may have come to re-evaluate how 
scholarly, educational and management values and incentives are prioritising 
advancing knowledge and skill sets in dealing with unknowales and unknowns. 
Ultimately the M3 Theory of Strategic Decision-Making under Uncertainty offers a 
new set of tools for innovators to manage uncertainty at the shoreline to keep scaling 
knowledge and capacity building under uncertainty. This thesis offers decision-
makers and collaborators resources for comparing, developing and evolving strategic 
stances in interesting, dangerous, exciting and uncertain environments. By balancing 
and integrating the momentum generated by the opposing drives of systematic (+S), 
responsive (+R) strategies, as well as conforming (+C) and divergent (+D) strategies, 
the combination of drives can be deployed to keep evolving humanity’s complex 
relationship with the ever-changing constant paradox of unknownables and 
unknowns.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Criteria for Evaluating Confessional Ethnography 
 
Ethnographic methodology is not typically evaluated in terms of philosophical 
standpoint (such as positivism and emotionalism). Ethnographic studies do however 
need to be evaluated in some manner. No consensus has been developed on 
evaluation standards, but Richardson (2000: 254) provides five criteria that 
ethnographers might find helpful. Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein's (1997) 
monograph, The New Language of Qualitative Method, discusses forms of 
ethnography in terms of their "methods talk." 
• Substantive contribution: "Does the piece contribute to our understanding of 
social-life?" 
• Aesthetic merit: "Does this piece succeed aesthetically?" 
• Reflexivity: "How did the author come to write this text…Is there adequate self-
awareness and self-exposure for the reader to make judgments about the point 
of view?” 
• Impact: "Does this affect me? Emotionally? Intellectually?" Does it move me? 
• Expresses a reality: "Does it seem 'true'—a credible account of a cultural, social, 
individual, or communal sense of the 'real'?" 
  
For the purposes of specifically the social realism confessional ethnography, the data 
presentation and analysis had been further refined to focus on reliability, validity, 
juxtabosition, moderation, interlacing, minimalism and dialogic qualities in an 
attempt to produce the highest quality scientifically rigorous work. 
  
 
Reliability 
 
In the context of the confessional ethnography taking a developmental snapshots 
approach, reliability is consistent with Hammersley (1992:67) and Kirk & Miller 
(1986:19) definition for being to the degree of consistency with which instances are 
assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on 
different occasions. The critical categories in this thesis would thus be: 1) the 
developmental snapshots, and 2) the coding of the strategic drives. 
 
In pursuit of this categorical consistency of the same observer in different occasions 
  261  
the following checks and balances were introduced: five different case studies of 
emergent new initiatives are presented so that the categories can be understood 
relative to each other. Additionally, 100 strategy models were analysed for the 
evidence of the same drivers, an additional 100 management theories were also 
coded, and lastly this thesis's model development was put through the same 
reliability wringer as a prototype. The first four collaborations informed the model 
building, the fifth collaboration was a quality control check afterwards, all the 
strategy and seminal management models refined the definitions and complexities of 
the drives and the prototype sought to challenge and illuminate the optimization of 
all that was learned from practice and theory. 
  
In pursuit of categorical consistency across different observers, At the point that this 
thesis was written [three] individuals had been briefed on the coding criteria for 
snapshots and drives and reliably are able to reach consensus on both the categorical 
snapshots and drives of the collaboration, as well as coding of drives that they have 
no socio-political connection to. 
 
  
Validity 
 
In the context of confessional ethnography and taking developmental snapshots on 
the strategic decision point that serve as primary information points in the 
emergence and development of ideas Validity relates Hammersly's (1992:67) and 
Kirk & Miller's (1986:19) definition to the representativeness of the data and the 
truthfulness of an ethnographer's interpretation. It expresses the extent to which an 
account accurately represents a social phenomenon or event. 
  
In pursuit of the representative of the data the representative of the data is once again 
reiterated when the strategic drives observed in the four collaborations was 
consistently spotted in the fifth. It was also spotted hundreds of time in the 
development of strategic and management models and was indeed applicable to the 
development of this thesis.  
  
In pursuit of the truthfulness of the ethnographer's interpretation observations were 
video and audio recorded as well as archived when possible. Additionally, formal and 
informal documentation such as reports, PowerPoint, collaboration spaces, emails, 
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texts, paper napkins, were archived. And lastly handwritten notes during an 
observation, field notes during a reflection period and headnotes after time has 
passed were all collected and referenced back to. Additionally, two very distinct tracks 
were taken on the field notes. The first, affective field notes were collected almost 
daily and chronicled passionate unfiltered responses. They were not written in 
English to allow for a translation barrier and the freedom to have unfiltered thoughts 
but often also descended into rational to do lists. The second set of field notes were a 
systematic and rational dialogue with the strategists and academics whose work 
connected. It also involved dialogue with strategists and academics whose work did 
not connect there was an incentive to work harder to see if it could be integrated. This 
dialogue was in English. Many of these conversations did not talk back unless there 
was a live email, phone, Skype or in-person outlet for it too. 
  
As observed by Silverman (1993:156) respondent validation or member checking 
after the fieldwork has been concluded constitutes another strategy for enhancing 
validity. Pre-final renderings of perceptions of truth was also shared with participants 
to give them a chance to inform on their perceptions of truth from their vantage point 
and to protect their socio-political stance if this thesis could fulfil its truth without 
doing harm. With regards to the concern of Czarniawska-Joerges in questioning the 
usefulness of participants' feedback as a measure of validity, pointing out that people 
in the field might have political reasons for both supporting and denying claims made 
by the researcher (similarly Hammersley 1992; Miles 1979), this specific these may 
take a less traditional position. Since snapshots of ideas' evolution are driven by 
socio-political interests what the participants wish to convey is highly relevant to the 
reader of the ethnography is highly relevant. If there is a difference of opinion 
between perceived (or conveyed) truths this ethnography needs to create the space 
for it.  
 
  
Juxtapositions 
 
Under the term 'criticality' Golden-Biddle & Locke (2007), as well as Marcus & 
Fischer (1986) has some important observations. Golden-Biddle and Locke examined, 
and found that 'criticality' was achieved by challenging readers to pause and think 
about specific situation, by provoking them to answer questions, and by guiding 
readers through novel ways of thinking. Marcus & Fischer found that 'cultural 
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critique' is achieved when the foreign culture is held up as a mirror to the audience's 
culture so that readers learn something about themselves as they juxtapose cultures, 
assumptions and practices. Absolutely valid anchor points for this ethnography, the 
concern however is with the term 'criticality'.  
 
In this ethnography perceiving the tension between the different opposing drives that 
moves ideas forward is important. However, giving equal weight to the validity of 
each is also important. Through the eyes of a foreign non-conformist who recognizes 
but rejects easy paths, the politically astute reader may experience tension that 
challenges their preferred strategic stance on matters. Through the affective 
vulnerable writing the rationalist expert may experience tension that challenges their 
preferred strategic stance. Likewise, if the opposing drives of conforming to generally 
accepted norms and systematic objective analysis is also present, in once single 
package, the supporting a reader in experiencing the full 360 of drives could be 
achieved. This model is built on the premise that all of the drives are important for 
transformation of an idea, so the ethnography needs to also prototype that tension. 
 
  
Moderation 
 
In this objective of illuminating clear juxtapositions it is however important to ward 
against being excessive or too hyper in relation to where the socially accepted norm 
line stand at the time of publication in the culture of academia. Behar (1996:14) 
warns about confessional texts becoming too autobiographical: "Self-serving and 
superficial, full of unnecessary guilt and excessive bravado." Van Maanen (1998:93) 
refers to such excesses as "vanity ethnography" where confessional ethnographic 
texts are reduced to private muses and demons of a field worker. 
  
To ward against this the limitation of eight snapshots have been placed on the 
evolution of each collaboration. This focuses the reader's attention to flashes of the 
most critical events in context of the energy that was around it at the time. The energy 
of the field worker is important because it is the constant threat that ties all the 
collaborations together but it is worthless if it cannot be mirrored without funhouse 
distortions the mirror image and energy balance of the reader. Three actions to help 
with striking the a better moderation balance include: i) drawing strongly from 
sources other than the field worker's field notes and head notes in the pre-final draft, 
ii) creating the space to receive valuable additions that thoughtfully serve the central 
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premise of the research intent in the  feedback on the pre-final draft, iii) creating a 
space to allow outsiders not familiar with the narratives to inform where continuity 
gaps or exposition can be made more clear and accessible. 
  
 
Interlacing 
 
Wrapping the actual ethnographic content around the consistent thread of the 
confessional field worker material with the actual ethnographic content (e.g. Behar 
1996), as oppose to doing a traditional ethnographic account and then an 
autobiographical content at the end (e.g. Van Maanen, 1998, Kunda 1992; Rabinow 
1977; Whyte 1996) also does two things. First it helps with the moderation discussed 
earlier. Behar (1996:18) observes that Interlacing the self-reflexive confessional with 
the actual ethnographic material also minimizes the risk of the autobiographical 
content overpowering the actual ethnographic content, or vice versa. Secondly, it also 
helps with the juxtaposition explained earlier because a constant comparison can be 
perceived of phenomena in relation to each other. Whythe (1996) explains that even 
though the confessional tale of the field worker in the appendix is effective as a tool 
for teaching other ethnographers about the research process, its ability to achieve 
[juxtaposition] (or cultural critique) is uncertain given that interest in these tales is 
predicated on the actual ethnography's prior success. In the interlacing the field 
worker prior successes and failures subservient to the context of the snapshot.  
 
  
Minimalism 
 
Just like the eight snapshots of the transformations that ideas underwent over the 
course of a year's collaboration are minimalist in comparison to a continuous video 
stream over multiple years, so too the information of the field worker self would serve 
the snapshot best if it does not clutter decision-making under uncertainty with 
horded items. Behar (1996:13) explains this point of view as: "To assert that one is a 
"white middle-class woman" or a "black gay man"...is only interesting if one is able to 
draw deeper connections between one's personal experience and the subject under 
study. That does not require a full-length autobiography, but it does require a keen 
understanding of what aspects of the self are the most important filters through 
which one perceives the world and, more particularly, the topic being studied.  
Again, reaching the right minimalistic balance requires in the final draft critically 
looking at the findings and discussion items that were used, or importantly not used, 
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and removing that which is not supporting the reader in achieving a full view of the 
snapshot. And just like the first five objectives before, "checking if things are as 
autobiographically lean as it can be without hurting the snapshot will require 
listening carefully to outsider opinions. 
  
 
Dialogic 
 
A dialogic space is necessary to allow field worker's perspective or memory of details 
to be exceeded by those of research participants with different perspective or clearer 
memory. If evidence of this is not found the dialogue level is not at a high enough 
quality.  Interpretations and findings may be expounded on by the study’s 
participants while conclusions are still in the process of formulation. 
  
To evaluate this the pre-final review draft need to allow for space and template so 
that feedback can be reported and built upon. This should also serve as a check for 
the theory. Additionally, readers reviewing only the final draft should see clear 
evidence of differences between the field worker and other participant's perceptions 
or attitudes. Best effort should also be put forth to ensure participants' rationality if 
different from the field worker is as clear and articulate as possible.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
 
EMAIL FOR CLOSING THE FEEDBACK LOOP 
 
Dear [name of research participant in a specific collaboration],  
  
Hope you are well and you are enjoying the last stretch of summer. 
 
Thank you again for allowing me to follow the development of the [name of collaboration as 
the participant refer to it] a year or two ago as one of five ethnographies for research in 
emergence and strategic decision-making under uncertainty. Attached are 7 or so snapshots 
that stood out as the most important or revealing decision points from my vantage point over 
the period of time that I was involved.  Specifically of interest is your take on the snapshots 
that YOU were involved in (as indicated by your name in red but you are also welcome to 
read wider). Your response to three questions are of particular interest: 
1. Snapshot picks: From your point of view was these also the top defining 
moments as the project moved forward? What would you say is the final snapshot 
today on the project now that a year (or more) has passed? 
2. Accuracy of content: is there any factual details or perceptions with which you 
disagree that could be corrected? Same applies if there was something I missed that 
is worth including in your opinion. 
3. Strategic stances: On the last page is a model with four quadrants that resulted 
from your and the four other case studies' development. If you had to pick from the 
four options on the last page, what strategic stance you used for your strategic 
decision-making under uncertainty on this project, which would you most closely 
identify with? Is this similar to what you have picked on other similar projects? Was 
the collaborators with whom you worked in the same quadrant? Please explain. 
Hope it would be convenient for you to respond in writing over the next few days? If you 
prefer to visit in Skype that is absolutely an option too. My skype ID is still: 
emmalinde.roelofse. Sincerely looking forward to your response. 
 
Only the best, 
 
Lindi 
 
 
EMAIL ATTACHEMNT 1 (the case write-up with content almost identical to one 
listed in this thesis) 
EMAIL ATTACHEMNT 2 (follows) 
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What quadrant do you identify with most on this Project? 
 
 
 
Q1. Classic Rational Decision-Making under Uncertainty Models (+S, +C) – are concerned 
with making logically sound decisions by conforming to multi-step processes following a 
rational, orderly and linear path from problem identification through solution. Like its two 
anchoring strategic drives would suggest, these models are concerned with systematic 
strategies (+S)8 that conform to expectation of power centres (+C)9. Pioneering rational 
decision-making under uncertainty emerged with theorists like Blaise Pascal (1670) and his 
Famous Wager, and Daniel Bernoulli (1738) and his St. Petersburg Paradox. This is the type 
of decision-making that is most commonly taught in formal education. 
 
Q2. Behavioural Decision-Making under Uncertainty Models (+R, +C) – recognize human 
decision-making’s limitations with regards to available information, time, processing ability, 
and place a premium on the schemas and mental short cuts to prevent information overload. 
This includes the use of social cues and sensitivity to loyalty, trust and the pursuit of 
outcomes that satisfactorily are sufficient to meet a minimum qualification threshold. Like 
their two anchoring strategic drives would suggest, these models are concerned with 
responsive strategies (+R)10 that conforms to expectation of power centres (+C). An astute 
awareness of organizational politics is often required of persons not holding comprehensive 
formal power and that same astute awareness also applies to people in formal power as they 
use it to get collaborators to conform to their strategic stance. Pioneering behavioural 
decision-making theorists include Nobel laureate Herbert A. Simon (1957) who introduced 
the models’ central tenants of bounded-rationality and satisficing, and Charles Edward 
Lindblom (1959) who introduced gradualism. Today many economists also refer to 
Behavioural decision-making as the next frontier and holy grail. This is the type of intuitive 
‘feel of the game’ decision-making that comes with experience. 
 
Q3. Improvisational Decision-Making under Uncertainty Models (+R, +D) – is “bringing to 
the surface, testing, and restructuring one’s intuitive understanding of phenomena on the 
spot, at a time when action can still make a difference” (Weick, 1996: 147). In spite of findings 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), that humans are generally risk averse, purposeful decision-
                                                 
8 systematic strategies (+S) - the drive towards increasingly sophisticated rational cognitive processes. 
These processes plan, purposefully compartmentalize, and regulate emotions 
9 conforming strategies (+C) - the drive towards converging power by adapting or conveying a socially 
perceived superior norm. These processes include the exploitation of existing power 
10 responsive strategies (+R) - the drive toward increasingly sensitized intuitive cognitive processes. 
These processes are reflective, associative, action-orientated and emotionally expressive 
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making strategies do exist where a strategic stance is taken intentionally in pursuit of higher 
levels of uncertainty. Higher levels of innovation are often at the core of these strategic 
stances as strategic decision makers respond in real-time to changes and information that 
might not be fully anticipated.  As the two anchoring strategic drives suggest, when giving in 
to these differentiating (+D)11 impulses is reactive, and the response not rationally calculated 
(+R), it would be synonymous with what is commonly referred to in music or theatre as 
improvisation. Pioneering management scholars have only been exploring this strategic 
stance in the context of management for the past decade or two because such a premium is 
traditionally put on control and order in management. Introducing the terminology into 
management literature are scholars like Moorman and Miner (1998) and Cunha, Cunha and 
Kamoche (1999). Improvisation is also generally accepted to include bricolage (Lévi-Strauss, 
1967; Baker et al., 2003; Garud & Karnøe, 2003), adaptation (Campbell, 1969; Stein, 1989) 
and serendipity (Merton, 2002) in dealing with change and ambiguity. 
 
Q4. Consilience Decision-Making under Uncertainty Models (+S, +D) –are decision-making 
under uncertainty that unifies knowledge and draws strength from the integration of 
objective knowledge from various sources. It is also the intentional and simultaneous process 
of creating and destroying something else of value by the same group of decision-makers. 
Similar to Improvisation models, these strategic decision-maker take big risks that could 
have serious personal and professional consequences if the more radically innovative 
approach frails, yet if it succeeds three is offer a much longer-term benefit for a greater 
collective. In context of the four drives it is thus the rational and calculated (+S) decision 
even when the (short-term) odds are against the strategic decision-maker (+D). Though this 
more extreme uncertainty decision model option is not as commonly modelled by decision-
making theorists as in Hollywood, biographies, and media this is the dark horse that legends 
are made of. There has however been a considerable uptake in recent years of strategy 
theorists contributing models to the development of strategic stances which are the 
purposefully pursuing solutions in uncertain and changing environments. In Management 
Studies, much of the work of Clay Christensen's (1997) Disruptive innovation12 and Otto 
Scharmer's (1999) Theory U and 2009 Nobel laureate Elanor Ostrom’s Common Pool 
Resource Management makes contributions to this quadrant. High-level post-
conventionalism ethical decision-making (Kohlberg, 1957) would be another example. 
However, the word and philosophy originates as discussed in Chapter 1 outside of 
management studies while advocating for an integration of knowledge as is commonly done 
by innovative strategic decision-makers but discussed using different vocabulary. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11  differentiating strategies (+D) - the drive towards diverging power by deviating from the norm and 
empowerment for exploration. These processes include novelty-seeking, sabotage, risk-taking, experimentation, 
play, flexibility, discovery, and higher level innovation. 
12 Note that there are two different types of disruptive innovation. The first type is where the decision-maker is 
simultaneously the creator and destroyer of some aspect of value if it a part of the Consilience model (+S, +D). 
The second type where the decision-maker is creating value for themselves but destroying value for another 
(competitive) party. In the latter case the disruptive innovation would be classified as a part of the improvisation 
model (+R, +D). 
  269  
 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
June 30 to July 1, 2014 
 
Information, Consent and Debriefing Sheet 
 
The objective of this research project in collaboration with Gateshead Council is to gather 
insight from experts connected to economic development on collaboration processes. 
 
The aims of this research undertaking are twofold: 
1. To make a theoretical contribution to strategy, trust, and inter-organizational 
collaboration in early stages of collaborative relationship formation; and 
2. Discover and disseminate knowledge and insights for improving the process of inter-
organizational collaboration for economic vitality and resiliency [Collaboration 3], 
Intra-organizational development of product extensions. 
 
Debriefing on information gathered will be available via the host organization via a formal 
report, but you can also contact the researcher directly to obtain conclusions about the study 
by emailing Emmalinde Roelofse at e.roelofse@ncl.ac.uk  
 
Some participants may also be invited to partake in an interview following the event; this is 
entirely voluntary. 
 
Anonymity of the content you share will be assured unless you explicitly give permission to 
be identified. The event’s proceedings will be recorded for research as well as economic 
development related purposes. As is customary at public events, please let me know if you 
wish to opt out of the research at e.roelofse@ncl.ac.uk. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Emmalinde Roelofse 
Doctoral Researcher 
Strategy and Innovation 
Newcastle University Business School 
e.roelofse@ncl.ac.uk 
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Chronologic List of 100 Seminal Strategy Theories Coded 
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